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ABSTRACT
This thesis is about the viability of  meta-normative expressivism. On what I
take to be the dominant conception of  the view, it subscribes to two theses. First, that
the meaning of  sentences is to be explained in terms of  the mental states these
sentences conventionally express. Second, that there is a fundamental difference in
the roles of  the states expressed by normative sentences and the states expressed by
descriptive sentences: descriptive sentences, according to expressivists, express mental
states which are representational and non-motivational, while normative sentences
express non-representational and motivational states.
Expressivism has attracted many naturalistically inclined philosophers for its
ability to explain many of  the distinctive features of  normative discourse and
thought, without adding entities to our ontology that are metaphysically and
epistemologically problematic. In this way, expressivism promises to preserve the
legitimacy of  our ordinary normative practice within a naturalistic world-view,
without giving up on any of  its distinctive features. Despite it’s benefts, expressivism
also faces signifcant problems. While one of  these problems, the Frege-Geach
Problem, has attracted a lot of  attention, there are several other problems that have
not been suffciently addressed by expressivists. But, given that the reasonable
assumption that the plausibility of  philosophical theories needs to be assessed
holistically, it seems that one should pay attention to these problems to be able to
assess expressivism’s overall plausibility. In this thesis I explain how expressivists can
solve two of  these problems.
The frst problem the dissertation is concerned with is the normative attitude
problem. This is a dilemma based on the challenge that expressivists need to give an
account of  the nature of  the attitude that normative thinking consists in. The
dilemma is then that expressivists could either do this by holding that normative
thinking consists in sui generis attitudes, which is uninformative and potentially in
confict with naturalism, or by holding that normative thinking reduces to attitudes
fully describable in non-normative terms, which is in confict with our intuitions
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about normative thinking. I argue that this dilemma is structurally identical to a
dilemma which meta-normative representationalism faces (expressivism’s dialectical
rival) and that expressivists can use the same theoretical resources to address the
normative attitude problem meta-normative representationalists have used to address
their version of  the dilemma. I also argue that these resources will not only help more
traditional versions of  expressivism, according to which normative thinking reduces
to familiar kinds of  attitudes fully describable in non-normative terms, but opens up
the possibility of  an expressivist view according to which normative thinking consists
in sui generis attitudes.
The second problem I consider is a challenge to a particular expressivist
project: quasi-realism. Part of  this project is to show that expressivism is compatible
with a web of  closely connected assumptions, namely, that normative thought and
discourse are truth-apt and normative judgements are beliefs. While quasi-realists
have made some progress in this direction, there is one relevant phenomenon that has
so far been neglected, namely, those uses of  that-clauses that are associated with
propositional content. This is a problematic neglect, because that-clauses fgure
prominently in platitudes characterizing our ordinary notions of  “truth-aptitude” and
“belief ”, and so expressivists need to provide a plausible account of  these uses of
that-clauses which fts with their allowing that normative thought and discourse are
truth-apt and normative judgements are beliefs. I address this challenge as follows: I
frst remove any worries that one might have that a plausible account of  that-clauses
that helps the quasi-realist could be given, by introducing the distinction between
semantics and meta-semantics and locating expressivism at the level of  meta-
semantics. I then develop a defationist view of  that-clauses which suits the quasi-
realist’s purposes. I start by giving such a view for the use of  that-clauses in meaning-
attributions by expanding on the work of  Wilfried Sellars. I then go on to explain
how the account can be generalized to the use of  that-clauses in belief-attributions
and propositional attitude ascriptions more generally, in a way that allows
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Ever since it was frst raised by Peter Geach in 1960,1 the Frege-Geach Problem
has been a constant companion for those with sympathies for—or even just an
interest in—expressivism. In fact, there is no problem for expressivism which has
received more attention than it. While there is no doubt that the Frege-Geach
Problem is very important, this focus seems a little surprising on closer inspection:
expressivism is a view with many attractive features and which opens up novel
avenues for thinking about concepts many philosophers fnd puzzling. When we are
dealing with a view like this, should we not look at the whole package rather than
only particular aspects of  it, especially when already so much ink has been spilled over
that particular aspect? Not only do I believe that we should, I think that it is
philosophically fruitful to do so. So, this dissertation is set out to do a little to change
this narrow focus of  the debate: to move beyond the Frege-Geach Problem and to
pay attention to issues surrounding expressivism that, so far, have been neglected both
by those defending expressivism and by those who are opposed to it.
The structure of  the dissertation is as follows. The frst chapter serves as an
introductory chapter. It explains in greater details how I understand expressivism and
why it is attractive, elaborates on why we should go beyond the Frege-Geach
Problem, and provides more detail regarding the neglected problems this dissertation
will be concerned with. Of  course, there is only so much space and time when it
comes to a PhD dissertation, and so I have to restrict my discussion to the following
two problems. First, the problem of  specifying the nature of  the attitude in which,
according to expressivists, normative judgements consist. This is the problem that the
second chapter is concerned with. Second, the problem of  giving an expressivist
friendly account of  those uses of  that-clauses that are associated with propositional




CHAPTER I: EXPRESSIVISM. WHAT, WHY, AND WHERE TO GO FROM
HERE?
0. INTRODUCTION
This dissertation is concerned with going beyond the Frege-Geach Problem and
defending expressivism against two important, but neglected challenges. Before I turn
to these challenges, however, I should explain what expressivism is, why it has appeal,
and why it is important to pay more attention to challenges to expressivism other
than the Frege-Geach Problem. Finally, I should say a little bit more about the
challenges I will be concerned with. I do all of  this in this chapter. The chapter
proceeds as follows. In the frst section, I explain what I take expressivism to be. In
the second section, I present the main motivations for the view. In the third section, I
then talk about the Frege-Geach Problem, why we should go beyond it, and provide a
short introduction of  the challenges that will concern us for the rest of  the
dissertation.
1. WHAT IS EXPRESSIVISM?
By “expressivism” I mean a family of  theories that constitute the most
sophisticated development in the tradition that gained prominence with emotivism
and prescriptivism.1 Some of  the most well-known defendants of  expressivism as I
1 Emotivism is the view according to which moral sentences, unlike descriptive sentences, do not
have literal meaning and are not truth-apt, but rather function like interjections such as “Boo!” or
“Yuk!”. It was prominently defended by Alfred Ayer (Ayer 1936), Rudolf  Carnap (Carnap 1932),
Charles Ogden and Ivor Richards (Ogden and Richards 1923), Bertrand Russell (Russell 1935),
and Charles Stevenson (Stevenson 1937 and Stevenson 1944). Arguably, there is an interpretation
of  David Hume on which such a view can be attributed to him, as he sometimes says that moral
judgements consist in feelings (see e.g. Hume 1739). Of  course, whether this is so is a question for
Hume scholars that I will not engage in here. Prescriptivism is the view that moral language is a
species of  prescriptive language, where the paradigm examples of  prescriptive language are
imperatives. It was prominently developed and defended by Richard Hare (Hare 1952, Hare 1965
and Hare 1982). Arguably, there is an interpretation of  Immanuel Kant on which he held a version
of  this view, as he held that moral judgements are “categorical imperatives” (see e.g. Kant 1785).
Of  course, whether this is so is a question for Kant scholars I will not engage in here. Both
emotivism and prescriptivism share the thesis that the meaning of  moral sentences needs to be
explained in very different terms than the meaning of  descriptive sentences. The tradition these
views made prominent is often called “non-cognitivism”, but I will not use that label as it has
unfortunate implications, such as that “beliefs” have to be states of  a certain kind, and that
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understand it here are Simon Blackburn, Allan Gibbard, Terry Horgan and Mark
Timmons, Michael Ridge, and (arguably) Mark Schroeder.2 Until quite recently,
expressivism was seen primarily as a view about moral language and thought. But, as
it became clearer that the motivations for expressivism derive from features that
moral language and thought have in virtue of  being normative in a particular sense,
expressivism is now mostly understood as a view about all discourses and domains of
thoughts that are normative in this sense.3 In this dissertation I will be concerned
with expressivism as a general view of  this kind, namely, as a view about normative
language and thought, which is why I will call expressivism and its dialectical rivals
“meta-normative” theories (rather than using the more traditional label “meta-
ethical”). However, for reasons of  scope I will impose two restrictions on the kind of
expressivism I will be concerned with. First, I will be concerned with expressivism
only as a view about practical normative thought and discourse and bracket
expressivism about other forms of  normative thought and discourse to the extent this
is possible. Second, I will be concerned with expressivism as a view primarily about
normative judgements an d declarative normative sentences. Before I turn to my
presentation of  the commitments that I take to be characteristic of  expressivism, let
me explain what these restrictions mean. I will begin with explaining what I take to
be the relevant sense of  “normative” that expressivism is concerned with.
It is surprisingly hard to give a genuinely theory-neutral characterization of
what makes a domain of  thought and discourse “normative” in the sense meta-
normative theories like expressivism and its dialectical rivals are concerned with. One
expressivists are, thereby, committed to denying that normative judgements are beliefs. As I will
explain later (in the third chapter), this is an assumption we should not accept, at least without
further argument. A better label, I think, would be “non-representationalism”. A comprehensive
overview over this tradition is given by Mark Schroeder (Schroeder 2010a).
2 The views of  these authors differ in important respects, but unless otherwise stated, these
differences do not matter for the purposes of  this dissertation. For Blackburn’s form of
expressivism, see e.g. Blackburn 1984a and Blackburn 1998a. For Gibbard’s form of  expressivism,
see e.g. Gibbard 1992 and Gibbard 2003. For Horgan’s and Timmons’ form of  expressivism, see
e.g. Horgan and Timmons 2006. For Ridge’s form of  expressivism, see e.g. Ridge 2006a, Ridge
2007a or Ridge Forthcoming. For Schroeder’s form of  expressivism, see e.g. Schroeder 2008a.
Schroeder only “arguably” counts as a defendant of  expressivism, because even though he
develops a very sophisticated form of  expressivism in his book “Being For”, he ultimately rejects it
in that same book.
3 For arguments that the relevant features are possessed by all normative thought and discourse, see
e.g. Bedke 2010, Cuneo 2007, Enoch 2011, Gibbard 1983, Gibbard 1992, Schulte 2010 and
Wedgwood 2008.
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way to get at the phenomenon in question is by ostensive means. For example,
whatever the phenomenon in question is, it is distinctively possessed at least by moral
thought and discourse, so we might be able to pin the phenomenon down by pointing
to moral thought and discourse. Furthermore, there are certain key terms such as
“ought”, “reason”, “good”, etc., which, in particular uses, are the mark of  the
normative. These terms provide further ostensive means to pick out the relevant
phenomenon. While both of  these are legitimate ways to provide us with some
starting point for understanding the normative, I think a more informative and
systematic characterization can be given via the functional role that normative
judgements play within our cognitive economy.4
A distinctive feature of  humans (or rational agents generally) is their ability to
step back from their immediate impulses towards and reactions to the world, to take
responsibility for certain of  these responses, and to deliberate about what responses to
take: what actions to intend, what beliefs to form, how to feel about a particular
situation, and so on. That is, a distinctive characteristic of  humans (or rational agents
generally) is that they have what Thomas Scanlon has called “judgement-sensitive
attitudes”, the prime examples of  such attitudes being intention and belief, and that
they can form judgements to which these attitudes are responsive, judgements which
directly settle what attitude to adopt.5 I take a domain of  thought to be normative, in
the sense that expressivism is concerned with, if  the primary functional role of
judgements in that domain is to play this particular and distinctive role in settling a
person on the thing to do, feel, think, believe, and so on.6 A domain of  discourse is
normative if  assertions in that domain express judgements that play a functional role
of  this kind. Of  course, this characterization needs to be qualifed a little bit, because
4 Here I follow Michael Ridge’s approach of  how to individuate the normative (see Ridge
Forthcoming, and also Köhler and Ridge 2013).
5 See Scanlon 1998: 18-22.
6 Among expressivists, a similar understanding for the practical domain can be found, at least
implicitly, in Gibbard (see e.g. Gibbard 1992 and especially Gibbard 2003), in Blackburn (see
Blackburn 1998a), and in Horgan and Timmons (see Horgan and Timmons 2006 and Horgan and
Timmons 2008). The role of  normative thoughts in deliberation—or generally for the reactive
attitudes—as their characterizing feature has also been highlighted by opponents of  expressivism,
such as David Enoch (Enoch 2011), John McDowell (McDowell 1988), Thomas Scanlon (Scanlon
1998), and Ralph Wedgwood (Wedgwood 2008). Of  course, the distinctive role that normative
judgements play in settling people on the responses to adopt is much richer than I can do it justice
here. For example, one way in which our normative judgements settle our responses, is by blocking
certain paths of  deliberation, effectively combatting temptation in this manner.
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not all judgements in normative domains of  thought will play this kind of  role. For
example, such domains will include disjunctive judgements, such as
(1) Giving to charity helps people or it is not morally required.
or conditional judgements, such as
(2) If  an action maximizes satisfaction of  one’s long-term interests,
then one has prudential reason to perform it.
Complex judgements like (1) and (2), however, do not have the relevant functional
profle. Rather, it is what we can call atomic normative judgements, those normative
judgements expressed by sentences that can no longer be broken down into logically
less complex sentences, that paradigmatically have the relevant profle. So, I take a
domain of  thought to be normative, if  the primary functional role of  atomic
judgements in that domain is to play this particular and distinctive role in settling a
person on the thing to do, feel, think, believe, and so on.7 A domain of  discourse is
normative if  assertions of  atomic sentences in that domain express judgements that
play a functional role of  this kind. With this characterization of  normative thought
and discourse on the table, let me now explain what the two restrictions I introduced
above mean.
First, I said that I will be concerned with expressivism only as a view about
7 Of  course, if  we individuate the normative by pointing to atomic judgements and sentences, one
diffcult question is how it is determined whether a specifc complex judgement or sentence is
normative. It cannot be the case that a complex judgement is normative if  and only if  an atomic
normative judgement fgures in it, because not every complex judgement that has an atomic
normative judgement as its part is plausibly regarded itself  as normative (think of “2+2=4 or
murder is morally wrong”, for example). So, how exactly do we distinguish normative from non-
normative complex judgements? My answer to this question is that I take it to be a part of  the
project that meta-normative theories engage in to fully answer this question and that diffculties
with systematically distinguishing normative from non-normative thinking are problematic for
expressivists and their dialectical rivals alike. I will give a rough sketch of  how I think this question
should be addressed in the context of  my response to the normative attitude problem in the second
chapter. Let me note, however, that for our purposes here, namely, the purpose of  identifying the
normative domain, we do not require a complete answer to this question. We already have some
intuitive grasp regarding what distinguishes normative from non-normative judgements in general
and normative from non-normative complex thoughts in particular. This is an understanding that
any theory of  normative judgements needs to respect and which we can use as starting points for
the purposes of  constructing a general philosophical theory of  normative judgement. However, I
take it that our intuitive grasp with regards to atomic normative judgements is much stronger, which
is why it is these judgements that are assigned a much more prominent role in identifying normative
domains in developing a theory of  normative judgement and are given a primary theoretical focus
in the debate. In fact, I take it to be very plausible that even according to our pre-theoretic
understanding of  the normative what is distinctive about the normative domain is located primarily
in atomic normative judgements, not in complex normative judgements.
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practical normative thought and discourse. Practical normative thought and discourse
are normative thought and discourse concerned with the thing to do or the thing to
intend. Paradigmatic examples of  such discourse are most parts of  moral thought and
discourse, as well as most parts of  prudential thought and discourse, but of  course
other kinds of  judgements might fall under this as well, such as generic thoughts
about what one has reason, pro tanto or all things considered, to do. Most importantly,
focusing on practical normative thought and discourse means that I will bracket
expressivism about epistemic normativity (although of  course other kinds will be
bracketed as well, e.g. aesthetic judgements insofar as they are plausibly construed as
normative judgements concerned with how to feel).8 While I do think that
expressivism about all normative thought and discourse is defensible, I will see
expressivism as only concerned with practical normative thought and discourse to
give the dissertation more focus. While I think such arguments can be made,
motivating expressivism about non-practical domains requires additional arguments
to the more well-known ones. Going into the details of  these arguments would,
however, unnecessarily distract from the dissertation’s core ideas.
Second, I said that I will be concerned with expressivism as a view primarily
about normative judgements and declarative normative sentences. Expressivism is an
explanatory theory about the nature of  normative language and thought. In general,
we can see an explanatory theory of  normative language as a theory that provides an
account of  the meaning of  normative terms, phrases, and sentences. And, in general,
we can understand an explanatory theory of  normative thought as giving an account
of  the nature of  the mental states that constitute normative thought. However, any
normative domain of  thought and discourse will include many different kinds of
mental states and events, as well as sentences the use of  which expresses them. For
example such a domain will not only include normative judgements and the
sentences that express them, but also, for example, normative questions and their
8 For expressivism about epistemic normativity, the normativity involved in knowledge-attributions or
claims about what one ought or has reason to believe, see e.g. Blackburn 1996, Chrisman 2007,
Field 2001a, Gibbard 2003, a n d Ridge 2007b. Some authors have argued that epistemic
expressivism faces the special worry of  being incoherent (see e.g. Cuneo 2007 and Lynch 2009).
For replies to these worries, see Carter and Chrisman 2012 and Kappel 2011. For expressivism
about aesthetic judgements, see Todd 2004.
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mental counterparts. And, a complete explanatory account of  normative language and
thought will give an account of  al l kinds of  normative sentences and al l kinds of
normative thoughts, that is e.g. declaratives, interrogatives, imperatives, etc. (and the
mental counterparts of  uses of  such sentences). While giving such a full account
should be the eventual aim for an expressivist, I will see expressivism and its
dialectical rivals, for the sake of  simplicity, as primarily concerned with normative
judgements a n d declarative normative sentences.9 Consequently, when I talk of
“normative sentences” and “normative thought” I will mean “declarative normative
sentences” and “normative judgements” unless otherwise stated.10 With these caveats
out of  the way, let me now turn to the commitments that characterize expressivism.
Expressivism, as I understand it, is characterized by the subscription to the
following two-part account.11 First, expressivism is characterized by the subscription
to a distinctive theory about the meaning of  (declarative) sentences.12 According to
9 As the linguistic equivalents of  judgements, declarative sentences are often also called judgements,
but I will restrict the use of  “judgement” to the relevant mental phenomena.
10 Of  course, restricting one’s focus primarily to giving an account of  normative judgements and
declarative normative sentences in giving an account of  normative language and thought is not
arbitrary. First, as the functional characterization of  the normative shows, these phenomena lie at
the heart of  normative language and thought. Second, there is, arguably, an explanatory
asymmetry between declarative sentences and other kinds of  sentences and judgements and other
kinds of  thoughts in general (here I follow roughly Robert Brandom’s reasoning for rejecting
Wittgenstein’s idea that language (and thought) does not have a “downtown”. For Wittgenstein’s
position, see Wittgenstein 1953. For Brandom’s opposing position, see e.g. Brandom 1983,
Brandom 1994: 157 and Brandom 2008: 39-42). For example, it seems that at the centre of  any
account of  the nature of  questions lies an account of  the judgements that are supposed to be
answers to these questions. But, it does not seem to be the other way round: to give an account of
the nature of  a certain kind of  judgements we do not frst need to have an account of  the
corresponding questions. The same seems to hold for other kinds of  sentences (and their mental
counterparts), such as imperatives, for example. Because of  this explanatory asymmetry declarative
sentences and judgements are marked as explanatory primary to other kinds of  sentences and
thoughts, so that we can treat explanatory accounts of  those sentences which do not take
declarative form and those mental states which are not judgements as lying downstream from
accounts of  declarative sentences and judgements.
11 See e.g. Blackburn 1998a: 49/50, Gibbard 1992: 55 and Gibbard 2003: 7, Horgan and Timmons
2006: 257/258, Ridge 2006a: 303 and Schroeder 2008a: 16-19. Note that what I call
“expressivism” is not the only view that has been called “expressivism” in the contemporary
debate. Robert Brandom and Huw Price, for example, sometimes call their views forms of
expressivism as well, although the labels “pragmatism” or “non-representationalism” are
sometimes also used (see e.g. Brandom 2000: 7-12, and MacArthur and Price 2007 and Price
2011). While these views are not what I intend to use the label “expressivism” for, it can be noted
that they nevertheless share important features with the view I am concerned here. In particular,
they endorse a non-representationalist order of  explanation (in the sense I will explain in a little bit)
for certain philosophically interesting vocabularies (and in fact for all vocabularies).
12 How exactly we formulate this commitment depends on whether we want to give priority to the
meaning of  sentences or to the meaning of  sub-sentential constituents of  sentences. In what follows I
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expressivism the meaning of  (declarative) sentences in general is to be explained in
terms of  the mental states that assertoric uses of  those sentences conventionally
express. The meaning of  words or sub-sentential phrases is then explained in terms
of  the contribution they make to the mental states conventionally expressed by
assertoric uses of  sentences in which those words or phrases fgure.
One crucial question in this context is what the relation of  expression amounts
to. Until recently, it has been surprisingly unclear to what account of  the expression
relation expressivists are actually committed to. While there are some plausible
alternative construals, I take it that this is most naturally understood in a way that
makes expressivism part of  the ideationalist tradition.13 This tradition goes back at least
to John Locke, and has gained some prominence in the 20th century through the work
of  Paul Grice.14 According to ideationalism the meaning of  meaningful linguistic items
is explained by those items being related via linguistic conventions with certain
mental entities, e.g. by words being related to ideas, and by sentences being related to
thoughts or mental states. In this way, ideationalism holds a domain of  thought and
its distinctive characteristics to be explanatorily primary to the kind of  discourse’s
distinctive characteristics which is that domain of  thought’s linguistic counterpart.15
Within the ideationalist framework, expressivists have a variety of  options of
how to understand the expression relation. For example, they could, as Allan
Gibbard does, accept a Gricean account of  the expression relation, according to
which,
will, for expository purposes, present expressivism in terms of  the former view, but for the purposes
of  this dissertation nothing crucial hangs on this. Everything that is said should mutatis mutandis
work for either version of  the view.
13 One interesting alternative suggestion is made by Peter Schulte, who suggests that expressivists can
use a teleosemantic account to give an account of  the expression relation (see Schulte 2010: 178-197;
for proponents of   teleosemantics see e.g. Millikan 1984 and Millikan 1989 or Papineau 1984; for
an overview, see Neander 2012). According to Schulte, a sentence S expresses a mental state M, if
and only if  utterances of  S have the function to convey that the speaker is in M, where, roughly
some entity x has the function to Φ, if  and only x exists because its predecessors have Φ-ed to a
suffcient extent (of  course, other teleosemantic accounts might be used to spell this out slightly
differently depending on the notion of  “function” used). A discussion of  this alternative is beyond
the scope of  this dissertation.
14 See Locke 1690 and Grice 1957 and Grice 1969. The most worked-out and sophisticated version
of  ideationalism is the account by Wayne Davis (see Davis 2003 and Davis 2005). 
15 Of  course, this order of  explanation has been contested. See for example Wilfrid  Sellars’ “Myth
of  Jones” (Sellars 1956), which is a thought experiment that is supposed to show that the mental
can be explained by taking established linguistic conventions as primary.
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INTENDING TO CONVEY: A sentence S expresses a state of  mind M, if  and
only if  by uttering S the speaker intends her audience to come to
believe that she is in M in virtue of their recognizing her intention to
bring them to believe that she is in M by uttering S.16
Of  course, there are well-known problems with the Gricean program.17 A second
option, and one that was developed to escape the problems of  the Gricean account,
would be to adopt the account of  the expression relation given by Wayne Davis.18
According to Davis the expression relation should be understood in terms of
indication. According to this construal of  the expression relation
INDICATION: A sentence S expresses a state of  mind M, if  and only if  by
uttering S the speaker conventionally indicates the presence of  M.
A third option would be to adopt an account on which expression is understood
in terms of  accountability.19 On this account linguistic conventions are such that
uttering a sentence makes one accountable to be in the state that is conventionally
associated with the utterance of  that sentence. According to this construal of  the
expression relation
ACCOUNTABILITY: A sentence S expresses a state of  mind M, if  and only
if  the person uttering S is, as a matter of  linguistic convention,
accountable for being in M.
In what follows, I will not commit myself  to any specifc account with regards to the
nature of  this relation, as the specifc details will not matter for my discussion. What
matters is only that expressivists hold a domain of  thought and its distinctive
characteristics to be explanatory primary to the kind of  discourse’s distinctive
characteristics which is that domain of  thought’s linguistic counterpart. In particular,
what normative language means and the distinctive ways in which it behaves is
supposed to be solely explained in terms of  the nature of  the mental states that
16  See Gibbard 1992: 84-86. The account is from Grice 1957 and Grice 1969.
17 See e.g. Davis 2005: 84, Millikan 1984, Platts 1979, and Ziff  1967. For an overview, see Lycan
2008: 86-96 and Miller 1998: 224-241. A defense of  the Gricean account in the face of  many of
the original worries has been developed by Stephen Schiffer (see Schiffer 1972).
18 See Davis 2003 and Davis 2005.
19 Accounts along these lines have been suggested by Simon Blackburn, Michael Ridge, and Mark
Schroeder. See Blackburn 1984a: 124-126, Ridge Forthcoming: chapter 4, and Schroeder 2008a:
25-32 and Schroeder 2008b: 108/109.
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constitute normative thinking, as what descriptive language means and the distinctive
ways in which it behaves is supposed to be solely explained in terms of  the nature of
the mental states that constitute descriptive thinking. With this said, let us now turn to
expressivism’s second commitment.
The second distinctive thesis of  expressivism is that the type of  mental state in
terms of  which the meaning of  normative sentences is to be explained differs in
theoretically interesting, important, and fundamental ways from the type of  mental
state in terms of  which the meaning of  descriptive sentences is to be explained:
normative judgements and descriptive judgements differ in very deep and
fundamental respects. To explain what this claim amounts to in detail, it will be
worthwhile to take a little detour through the assumption about declarative sentences
and the states of  mind they express commonly made in contemporary philosophy to
which expressivism’s second thesis stands in opposition.
The assumption is what can be called “representationalism”. According to
representationalism, the meaning of  all declarative sentences is to be explained in
terms of  those sentences standing in some theoretically robust representation relation
to things in the world. More importantly for our context, representationalism’s
assumption about the mind is that the nature of  all judgements—the states of  mind
expressed by meaningful declarative sentences—is to be explained in terms of  those
states consisting in representational states, states the primary functional role of  which is
to represent, in some theoretically robust and signifcant sense, the world as being a
certain way.20 And, it is not only the case that all judgements consist in such
20 Frank Jackson is an outspoken proponent of  this position (Jackson 2008: 78). Of  course, it is a
signifcant and quite tricky question how the notion of  a sentence or mental state being
“representational in a theoretically signifcant sense” is to be spelt out. In meta-normative theory, a
common way to do this for mental states is by using the notion of  a “constitutive aim” or
“direction of  ft” (for this notion, see e.g. Lillehammer 2002: 10 and Smith 1994a: 111/112; for
two interesting proposals for how cash out the notion of  robust representation in this vain, see
Ridge 2006b and Sinclair 2006) . According to this characterization, representational states have
“mind-to-world ft”, where states with mind-to-world ft “aim” at ftting the world: if  the world is not
in accordance with their content, these states can be expected to cease to exist. Of  course, the
notion of  a direction of  ft is itself  highly metaphorical. There are different ways to cash out this
metaphor, but the specifcs will not interest us here (for different ways of  doing so, see e.g. Smith
1994a: 111-116 (who cashes the notion out in dispositional terms) and Schulte 2010: 160-168 (who
cashes the notion out in terms of  teleofunctionalism). It should be noted that there are some
philosophers, who can be called “global non-representationalists”, who have argued that no sense
can be made of  a “theoretically signifcant” notion of  “representation”, at least not in the sense
required by representationalism (this has been argued e.g. by Robert Brandom (Brandom 1994 or
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representational states: rather all judgements consist in representational states such
that the judgement is true if  and only if  the representational state it consists in is true.
This caveat is important because representational states could be part of  complex
mental states that are not themselves representational states. According to
representationalism, those complex mental states would not be judgements. Complex
mental states are only judgements if  they consist in representational states that
determine the mental states’ truth-conditions.
Plugged into ideationalism, representationalism yields the thesis that the states
of  mind expressed by declarative sentences, the states that constitute judgements in
the relevant domain, are representational states such that the use of  a sentence is true
if  and only if  the representational state expressed by use of  that sentence is true.
Judgements consist in representational states such that a judgement is true if  and only
if  the representational state it consists in is true. Note that according to
representationalism, the distinctive nature of  domains of  discourse is to be explained
in terms of  the particular things they function to represent. For any domain of
thought and discourse, representationalism gives questions about the facts they
represent explanatory primacy in accounting for the nature of  that domain of
thought and discourse. Call this the “representationalist order of  explanation.”
According to expressivists representationalism is correct with regards to
descriptive language and thought: descriptive sentences express and descriptive
judgements are primarily representational states. More precisely, according to
expressivists, it is true that uses of  descriptive sentences are true if  and only if  the
representational state their use expresses is true, and that descriptive judgements are
true if  and only if  the representational state it consists in is true. But, expressivists
d e n y that representationalism is correct with regards to normative language and
thought: the mental states expressed by normative sentences and which constitute
normative judgements are not primarily representational states. That is, it is not true
Brandom 2000), Joshua Gert (Gert 2012: 11-18), Huw Price (Price 2004, Price 2010 and Price
2013), Richard Rorty (Rorty 1995) and (most famously) Ludwig Wittgenstein (Wittgenstein 1953).
Note that these authors do not necessarily think that “representation” makes no sense. Rather they
think that the notion cannot do the theoretical work many philosophers assign to it. While I have
some sympathies for this approach I will, in this dissertation, follow expressivists in assuming that
representationalism is not false in general but only applied to certain domains of  thought and
discourse.
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that uses of  normative sentences are true if  and only if  the representational state
their use expresses is true, or that normative judgements are true if  and only if  the
representational state they consist in is true. So, expressivists are bifurcationists: they
think that representationalism is true for some domains, but not all.
This means, of  course, that according to expressivists normative judgements
are non-representational states. But, expressivists also have something more substantive
to say about the nature of  those non-representational states which constitute
normative judgements. According to expressivists, normative judgements are
importantly constituted by states that fall into the broad category we can call
“conative attitudes”. Conative attitudes are mental states with the following unifying
feature: they are non-representational states the functional role of  which is such that
they can potentially play a certain kind of  motivating role in the production of
action, namely, a motivating role that can sensibly fgure in the intentional
explanation of  actions.21 The paradigm examples for states that fall into this category
are attitudes of  approval and disapproval, desires, intentions, or plans. According to
expressivists, normative judgements at least partially consist in attitudes that fall into
this category. Note that this claim leaves room for what can be called traditional
expressivism, according to which normative judgements consist o n l y in conative
attitudes and for what can be called hybrid expressivism according to which normative
judgements consist in both representational states and conative attitudes, although the
judgements are not true if  and only if  the representational state they consist in is
true.22 Since what I will say in the remainder of  the dissertation is supposed to be
21 It is, of  course, an important question how this functional role that all these attitudes have in
common is to be cashed out. We might want to do this, again, using the “direction of  ft”
metaphor. According to this metaphor, conative attitudes are those states with “world-to-mind”
direction of  ft, where mental states with world-to-mind ft “aim” to ft the world with themselves: if
the world is not in accordance with their content, these mental states can be expected to motivate
the person (at least pro tanto, meaning that the motivation can be overridden) in them, to bring the
world in accordance with their content.
22 Most of  the well-known defendants of  expressivism are traditional expressivists: for example,
Blackburn, Gibbard, Horgan and Timmons and Schroeder all defend some version of  traditional
expressivism. Hybrid expressivism is a more recent development and has, consequently, not yet
found many adherents. The prime defender of  a hybrid view is Michael Ridge (see especially his
Ridge 2006a, Ridge 2007a, and Ridge Forthcoming, as well as his Ridge 2007b and Ridge 2009a).
Hybrid forms of  expressivism have also been suggested by Mark Schroeder (Schroeder 2013a) and
Teemu Toppinen (Toppinen 2013). For an introduction into hybrid theories in meta-normative
theory, see Köhler and Ridge Forthcoming and Schroeder 2009.
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compatible with both pure and hybrid expressivism, I will not commit myself  either
way.
We can now summarize as follows the two distinctive claims to which
expressivists subscribe. First, expressivists subscribe to a particular account in the
theory of  meaning, namely, a
PSYCHOLOGIZED THEORY OF MEANING: The meaning of  declarative
sentences is to be explained in terms of  the judgements assertoric uses
of  those sentences conventionally express.
Second, expressivists subscribe to a particular claim about normative judgements,
which can be further distinguished into two parts, namely,
NON-REPRESENTATIONALISM ABOUT NORMATIVE JUDGEMENTS: The mental
states which constitute normative judgements do n o t consist in
representational states such that a normative judgement is true if  and
only if  the representational state it consists in is true.
and
CONATIVE NATURE OF NORMATIVE JUDGEMENTS: The mental states which
constitute normative judgements (at least partially) consist in conative
attitudes.
With this characterization in place, let us now turn to the main motivations for
accepting some form of  expressivism.
2. WHY EXPRESSIVISM?
Why believe in expressivism? I take it that the arguments in favour of
expressivism are well-known, and I do not think that there is much value in my
extensively mulling over well-trodden territory here. So, I will try to keep my
presentation as short as possible, trying to emphasize the broader picture of  what
motivates expressivism, rather than going too much into the details. Before I turn to
the motivations for expressivism, however, I will frst say a little bit about what views I
will see as expressivism’s dialectical rivals for the purposes of  this dissertation.
There are three possible reasons for rejecting expressivism. First, it could be
that you only disagree with expressivism’s frst thesis, it’s commitment in the theory
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of  meaning. Second, it could be that you only disagree with expressivism’s second
thesis, it’s commitment about the nature of  normative thought. Third, it could be
that you disagree with both theses. In what follows, I take the primary dialectic
relevant for the purposes of  this dissertation to be the one concerned with the nature
of  normative thought. Of  course, it is not the case that expressivism’s frst thesis,
which I have classifed as embedding expressivism within the ideationalist tradition, is
uncontroversial: there is signifcant debate about whether it is the most plausible view
in the philosophy of  language. And, of  course, there are some meta-normative
theories that explicitly reject expressivism because of  its acceptance of
ideationalism.23 I see these disputes, however, as primarily being disputes in the
philosophy of  language in general, namely, disputes about what most plausibly explains
the meaning of  linguistic entities and whether the linguistic has explanatory primacy
over the mental or vice versa and not disputes particularly concerned with what is most
interesting about expressivism as a meta-normative view. In fact, I think that insofar as
positions have an axe to grind with expressivism’s meta-normative commitments, that
we mostly can—without much theoretical loss—rephrase this disagreement in terms
of  a disagreement about the nature of  normative thought. Consequently, I will, for
the purposes of  this dissertation, treat the debate about the nature of  normative
thought as the centre of  the meta-normative dialectic that is the home of
expressivism, and consider only those rivals that deny it’s second thesis. This has the
disadvantage of  bracketing the details of  certain interesting meta-normative views,
but has the advantage of  making the discussion more tractable.
With this restriction in place, what are the main motivations for expressivism as
a view about the nature of  normative judgements? Since expressivism’s second thesis
has two parts, points in favour of  expressivism derive from the non-representational and
conative character of  normative judgements. That is, the phenomena meta-normative
theories are interested in exemplify certain distinctive characteristics that are well
captured by views that subscribe to NON-REPRESENTATIONALISM ABOUT NORMATIVE
JUDGEMENTS and to the CONATIVE NATURE OF NORMATIVE JUDGEMENTS, and which cause
trouble for views which deny these two theses. Before I explain what this means,
23 Matthew Chrisman is the most outspoken critic of  expressivism on this front. See e.g. Chrisman
2010, Chrisman 2011 and Chrisman 2012.
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however, let me make a quick note about what I take to be an appropriate
methodological assumption regarding how to decide between different meta-
normative views. 
I take it that one of  the prime lessons for philosophy to take from W. V. O.
Quine’s work is that we should not expect there to be knock-down arguments for or
decisive proof  of  philosophical theories:24 all philosophical theories need to be
assessed holistically, in the light of  how well they do on balance in the light of  a variety
of  desiderata, such as how well they capture the relevant phenomena, what
additional assumptions they require and how plausible those assumptions are, how
well those theories cohere with what else we believe, etc. I take it that this fact about
philosophical theories explains why refective equilibrium is the methodology of
choice not only in normative ethics or political philosophy, but in philosophy in
general.25 Consequently, we should assess meta-normative theories in the light of  how
well they do on balance and compared to their dialectical rivals in terms of  the
collection of, borrowing a phrase by David Enoch, “plausibility points.”26 When we
consider the main motivations for expressivism, what we should, therefore, look for
are the respects in which expressivism gains plausibility points over its dialectical
rivals. What follows should be read in this vein.
So, in what respect does normative judgement have a non-representational or
conative character? Let us start with the 
CONATIVE NATURE OF NORMATIVE JUDGEMENTS: The mental states which
constitute normative judgements (at least partially) consist in conative
attitudes.
The classic argument in support of  the CONATIVE NATURE OF NORMATIVE JUDGEMENTS is
that this thesis can easily and straightforwardly account for the role of  normative
judgement in the production of  action. It seems quite plausible that at least all things
considered atomic normative judgements are governed by some form of
24 See Quine 1951.
25 Refective equilibrium gained prominence in normative ethics and political philosophy through the
work of  John Rawls and Norman Daniels (see Daniels 1979 and Rawls 1999: 18/19). However,
refective equilibrium is very plausibly also the most widely used methodology in philosophy in
general. For refective equilibrium as a methodology for philosophy in general, see e.g. DePaul 1998,
Goodman 1955, Kelly and McGrath 2010, or Lewis 1983: x-xi.
26 Enoch 2011: 14.
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MOTIVATIONAL JUDGEMENT INTERNALISM: Someone who makes a
normative judgement is, thereby, in certain relevant conditions C,
motivated to act accordingly, on pain of  irrationality.27
For example, we expect someone who judges that there is all things considered reason
to perform action Φ in conditions C to actually be motivated to Φ if  she believes to
fnd herself  in C, on pain of  irrationality. If  you say that you have all things
considered reason to give thirty percent of  your income to charity, but are not
motivated to give thirty percent of  your income to charity, we will judge you to be
irrational (or insincere).
Why does MOTIVATIONAL JUDGEMENT INTERNALISM support the CONATIVE NATURE OF
NORMATIVE JUDGEMENTS? Because following a broadly Humean theory of  motivation,
which is often taken to be our most plausible theory of  action, frst the production of
any action requires a relevant representational state and a suitably related conative
attitude, and second representational states and conative attitudes are modally
distinct.28 If  normative judgements can motivate to act without the addition of  any
further conative attitudes, this seems to imply that normative judgements have to be
constituted (at least partially) by conative attitudes. At the very least, this seems to be
the easiest and most straightforward way to explain the motivational power of
normative judgements.29
An additional line of  support for the CONATIVE NATURE OF NORMATIVE JUDGEMENTS
derives from the fact that normative judgements seem emotionally charged.30 The
27 Of  course, it is neither uncontroversial what form of  MOTIVATIONAL JUDGEMENT INTERNALISM is the most
plausible, nor whether any form of  MOTIVATIONAL JUDGEMENT INTERNALISM is plausible. This dissertation
is not the place to get into this debate, so here I am just going to assume that a theory’s ability to
account for MOTIVATIONAL JUDGEMENT INTERNALISM counts in favour of  that theory. For different
versions of  MOTIVATIONAL JUDGEMENT INTERNALISM, see e.g. Bedke 2009, Blackburn 1998a, Dreier 1990,
Gibbard 2003, Korsgaard 1996, Lenman 1999, and Smith 1994a. For critics of  MOTIVATIONAL
JUDGEMENT INTERNALISM, see e.g. Brink 1986 and Brink 1989, Copp 2001, Shafer-Landau 2003 and
Svavarsdóttir 1999 and Svavarsdóttir 2006.
28 The Humean theory of  motivation has gained prominence in the philosophy of  action through the
work of  Davidson, although he himself  did not use that label for the theory (see Davidson 1963).
Recently the Humean theory of  motivation has been defended by Michael Smith (Smith 1987 and
Smith 1994a), and Neil Sinhababu (Sinhababu 2009).
29 Other explanations are, of  course, possible (see e.g. Nagel 1979 and Smith 1994a). In most cases
these explanations need to make more robust assumptions about the nature of  rationality as has
been aptly diagnosed by Jay Wallace (Wallace 1990). I take it that having to make these
assumptions can itself  be seen as a loss of  plausibility points as a more slim theory of  rationality
scores points on parsimony (see Sinhababu 2009).
30 I take it that at least the fact that moral judgements are emotionally charged is stably confrmed by
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clearest illustrations are probably moral judgements: for example, if  others act in
ways which we judge to be morally wrong this, ceteris paribus, provokes anger or disgust
within us, and if  we ourselves act in such ways this, ceteris paribus, provokes us to feel
guilt or shame. But we also feel, for example, frustrated or angry when someone,
including ourselves, fails to do what there was most reason to do, independently of
whether we feel that this has something to do with morality. That normative
judgement is emotionally charged supports the CONATIVE NATURE OF NORMATIVE
JUDGEMENTS, because this is the most straightforward way to explain this fact. After all,
if  there are paradigm examples of  mental states that are emotionally charged in the
relevant way, those mental states are conative attitudes. Disapproval and approval, for
example, often go hand in hand with emotions, such as being angry or upset when
the disapproved thing occurs, and plans or intentions, to take another example, often
have guilt as an emotional uptake if  we fail to follow through with them.
These considerations give some plausibility to views that subscribe to the
CONATIVE NATURE OF NORMATIVE JUDGEMENTS and, consequently, score expressivism
plausibility points. What about
NON-REPRESENTATIONALISM ABOUT NORMATIVE JUDGEMENTS: The mental
states which constitute normative judgements do n o t consist in
representational states such that a normative judgement is true if  and
only if  the representational state it consists in is true.
though? Traditionally it was held that NON-REPRESENTATIONALISM ABOUT NORMATIVE
JUDGEMENTS follows from the CONATIVE NATURE OF NORMATIVE JUDGEMENTS. However, recent
developments have shown that those two theses can come apart. This is due to the
possibility of  hybrid views according to which normative judgements consist in a
complex mental state constituted by conative attitudes and representational states, but
where the judgement itself  remains a representational state.31 Because of  the
possibility of  such views, we can only fully see what considerations support
expressivism by considering further arguments that earn those views plausibility
points which subscribe to non-representationalism.
moral psychology. See, for example, Greene et al. 2001, Greene and Haidt 2002, Haidt 2001 and
Prinz 2006 and Prinz 2007.
31 For a view of  this form, see Tresan 2006.
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The main argument in favour of  the non-representational character of
normative judgements derives from problems faced by views that subscribe to
REPRESENTATIONALISM ABOUT NORMATIVE JUDGEMENTS: The mental states
which constitute normative judgements consist in representational
states such that a normative judgement is true if  and only if  the
representational state it consists in is true.
Let us call such views forms of  “meta-normative representationalism”.32 The most
forceful considerations for non-representionalism about normative judgement take
the form of  a dilemma, which can be set up as follows.33 If  you subscribe to meta-
normative representationalism, you accept the representationalist order of
explanation with regards to normative judgements. That is, if  you subscribe to meta-
normative representationalism, you commit yourself  to the claim that the distinctive
nature of  the normative domain is to be explained in terms of  the particular things
that judgements in that domain function to represent. With regards to their account
of  the nature of  the normative facts, meta-normative representationalists can either
accept or deny
REDUCTIONISM ABOUT NORMATIVE FACTS: The facts represented by
normative judgements are fully describable in non-normative
descriptive terms.34
Along these lines, we can distinguish two positions within the camp of  meta-
normative representationalism. First, non-reductionist meta-normative representationalism
(which I will call “non-reductionism” for short) which is any form of  meta-normative
representationalism rejecting REDUCTIONISM ABOUT NORMATIVE FACTS. According to non-
reductionism, accounting for the representational content of  normative judgements
32 Views that endorse REPRESENTATIONALISM ABOUT NORMATIVE JUDGEMENTS are often called forms of  “meta-
normative cognitivism”, but I prefer the label “meta-normative representationalism”, because it
does not suggest that beliefs have to be representational states. As I will explain in the third chapter,
quasi-realist expressivists have given good arguments that we should not accept this assumption, at
least not without further argument.
33 The dilemma was originally put forward by Ayer (Ayer 1936), and remains expressivists’ argument
of  choice, although the terms in which Ayer posed it are no longer ones in which contemporary
expressivists would pose it.
34 The relevant distinction here is sometimes taken to be the distinction between “natural” and “non-
natural” facts. However, it is notoriously diffcult to say what this distinction amounts to (See
Papineau 2009 or Ridge 2008) and most of  the relevant forceful arguments seem to be concerned
with whether normative facts are reducible to facts fully describable in non-normative descriptive
terms. For these reasons I view the central issue to be between reductionists and non-reductionists.
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requires introducing an additional type of  fact into our ontology over and above
those that are already the objects of  non-normative descriptive thinking. Following
this approach, representationalists will hold that the facts represented by normative
judgements consist (characteristically) in a distinctive, sui generis type of fact, which
cannot be (completely) reduced to those types that are the objects of  non-normative
descriptive judgements. Second, meta-normative representationalists could endorse
reductionist meta-normative representationalism (which I will call “reductionism” for short)
which is any form of  meta-normative representationalism that accepts REDUCTIONISM
ABOUT NORMATIVE FACTS. According to reductionism, accounting for the representational
content of  normative judgements does not require introducing an additional type of
fact into our ontology over and above those that are already the objects of  non-
normative descriptive judgements. Instead, the facts represented by normative
judgements can be completely accounted for in terms of  facts that are the objects of
non-moral descriptive thinking. 
The dilemma directed against representationalism is now that each of  these
views faces quite signifcant problems, and that non-representationalism avoids all of
these problems, in this way gaining expressivism plausibility points for endorsing non-
representationalism. On the frst horn of  the dilemma, if  meta-normative
representationalists endorse non-reductionism it turns out that there are important
features of  normative facts which non-reductionism cannot explain, but must merely
presuppose. This makes those facts and the relationship between them and our
normative judgements very mysterious in a way that representationalism threatens to
entail an error theory. On the second horn of  the dilemma, if  meta-normative
representationalists endorse reductionism it turns out that normative judgements
possess certain characterizing features which judgements about other kinds of  facts
do not possess. This means that representationalism threatens to eliminate what is
distinctive about normative judgements. Let me present each horn in further detail.
The frst horn of  the dilemma is directed against non-reductionism.35 Non-
35 The locus classicus for non-reductionism is G.E. Moore’s Principia Ethica (Moore 1903). After being
out of favour for some time non-reductionism has reemerged quite strongly in recent years. For
moral judgements non-reductionism has been defended by Thomas Nagel (Nagel 1989), Russ
Shafer-Landau (Shafer-Landau 2003), and Nicholas Sturgeon (Sturgeon 1988). Most of  the newer
non-reductionists have defended non-reductionism about normativity in general  (see e.g. Dancy
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reductionism is often motivated by the impression that we can vindicate the central
presuppositions underlying our ordinary normative practice only if we treat normative
judgements as representing non-reductive normative facts. However, non-reductionism
faces the problem that on such an account features of  normative facts and the
relationship between our judgements and these facts would remain unexplained in a
way that makes them mysterious. Rather than vindicating our ordinary practice, non-
reductionism, thereby, threatens to entail that our normative judgements are
fundamentally in error because they represent facts which do not exist. There are two
general kinds of  worries which non-reductionism faces which support this conclusion.
First, there are epistemological worries. These can be seen as worries about the
relationship between our normative judgements and the facts they are supposed to be
judgements about. On any view which holds that our normative judgements are
judgements representing some domain of  fact, we must have some sort of  epistemic
access to those facts supposed to be the normative facts: our normative judgements
must stand in some kind of  relationship to normative facts which makes it plausible
to assume, e.g. that the facts they are about really do exist, that we hold our
judgements because they exist, that our judgements reliably track these facts, etc. At
the very least, it must be plausible that there could be such an account.36
The problem for non-reductionists, however, is that it is not clear what kind of
2006, Enoch 2007 and Enoch 2011, Oddie 2005, Parft 2006, and Parft 2011, Scanlon 2003,
(arguably) Smith 1994a and Wedgwood 2008; interestingly, of  these authors only Sturgeon defends
a version of  non-reductionism on which the irreducible normative facts are nevertheless natural
facts, which indicates that philosophers think that non-reductionism and non-naturalism go hand
in hand). A full discussion of  the most recent developments in the non-reductionist tradition would
go well beyond the purposes of  this chapter. The worries these positions face are still, however,
roughly the same that traditional non-reductionist theories face.
36 This challenge is made even more pressing through an argument developed by Sharon Street
(Street 2006): it seems plausible that our normative judgements can be completely explained in
terms of  a causal story. After all, human beings are natural creatures, shaped by natural and causal
forces. For everything we do and that includes our normative judgements, there will probably be a
causal story—a story completely describable in naturalistic terms—which fully explains the
occurrence of  the respective event (Street formulates her challenge in terms of  our normative
judgements being shaped by evolution, but it seems that any formulation in terms of  the causal
factors that explain our judgements will do, for example, a story proceeding solely in terms cultural
and other environmental infuences. See Enoch 2010: 426 and Blackburn (unpublished) for similar
points). However, it is questionable whether the kinds of  causal factors that determine our
normative judgements, such as evolution or our cultural and environmental circumstances, would
bring about a correlation between our normative judgements and the normative facts. At least, it
seems that this would be a miraculous coincidence, to say the least.
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relationship they could bring forward to do the required explanatory work.37 It seems
that all non-reductionists can do is postulate the existence of  an extra source of
epistemic access, over and above those we have to access the non-normative
descriptive facts, maybe a faculty of  “intuition”, about which not much illuminating
can be said. But, this does not remove the mystery about the relationship between
our normative judgements and the normative facts at all. Rather, it just highlights the
fact that the non-reductionist has no plausible answer.38 However, without such an
answer the nature of  the relationship between normative facts and our normative
judgements becomes mysterious.39
The second kind of  worries that non-reductionism faces are metaphysical worries.
These can be seen as worries about certain features possessed by the facts our
normative judgements would be about if  non-reductionism were true. Any form of
REPRESENTATIONALISM ABOUT NORMATIVE JUDGEMENTS is committed to the representationalist
order of  explanation: explaining the distinctive features of  normative judgements—
what distinguishes them from other kinds of  representational states—in terms of  the
distinctive features of  the facts represented. It seems, however, that normative facts
37 This is highlighted by the fact that the most plausible way to explain a correlation between our
normative judgements and the normative facts, namely, in terms of  a causal relationship does not
seem to ft well with non-reductionism, since it seems that non-reducible normative facts do not
even fgure in the best explanations of  our normative judgements (Harman 1977: 3-10; of  course
this issue is subject to debate (see e.g. Sturgeon 1988)). However, it is also highly mysterious what
other way there could be than a causal relationship that explains the existence of  the relevant
correlation.
38 See e.g. Copp 2005 and Mackie 1977: 39.
39 One reply to such epistemological worries often given by non-reductionists are “companions in
guilt” arguments (see e.g. Parft 2011 and Shafer-Landau 2003; a notable exception here is David
Enoch (Enoch 2010)). First, they note that the same kinds of  epistemological worries plague other
domains of  judgement as well, e.g. mathematics, modality, or philosophy. However, the argument
continues, we would surely not hold these domains to be illegitimate just because of  epistemological
worries. So, one should also not hold that these worries threaten the legitimacy of  the normative
domain. Hence, epistemological worries pose no real problem for non-reductionism. Although
these arguments are common, however, I do not think that this is a good reply for a non-
reductionist to take. The reply presupposes that the best theory of  the respective domains of
judgement implies an interpretation of  those domains on which they do face similar
epistemological worries as non-reductionism faces and that the legitimacy of  those domains is,
thereby, not threatened. However, just one quick look at the relevant philosophical debates reveals
that this thesis is far from uncontroversial and not something one can presuppose in meta-
normative argument. Just like in meta-normative theory, non-reductionism is not the only possible
theory in the philosophy of  mathematics, the philosophy of  modality and the philosophy of
philosophy. Instead in these areas we also fnd reductionists, expressivists, error-theorists and
fctionalists. So, by using a companions-in-guilt argument the non-reductionists are far from being
able to point to something uncontroversial to justify the legitimacy of  something controversial.
Rather, they just shift the problem to another domain, where they still fnd similar challenges.
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would possess certain peculiar features. One example here is the common thought
that it is a conceptual truth that the normative facts supervene on the non-normative
descriptive facts.40 Such features, however, call for an explanation of  how normative
facts could possess them.
The problem that arises out of  such features for non-reductionism is that it
seems non-reductionists cannot give an explanation for these features of  normative
facts. At most they must presuppose that they have them. For example, according to
non-reductionists the normative facts and non-normative descriptive facts are
metaphysically independent of  each other. However, if  the normative facts and the non-
normative descriptive facts are distinct, it seems mysterious why the normative facts
nevertheless supervene on those facts and why this is a conceptual truth.
Consequently, it seems that non-reductionists must presuppose that, as a matter of
conceptual truth, a supervenience relation holds between normative and non-
normative descriptive facts without being able to explain this. This, however, would
make the normative facts look highly mysterious or, to use J.L. Mackie’s famous
phrase, queer. Similar worries arise for the other features of  normative judgements
that seem to call for an explanation.
Assume, for the purposes of  this dissertation, that these kinds of  challenges
cannot be met.41 This poses a serious threat for non-reductionism. First, these worries
threaten to undermine non-reductionism’s compatibility with a broadly naturalistic,
scientifc world-view, given that it seems that the facts postulated by non-reductionism
40 The challenge based on explaining supervenience originates in Blackburn 1971 and is also found in
Mackie 1977: 40/41. Blackburn refned his argument in Blackburn 1984b. For an overview over
the debate regarding supervenience, see e.g. Ridge 2008 and Schmitt 2013. Another example for a
problematic feature derives from the thought that normative facts would have to be intrinsically
motivating, or that they would provide categorical reasons for action, reasons not based on people’s
desires, interests, and the like (see Mackie 1977: 40-42. For a later versions of  this argument, see
e.g. Gauthier 1986 and Joyce 2001: 1-174). A third example might be the feature of  irreducible
normative facts of  seemingly playing no explanatory role—not even for our normative judgements
—and of  not being embedded in the causal framework at all. This challenge was originally raised
by Gilbert Harman (see Harman 1977. See also Leiter 2001 for a more recent development of  this
challenge).
41 I am only assuming this without argument for the purposes of  this dissertation. Obviously, non-
reductionists have tried to meet these challenges (for a reply to the epistemological worry, see e.g.
Shafer-Landau 2003: 84-98 and Enoch 2010: 427-438. For a reply to the problem with
supervenience, see e.g. Shafer-Landau 2003: 247-302 and Wedgwood 2008:134-152; for problems
with Shafer-Landau’s approach see Ridge 2007c, for problems with Wedgwood’s account see
Schmitt and Schroeder 2011).
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would not easily ft into the world as described by science. Given that the naturalistic
world-view is one we have good reasons to hold, non-reductionism would then lead
to the conclusion that normative facts do not exist, and in this way turn into an error-
theory. Second, even independently of  worries about the compatibility with
naturalism, the relationship between normative facts and our normative judgements
and the nature of  these facts themselves would by themselves be deeply puzzling in a
way that seems to provide good reasons to hold that such facts do not exist. In either
case, we are left with an error theory, according to which normative judgements are
judgements about non-reducible normative facts, but none of  these judgements are
true, because the facts they are about do not exist. This, however, is a serious cost for
non-reductionism as, other things being equal, a meta-normative theory that does
not need to attribute deep, systematic, and wide-spread error as underlying our
ordinary normative practice, error which threatens the very legitimacy of  this
practice seems preferable to one that has to attribute such error.42 Following this, on
the frst horn of  the dilemma directed against REPRESENTATIONALISM ABOUT NORMATIVE
JUDGEMENTS, the view would lose a signifcant portion of  plausibility points, if
combined with the denial of  REDUCTIONISM ABOUT NORMATIVE FACTS.
The second horn of  the dilemma is then directed against reductionism.
Reductionism, recall, is any view accepting
REPRESENTATIONALISM ABOUT NORMATIVE JUDGEMENTS: The mental states
which constitute normative judgements consist in representational
states such that a normative judgement is true if  and only if  the
representational state it consists in is true.
and
REDUCTIONISM ABOUT NORMATIVE FACTS: The facts represented by
normative judgements are fully describable in non-normative
descriptive terms.43
42 For a similar point, see e.g. Hare 1982: 82 and Blackburn 1985: 149-152.
43 Because the meta-normative debate mostly focused on moral judgements in the past, many of  the
classical reductionists have only defended reductionism for moral judgements. For reductionism
about moral judgements, see e.g. Brink 1989, Boyd 1988, Jackson 1998, Jackson and Pettit 1995,
Lewis 1989 or Smith 1994a. Many of  these approaches, however, are easily adaptable to the case
of  normative judgements in general. For authors who (arguably) defend some form of
reductionism about all normative judgements, see e.g. Brandt 1977, Finlay 2009, Gauthier 1986,
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Reductionism certainly fares better regarding the problems non-reductionism faces.
However, it faces a distinctive kind of  objection itself:44 roughly, it faces the worry that
normative judgements have certain characterizing features which judgements about
non-normative descriptive facts do not, and cannot, have and that, consequently, no
judgement about non-normative descriptive facts could be recognizable as a
normative judgement.
The kinds of  worries I have in mind have their origin in an argument known as
the “Open Question Argument” (O QA for short) introduced by G.E. Moore in
Principia Ethica.45 The OQA is an argumentative strategy supposed to establish that a
certain kind of  concept F can in principle not be analysed in terms of  another kind of
concept G. This is done by pointing out that an analysis of  F in terms of  G is
successful, only if  for some sub-set G* of  the set of  concepts belonging to G,
competent speakers regard the question “x is G*, but is x also F?” to be conceptually
closed (they have to think that for some sub-set G* one could not coherently imagine
some x which is G*, but not F). The next step then consists in strengthening the
intuition that for any sub-set G*, competent speakers will regard this question to be
conceptually open. Absent either any further explanation why these intuitions are
mistaken or another way of  justifying this divergence, analyses of  F in terms of  G,
therefore, fail.46
Moore used the OQA to argue that moral concepts could not be analysed in
terms of  naturalistic concepts, but it seems that the argument would equally well apply
to normative concepts and non-normative descriptive ones. Directed against
reductionism the argument using the OQA would be the following: take any
Railton 1986 and Railton 1990, Schroeder 2007, and Stemmer 2008. 
44 It is common for this objection to be pressed both by expressivists and by non-reductionists. It is
e.g. pressed in one form or another by Ayer (Ayer 1936:104-106), Blackburn (Blackburn 1998a: 83-
87 and 104-121), Gibbard (Gibbard 1992: 9-22 and Gibbard 2003: 11-17), Hare (Hare 1952: 79-
93 and 148/149), Horgan and Timmons (Horgan and Timmons 1992), G.E. Moore (Moore 1903)
and Wedgwood (Wedgwood 2008).
45 See Moore 1903: 10-17.
46 Note that the OQA as I present it here is an argument from inference to the best explanation (that
this is the best way to read the argument is argued by Stephen Ball (Ball 1988) in response to an
objection to the original formulation of  the OQA by William Frankena (Frankena 1939)).
According to this reading of  the OQA, the best explanation for the openness of  the relevant
questions is that there is a distinctive difference between normative and non-normative descriptive
judgements e.g. that the former are not about facts which are such that they can be completely
described in non-normative terms.
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normative concept N and any non-normative descriptive concept D. It seems that
competent speakers would hold the question “x is D, but is x also N?” to be
conceptually open. For example, it seems plausible that, for any non-normative
descriptive concept D, competent speakers will hold the question to be conceptually
open whether an action that has the property picked out by D is what we have, all
things considered, reason to do. Consequently, absent further explanation why these
intuitions are mistaken or another way of  justifying this divergence, analyses of
normative concepts in terms of  non-normative descriptive concepts fail. If  this is
correct, then normative judgements have certain specifc characterizing features
which judgements about non-normative descriptive facts do not—and cannot—have,
which means that no judgement about non-normative descriptive facts could be
recognizable as a normative judgement. This would have the obvious consequence
that reductionism loses a signifcant portion of  plausibility points as a view about
normative judgement.
However, while this original version of  the OQA long caused signifcant trouble
for reductionists, some of  its proponents have since developed ways to discharge the
challenge posed by this version of  the OQA. The relevant responses have been
developed with moral judgements in view, but the responses easily generalize to the
case of  normative judgements. The problem with the above version of  the OQA is
that the argument rests on at least two problematic presuppositions that reductionists
can reject to provide plausible explanations of  why the relevant intuitions are
mistaken, and so do not defeat reductionism. The frst problematic assumption is that
two concepts can only refer to one and the same property if  the concepts have the
same content, where the content of  a concept in this sense is accessible a priori by
competent speakers at least on refection. The second presupposition is that if  two
concepts have the same content in a sense accessible a priori by competent speakers on
refection, then this is obvious or at least easily determinable. Both of  these
assumptions, however, can be challenged. The details of  how this can be done will
become relevant in the second chapter and I will elaborate on them there. For the
purposes of  this chapter, it suffces to say that by challenging these two assumptions
reductionists have ways to escape the worry that their account misses something
26
crucial about normative judgements, at least in the form that this worry is raised by
the OQA. 
However, the worry still lingers, because there are more sophisticated versions
of, or predecessors to, the OQA that still apply even to these more sophisticated
versions of  reductionism. What I have in mind, is the argument frst proposed by
R.M. Hare and later developed in a more sophisticated form by Terry Horgan and
Mark Timmons.47 Hare and Horgan and Timmons again only develop their
argument for the case of  moral judgements, but the argument can be modifed to
apply to the case of  normative judgements in general. This argument goes as follows.
First, note that reductionists must provide an account of  how it is determined
to which properties, also describable in non-normative descriptive terms, normative
concepts refer. Specifcally, any such an account must specify a relation R in which
our normative concepts stand to those properties which fxes the reference of  those
concepts. This account, however, will have signifcant consequences on a reductionist
view. More specifcally, for any account a reductionist gives of  the relation relevant
for the reference fxing of  normative concepts, that account will, on the reductionist
view, determine when two individuals have the same concepts or different concepts,
and so whether their judgements will be in agreement or disagreement or at cross
purposes in a given situation.48 So, any such reductionist view will make certain
47 See Hare 1952: 148/149, Horgan and Timmons 1991, Horgan and Timmons 1992, Horgan and
Timmons 2000, and Horgan and Timmons 2009a.
48 I will ignore, for the sake of  simplicity, the possibility of  certain forms of  hybrid versions of
reductionism that need not subscribe to this thesis about agreement and disagreement. Hybrid
reductionist theories can come either in the form of  linguistic hybrid reductionism according to which
normative language expresses both representational states and conative attitudes, where normative
sentences are true if  and only if  the representational state they express is true, although normative
judgements consist only in representational states. Or they can come in the form of  mentalistic hybrid
reductionism according to which normative judgements consist in conative attitudes and
representational states where a normative judgement is true, if  and only if  the representational
state it consists in is true. It should be true for forms of  linguistic hybrid reductionism that
normative judgements can only be in disagreement if  they refer to the same properties (and so are
unable to explain certain cases of  disagreement that expressivists can explain (see my Köhler 2012
for a more detailed argument in this direction). Mentalistic hybrid reductionists, however, can say
that normative judgements can also be in disagreement if  they consist in disagreeing conative
attitudes. Even forms of  mentalistic hybrid representationalism have problems to fully account for
the phenomenon of  normative disagreement, though: on such views our attributions of  truth and
falsity and of  whether we agree or disagree with someone will come apart in problematic ways. For
example, there will be cases in which we can sincerely say that what someone judges is true, but
that we disagree with the person’s judgement. Discussion of  these fner details of  the debate,
however, would be beyond the scope of  this chapter. For detailed arguments, see Ridge
Forthcoming: chapter 4 and Ehrhardt Unpublished: chapter 7.
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predictions about what cases should and what cases should not count as cases of
disagreement in normative judgement, and should, consequently, be testable against
the linguistic intuitions of  speakers competent with the concepts in question. Horgan
and Timmons found a case to test this by modifying Hilary Putnam’s famous twin-
earth thought experiment.49
The idea is that i f  our normative concepts indeed refer to some set of
properties Δ fully describable in non-normative terms because they stand to Δ in
some relation R, then it should be the case that competent and clear-headed speakers
have, for the relevant relation R, the following intuitions: take Raphael who lives on
normative twin-earth, a distant planet in another galaxy, who has a set of  concepts N
that possess those “formal” properties and “surface appearances” we take to be
characteristic of  our normative concepts and which would make us inclined on frst
sight to assume that with N Raphael possesses the same normative concepts as we do.
That is, he has a set of  concepts that, like normative concepts, are emotionally
charged, play the same motivational role, and which also settle Raphael on the thing
to do or intend in the relevant distinct way. Assume next that our normative concepts
stand in relation R to a set of  properties Δ1 fully describable in non-normative terms
and that this settles to what properties they refer (that is properties in Δ1), and that
Raphael’s set of  concepts N stand in relation R to a different set of  properties Δ2 fully
describable in non-normative terms and that this settles to what properties they refer
(that is properties in Δ2). In this case, we should have the intuition that people on
earth cannot engage in normative disagreement and agreement or even in conversation on
normative issues with Raphael. Instead we should have the intuition that when Raphael
employs his respective concepts that these concepts are at cross-purposes with our
normative concepts. Indeed, we should be inclined to hold that Raphael does not have
normative concepts at all.
This provides us with a thought experiment that allows us to test any
reductionist proposal of  the relation R that is supposed to fx the reference of  our
normative concepts: if  we fll in the relation R with the relevant reductionist
proposal, would we think that earthlings and Raphael in the above case could agree
49 See Putnam 1975.
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or disagree when the earthlings employ normative concepts and Raphael employs
concepts from set N, or would we think that they are employing different concepts? If
our answer to the latter question is “No”, then we can see this as evidence that the
proposal has failed to provide a plausible account of  our ordinary normative
concepts and judgements, as it cannot account satisfactorily for our intuitions about
when two speakers can be in agreement and disagreement on normative matters,
rather than being at cross-purposes. Only if  our answer to the latter question is “Yes”
can we regard the reductionist view as giving a plausible account of  when two
speakers have the same normative concepts. Note that this kind of  test actually
connects to the intuitions that were supposed to be elicited by the original OQA:
what this test is supposed to tease out is whether competent and clear-headed
speakers think that normative questions can be conclusively settled by fnding out
that our normative judgements stand in some relation R to a set of  properties Δ fully
describable in non-normative terms.
How would reductionism fare with regards to this kind of  thought experiment?
Horgan and Timmons have argued that we have good evidence for moral judgements
that for any relation R a reductionist could propose, the account will always have the
wrong implications with regards to whom we can be in moral agreement and
disagreement with.50 Let us furthermore assume—for the purposes of  this
50 Their evidence derives from two sources. First, from considering prominent proposals by
reductionists and whether they would pass a respective normative twin-earth scenario (for their
arguments in detail see Horgan and Timmons 1992 and Horgan and Timmons 2009a; see also
Holland 2001 and Rosati 1995 for further evidence along these lines; of  course these arguments
have only been developed for the case of  moral judgements). Second, it comes from considering the
structure of  the normative twin-earth case and asking whether we think that there is a relation R
for which we would think that competent and clear-headed speakers’ intuitions about the thought
experiment are in agreement with the predictions of  the relevant reductionist account. And, it
seems that by only looking at the structure of  the scenario we can already say that it is unlikely that
there is such a relation: for any relation R to which our normative judgements could stand to any
set of  properties Δ fully describable in non-normative descriptive terms, sensible and meaningful
normative disagreements whether some action, person, state of  affairs, etc. that has Δ is indeed
good, bad, right, wrong, etc. seem possible. After all, it seems quite plausible that it is a very real
possibility that different individuals consistently apply normative concepts to a wide variety of
cases with quite different non-normative descriptive properties: just think about Hare’s example of
the missionary who lands on an island of  cannibals (Hare 1952: 148/149). We can imagine the
missionary and the cannibals applying their moral concepts to quite different things over a wide
variety of  cases, e.g. the missionary thinking people good “who are meek and gentle and do not
collect large quantities of  scalps” while the cannibals think people good “who are bold and burly
and collect more scalps than the average” (Hare 1952: 148). However, jus t the fact that the
missionary and the cannibals apply such concepts consistently to cases with different non-
normative descriptive properties would not make us at all inclined to say that they have different
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dissertation—that for normative judgements the very same is true.51 What would the
consequence of  this be? The consequence would be that reductionists give us
insuffcient individuation conditions for normative concepts, and that some
characterizing aspect of  normative judgements would be missed by any reductionist
account. More specifcally, it would show that competent and clear-headed speakers
have the intuition that the issues which normative judgements are about cannot be
settled conclusively by pointing to certain properties fully describable in non-normative
terms or some relation R in which our normative judgements stand to such
properties. This sets them distinctively apart from questions arising in science, e.g.
about what the chemical structure of  water is, which intuitively can be so answered. It
seems, consequently, that competent speakers have the intuition that questions
involving normative concepts are questions demanding a different kind of  judgement
as an answer than the kind of  answers that judgements about non-normative
descriptive facts provide. A good explanation for what goes wrong with reductionist
accounts might, therefore, be that non-normative descriptive judgements lack the
distinctive way in which normative judgements can settle the thing to do, and so that
reductionism misses what is distinctively normative about normative judgements. Of
course, if  this is correct this is a very serious problem for reductionism since it means
that any reductionist account of  our normative judgements will miss something that
is fairly central to these judgements, namely, their distinctive normative character.
This should be seen as costing the representationalist a quite signifcant chunk of
plausibility points, if  she decides to impale herself  on the second horn of  the
dilemma directed against REPRESENTATIONALISM ABOUT NORMATIVE JUDGEMENTS.52
moral concepts, as can be seen from the fact that we would regard the missionary and the
cannibals to be in disagreement about what is good. What normative twin-earth highlights, is the fact
that the reductionist must be able to tell a plausible story about why the fact that different
judgements stand towards different descriptive properties in some relation R should be any
different from the other ways in which individuals could be inclined to apply the same normative
concepts to cases with different descriptive properties. And the problem for reductionists is that it
seems hard to see what this story could be.
51 I am only assuming this without argument for the sake of  this dissertation. Of  course, meta-
normative representationalists have given responses to the kind of  argument given by Horgan and
Timmons. See, for example, Copp 2000, Laurence, Margolis, and Dawson 1999, van Roojen 2006,
Sayre-McCord 1997, and Viggiano 2008. For more elaborate defences of  the argument in the face
of  criticism, see e.g., Ehrhardt Unpublished: chapter 2, Horgan and Timmons 2000, and Rubin
2008.
52 Of  course it is possible that reductionists will come up with a satisfactory account of  the
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The fact that REPRESENTATIONALISM ABOUT NORMATIVE JUDGEMENTS loses a signifcant
number of  plausibility points either way provides support for NON-REPRESENTATIONALISM
ABOUT NORMATIVE JUDGEMENTS, and thus supports the second part of  expressivism’s
second thesis. That is, the problems that REPRESENTATIONALISM ABOUT NORMATIVE
JUDGEMENTS encounters give quite a lot of  plausibility to the thesis that normative
judgements have a non-representational character. In fact, it is easy to see that if  we
endorse NON-REPRESENTATIONALISM ABOUT NORMATIVE JUDGEMENTS we do not face the
worries we face on either horn of  the dilemma. If  we endorse NON-
REPRESENTATIONALISM ABOUT NORMATIVE JUDGEMENTS we lose any commitment to the
representationalist order of  explanation for normative judgements, and in this way
evade the problems it brings with it.
First, we face neither the epistemological nor the metaphysical problems of
non-reductionism. Specifc metaphysical worries about features of  normative facts do
not plague non-representationalism, as the non-representationalist’s explanatory
story of  the nature of  normative judgements does not even proceed in terms of  the
nature of  normative facts. Moreover, the same applies to the epistemological worries
that non-reductionism faces. Because the non-representationalist’s explanatory story
does not proceed in terms of  the nature of  normative facts, there will be no need for
an account of  the relationship between our normative judgements and the facts they
are about as part of  the explanatory story. So, non-representationalism makes no
assumptions about normative judgements that are incompatible with a naturalistic,
scientifc world-view, or which are otherwise metaphysically queer. It, thereby, does
not threaten to commit us to an error-theory and, consequently, does not undermine,
by itself, the legitimacy of  our ordinary normative practice. That it promises to do so
within a naturalistic framework rakes in additional plausibility points.
normativity of  normative judgement (which I have here assumed, for the purposes of  this
dissertation, is not the case). One such option might be “going hybrid” that is by giving accounts
according to which normative language serves to express or normative thinking consists in both
representational states and conative attitudes and by letting the conative element bring in the
normative dimension into normative judgements, while the representational state still remains
primary in determining the truth conditions of  normative judgements (see e.g. Copp 2001, Finlay
2004 and Tresan 2006 for views of  this kind). However, even these theories still face variants of  the
same problems that other reductionists face (as mentioned in footnote forty eight of  this chapter,
see again the arguments given in Ridge Forthcoming: Chapter 4 and Ehrhardt Unpublished:
chapter 7).
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Second, NON-REPRESENTATIONALISM ABOUT NORMATIVE JUDGEMENTS also does not have
implications of  the kind that reductionism has, which would lead us to ignore
something distinctive about normative judgement. For reductionism, the
representationalist order of  explanation brings with it the problem raised by the
OQA and its predecessors of  illegitimately closing or settling certain kinds of
questions, and by the resulting wrong predictions about the possibility of  normative
disagreement. Non-representationalism faces neither of  these problems. First,
nothing on a non-representationalist framework entails that normative questions can
be settled in the way in which reductionist theories are committed. While this just
means that non-representationalism avoids this problematic commitment, expressivism
—as a particular non-representationalist view—can already give a particular account
for this: on an expressivist account, questions requiring normative judgements as an
answer cannot be conclusively settled by judgements about facts fully describable in
non-normative terms because the formation of  a normative judgement consists (at
least partly) in the adoption of  a conative attitude, while the formation of  judgements
involving only non-normative descriptive concepts consists in adopting
representational states such that a judgement is true if  and only if  the
representational state it consists in is true. However, because conative attitudes and
representational states are modally distinct (as assumed by a broadly Humean theory
of  psychology), there is also a modal “gap” between adopting normative judgements
and adopting judgements about things fully describable in non-normative descriptive
terms.
Additionally, within a non-representationalist framework, whether or not two
parties disagree will not be determined by whether they stand in some relation to the
same facts or properties, and so non-representationalism avoids reductionism’s
problems with normative disagreement. Of  course, this also just means that non-
representationalism avoids problematic commitments, but again expressivism—as a
particular non-representationalist view—has a particular account to give for this
phenomenon: note that intuitively not only representational states, but also non-
representational states of  the kind that expressivists think (at least partially) constitute
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normative judgements can be in disagreement.53 One very clear example for this is
what C.L. Stevenson has called “disagreement in attitude”. For example, if
Hannelore wants herself  and Manfred to spent the evening watching a movie, while
Manfred wants Hannelore and himself  to spend the evening dancing at The Club, it
seems plausible to say that they have a disagreement in conative attitudes, not a
disagreement in representational states. However, people can disagree in these
relevant non-representational states, even if  they agree in all their representational
states. Not only that, but people can even disagree in these non-representational
states if  those states stand in the same relation R to different sets of  properties Δ1 and
Δ2 and even if  both of  the parties know this. So, on the expressivist account, two
individuals can have the same normative concepts and be in normative disagreement
or agreement in exactly those conditions which our intuitions about normative twin-
earth reveals that they can be.
The dilemma that REPRESENTATIONALISM ABOUT NORMATIVE JUDGEMENTS faces and the
way that NON-REPRESENTATIONALISM ABOUT NORMATIVE JUDGEMENTS avoids it can be seen as
the main source of  plausibility points for that thesis. More specifcally, the dilemma
t h a t REPRESENTATIONALISM ABOUT NORMATIVE JUDGEMENTS faces provides signifcant
credibility to the claim that the nature of  normative judgement is non-
representational. The fact that a particular thesis about what kind of  non-
representational state is constitutive of  normative judgement can provide plausible
explanations for certain of  the phenomena that representationalism has diffculties
capturing, lends stronger support for this thesis.
I think we should now have a reasonably good overview of  the main
motivations for expressivism, namely, the supporting considerations that derive from
the points in favour of  NON-REPRESENTATIONALISM ABOUT NORMATIVE JUDGEMENTS and in
favour of  the CONATIVE NATURE OF NORMATIVE JUDGEMENTS. The main point in favour of
expressivism, I take it, is that it promises to preserve the legitimacy of  our ordinary
normative practice and what is distinctive about normative thought and discourse,
without requiring the adoption of  extravagant metaphysical assumptions that might,
in the end, undermine the legitimacy of  ordinary normative practice, or which would
53 For different accounts of  disagreement in non-representational states, see e.g. Gibbard 2003: 65-71,
Ridge 2013 and Stevenson 1937 and Stevenson 1944: 1-19.
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put the legitimacy of  ordinary normative practice at odds with a broadly naturalist
world-view. I think it should be uncontroversial—even from this brief  overview—that
expressivism is a well-motivated and interesting philosophical view with some initial
theoretical appeal, a view the overall prospects of  which, it is worthwhile to
investigate. Because we must assess the prospects of  philosophical views holistically,
that is how well they do on balance compared to their competitors, however, it will not
do just to focus on the points in favour of  expressivism. If  we think that expressivism
and its promises are initially attractive, we must also consider expressivism’s problems
to be able to see how attractive it is on balance. I will turn to this issue in the next
section.
3. BEYOND FREGE-GEACH: NEGLECTED CHALLENGES FOR EXPRESSIVISM
While there are signifcant motivations for expressivism, expressivism also faces
signifcant problems. One such problem has, thereby, been at the centre of  attention
in the debate surrounding expressivism for more than ffty years: the Frege-Geach
Problem.54 I take the Frege-Geach Problem to be the following: expressivism gives an
account of  the meaning of  normative sentences, presumably an account of  those
sentences as they occur in natural languages. That means that expressivism should
entail the right kinds of  predictions about the semantic behaviour of  normative
sentences in natural languages. However, on the basis of  this requirement, there are
two features of  natural languages which pose a problem for expressivists. The frst
feature of  natural languages is that they are governed by the principle of  compositionality.
According to the principle of  compositionality, the meaning and semantic properties
of  every meaningful complex sentence is a function of  the meaning and semantic
properties of  its parts. The second feature of  natural languages is that normative
54 The Frege-Geach Problem was frst introduced independently by Peter Geach (Geach 1960 and
Geach 1965) and John Searle (Searle 1962). Since then the problem has received a lot of  attention
with expressivists (and those sympathetic to the view) proposing solutions to the problem or ways
how the problem might be solved (e.g. Hare 1970, Blackburn 1984a: 189-196 and Blackburn 1988,
Dreier 2006, Gibbard 1992: 83-102 and Gibbard 2003: 60-87, Horgan and Timmons 2006: 277-
282 and 288-292 and Horgan and Timmons 2009b, Ridge 2006a: 324-333 and Ridge 2007a: 62-
6 7 , Schroeder 2008a and Schroeder 2008c, Sinclair 2011, and Toppinen 2013) and their
opponents arguing that these solutions do not satisfactorily solve the problem (among the vast
collection of  such arguments a notable selection includes Schueler 1988, Hale 1993, van Roojen
1996, Unwin 1999 and Unwin 2001, and Schroeder 2008a). A very good overview of  this debate
and the nature of  the Frege-Geach Problem in general can be found in Schroeder 2008d.
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vocabulary can be part of  complex sentences in the same ways and with the same semantic
properties in which ordinary non-normative descriptive vocabulary can be part of
complex sentences.
An expressivist account must be able to preserve both of  these features of
natural languages and explain why sentences have the semantic properties they have.
However, giving such an account has proven to be incredibly diffcult for
expressivists, due to their commitments about the nature of  normative judgements.
As we know, on the expressivist account, the meaning of  any sentence is to be
explained in terms of  the mental state that sentence expresses. So, expressivists
should subscribe to the claim that the meaning of  more complex sentences is to be
explained in terms of  the mental states they express, where this mental state can
somehow be seen as a function from the mental states that are expressed by the
sentences which constitute the parts of  the relevant complex sentences. Consider now
the example of  an atomic normative sentence, namely, atomic moral sentences of  the
form 
(3) Φ-ing is morally wrong.
On a very simplistic expressivist model I will use for illustration, sentences of  the
form of  (3) express an attitude of  disapproval towards Φ-ing, where Φ-ing stands for
some action type. To account for the two features of  natural languages mentioned
further above, we now have to ask what mental state is expressed by more complex
sentences in which “... is morally wrong” fgures. To illustrate the diffculties that
expressivists have with giving a plausible answer to this, it suffces to take the most
simple case, the case of
(4) Φ-ing is not morally wrong.
What kind of  mental state could be expressed by (4)? It needs to be a mental state
being in which is inconsistent with being in the mental state expressed by (3), as (3) and
(4) are inconsistent and expressivists want to explain the properties of  sentences in
terms of  the properties of  the mental states they express. What mental state could
this be? It cannot be the same attitude towards inconsistent contents, because the
attitude which is inconsistent in this sense with the attitude expressed by (3) is
disapproval of  not Φ-ing. However, on the above expressivist account, disapproval of
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not Φ-ing should be the attitude expressed by “Not Φ-ing is morally wrong”, not the
attitude expressed by “Φ-ing is not morally wrong”. This means though that so far
we have an account of  the meaning of  (3) and of  
(5) Not Φ-ing is morally wrong.
but not for (4). Furthermore, it seems prima facie hard to see how the same attitude
expressed in (3) could plausibly fgure in (4) so as to give the correct kind of
semantics. But, if  we cannot give a plausible answer even for this simple case (making
it unlikely that expressivism would fare better for more complex cases), it seems that
this would be a very high, potentially devastating theoretical cost for expressivism.
It is unquestionable that the Frege-Geach Problem is a very important
challenge to expressivism. However, while this problem has attracted a lot of
attention in the debate surrounding expressivism, there are other problems for
expressivism that have been neglected. In this dissertation, I want to shift more of  the
attention of  the debate to such challenges, and make progress on developing
plausible expressivist responses to these challenges. I think that this is an important
task at least for the following reasons. First, as already explained in the last section, it
seems plausible that the prospects of  meta-normative theories need to be assessed
holistically, in light of  how attractive they are on balance compared to their respective
competitors. Consequently, to be able to determine the overall plausibility of
expressivism, we should consider whether expressivists can successfully respond to all
challenges it faces, and whether any of  the solutions an expressivist could give might
not even gain expressivism plausibility points over its competitors. So, while the Frege-
Geach Problem is most defnitely an important problem, there is good justifcation,
when trying to determine expressivism’s prospects as a meta-normative view and
maybe argue that the prospects are good, to pay more attention to more neglected
challenges as well. 
Someone might object at this point that no amount work done on any amount
of  other challenges to expressivism than the Frege-Geach Problem could in any way
counterbalance the loss in plausibility that expressivism faces if  the Frege-Geach
Problem cannot be given a satisfactory solution. However, it seems to me that recent
years have actually already seen a lot of  progress towards plausible solutions to the
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Frege-Geach Problem. First, and foremost, while the “Blackburn-Gibbard” solution
to the Frege-Geach Problem, which I take it is now the standard response, has
recently come under fre by Mark Schroeder, the debate that was generated in
response to Schroeder’s critique actually shows this solution to be far more promising,
resourceful, and plausible than Schroeder makes it appear.55 Second, even if  one were
convinced by Schroeder’s critique and concluded that the Blackburn-Gibbard
solution must be abandoned, Schroeder’s worries actually generated several quite
sophisticated alternative solutions to the problem for pure expressivists.56 Third, the
prospects of  hybrid forms of  expressivism to solve the Frege-Geach Problem “on the
cheap” by including a representational element in normative judgement that does
not dictate its truth-conditions also appear promising.57 In fact, Michael Ridge, the
main proponent of  a form of  hybrid expressivism, has argued in great detail that this
is one of  the main advantages of  hybrid forms of  expressivism, and has elaborately
feshed out how hybrid forms of  expressivism can deal with the problem.58 With all
this progress on the Frege-Geach Problem, however, I think that we can be at least
cautiously optimistic that a fully satisfying solution to the Frege-Geach Problem is
forthcoming. If  this is the case though, then there is actually reason to consider other
55 The “Blackburn-Gibbard” solution to the Frege-Geach Problem was suggested independently by
Simon Blackburn (Blackburn 1988) and Allan Gibbard (Gibbard 1992 and Gibbard 2003) and
later endorsed by Horgan and Timmons (Horgan and Timmons 2006). It suggests that we
introduce an attitude of  toleration o r rejection which is held to be expressed by sentences like (4).
Tolerating Φ-ing is, thereby, supposed to be inconsistent with disapproval of  Φ-ing in the same
sense in which (4) is inconsistent with (3). This is supposed to yield an account of  the attitude that is
expressed by (4), which has all the relevant semantic properties. According to Schroeder’s critique,
however, this account provides no real explanation of  what kind of  attitude “toleration” or
“rejection” is, nor an explanation for why that attitude does have all the properties that are required
of  it. Instead, it seems that the Blackburn-Gibbard solution merely presupposes what it was
supposed to explain (Schroeder 2008a: 49-55). I think that the best response to this criticism is
given by Allan Gibbard, who points out, roughly, that any theory of  meaning has to start with
unexplained primitives and that just because Schroeder thinks that we should start with different
primitives, this by itself  provides no objection to the expressivist’s order of  explanation (Gibbard
2012, 20: Appendix 2 Schroeder on Expressivism). Other responses to Schroeder’s critique have
been developed in e.g. Horgan and Timmons 2009b, Richard 2011: 322, Sinclair 2011 and
Wedgwood 2010.
56 Most notably, Schroeder’s own account which he is quite critical of  himself  (Schroeder 2008a).
Other notable novel responses are given by Nate Charlow (Charlow Forthcoming) and Seth Yalcin
(Yalcin 2011 and Yalcin 2012). Recently Schroeder has also argued that the higher-order attitude
approach originally suggested by Blackburn (Blackburn 1984a), has much more promise than is
often thought (Schroeder 2014a).
57 For hybrid forms of  expressivism that promise to solve the Frege-Geach Problem, see Ridge
Forthcoming, Schroeder 2013, and Toppinen 2013.
58 See Ridge 2006a: 324-330, Ridge 2007a: 56-67 and Ridge Forthcoming: chapter 4.
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challenges as well, as questions regarding how expressivism will fare with regards to
those challenges will then have some importance for determining expressivim’s
overall plausibility.
In fact, even if  we are pessimistic about whether an expressivist account that
resolves the challenge posed by the Frege-Geach Problem to our full satisfaction is
forthcoming, I take it that the progress made and the fact that all of  these (at least to
some extent satisfying) responses exist indicates that we should not think of  the Frege-
Geach Problem as having the force that the above worry suggests. Rather, even if  no
expressivist answer to the Frege-Geach Problem is fully satisfactory, the extent to
which it would be revisionist could be acceptable if  it fares much better on other
grounds, and if  other challenges can be successfully resolved. This is especially
important to bear in mind once we consider that the stage of  the meta-normative
debate and the fact that different aspects of  normative language and thought seem to
support inconsistent meta-normative theories should not make us optimistic that any
one meta-normative theory will be satisfactory on all grounds, and that, consequently,
revisionism to some extent needs to be expected.59 Here I agree with Gibbard’s
suggestion about how we should approach philosophical theories in general and
meta-normative theories in particular:
“An analysis can be offered not as a bald statement of  fact about what
people mean, but as a proposal. Where a term is problematical, a new
and clearer sense may serve its purposes—or some of  them. No
unique analysis need be correct; rather, we can expect some analyses
to work better than others. There may be an analysis that is clearly
best for certain purposes, and there may not. […] Any philosophical
analysis strains its concept. We can learn about a concept by seeing
what choice of  strains it offers. When an analysis keeps us from saying
things we want to say, then we have to think how important it is to go
on saying them, and we have to think about costs. Analyses let us
compare the strains of  alternatives.”60
59 In fact, Don Loeb, Michael Gill, and Walter Sinnott-Armstrong have taken the current stage of  the
meta-normative debate as evidence that no single meta-normative theory is true for all of  our
ordinary normative practice. These authors differ on why they think that this is the case, though.
Loeb has argued that this is because ordinary normative practice is incoherent (Loeb 2008). Gill has
argued that this is because different theories might be true for different parts of  ordinary normative
practice, but that no theory is true for all of  ordinary normative practice (Gill 2008a, Gill 2008b,
and Gill 2009). Sinnott-Armstrong has argued that this is because it is indeterminate which theory is
true for ordinary normative practice (Sinnott-Armstrong 2009).
60 Gibbard 1992: 32. For a similar point, see also Darwall, Gibbard, and Railton 1992.
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If  this is correct, however, then it will be even more important to consider how
expressivism would handle many different kinds of  challenges and to pay more
attention to the neglected ones, in order to see how much, compared to its
competitors, an expressivist account would strain our ordinary normative concepts.
There is one further motivation for looking at problems for expressivism other
than the Frege-Geach Problem that I want to mention here: looking at other relevant
challenges for expressivism might help to highlight signifcantly whether and how
important the Frege-Geach Problem actually is. If  a solution to these problems in
some way presupposes a solution of  the Frege-Geach Problem, for example, this
would highlight the importance of  solving the Frege-Geach Problem. If  these
problems can be solved independently of  the Frege-Geach Problem, on the other
hand, this would support that the Frege-Geach Problem is of  less importance than
one might think.
Of  course, while there are many neglected problems that one could pay more
attention to, reasons of  scope require that I restrict my focus for the purposes of  this
dissertation. In what follows I will focus on two challenges. Let me now end this
chapter by saying a little bit more, by way of  introduction, about each of  these two
challenges.
The frst challenge I will consider (in the second chapter) is what can be called
the “normative attitude problem”.61 This is an objection to expressivism based on the
claim that expressivists must provide an account of  the nature of  the conative
attitudes which centrally constitute normative judgements. According to the
objection, the challenge impales expressivists on a dilemma, each horn of  which has
unacceptable consequences for the expressivist. Consequently, expressivists cannot
give a satisfactory answer to the challenge of  giving an account of  the nature of  the
attitudes which constitute normative judgements. I argue that expressivists can
address this challenge by drawing on resources that meta-normative
representationalists made available when they faced a structurally similar dilemma,
and that these resources even make an expressivist account feasible on which
normative judgements consist in sui generis attitudes.
61 Following Alexander Miller’s terminology who calls the problem as applied only to moral
judgements the “moral attitude problem” (see Miller 2003).
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The second challenge I will consider (in the remaining chapters) is a challenge
to a particular expressivist project: quasi-realism. Quasi-realism aims to show that
expressivism is compatible with those assumptions underlying our ordinary practice
that lend support to meta-normative realism. Part of  this project is to show that
expressivism is compatible with a web of  closely connected assumptions, namely, that
normative thought and discourse are truth-apt and that normative judgements are
beliefs. While quasi-realists have made some progress in this direction, there is one
relevant phenomenon that has so far been neglected, namely, those uses of  that-
clauses associated with propositional contents. This is a problematic neglect, as I
argue in the third chapter, because in order to allow that normative thought and
discourse are truth-apt and normative judgements beliefs, expressivists must allow
certain relevant uses of  that-clauses. However, it is unclear how expressivism’s
theoretical assumptions ft with such uses. In that same chapter I then remove in
principle worries that expressivism could be compatible with such uses. In the fourth
and ffth chapters I will then develop a defationary account of  the relevant uses of
that-clauses that is fully compatible with expressivism’s theoretical commitments. I
will start developing the account in the fourth chapter by focusing on the use of  that-
clauses in attributions of  meaning. In the ffth chapter I will then explore how the
account can be expanded to the use of  that-clauses in belief-attributions.
4. SUMMARY
This chapter has served as an introduction into the material covered in this
dissertation. I have explained how I understand expressivism and presented the main
motivations for this view. I have then talked about the Frege-Geach Problem and
argued why it is important to go beyond this problem when one is concerned with
expressivism’s overall plausibility. I have ended the chapter with a short presentation
of  the problems that concern the rest of  the dissertation.
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CHAPTER II: DO EXPRESSIVISTS HAVE AN ATTITUDE PROBLEM?1
0. INTRODUCTION
The objection I consider in this chapter is the normative attitude problem. This is
the objection that (i) expressivists must give an account of  the nature of  the attitudes
constituting normative judgements, (ii) they can do so by saying either that these are
sui generis attitudes or that they are reducible to attitudes fully describable in non-
normative terms, but (iii) that the frst option is uninformative and incompatible with
naturalism and the second incompatible with our intuitions about normative
judgements. In this chapter I argue for two conclusions regarding this apparent
dilemma. First, that expressivists can and should address this problem by drawing on
strategies meta-normative representationalists use to address a problem, whose
analogy to the normative attitude problem has not been suffciently appreciated in
meta-normative theory. Second, that piggybacking on these strategies not only makes
the second horn of  the apparent dilemma viable for expressivists, but also clears the
way for expressivists to take its frst horn, holding that normative judgements consist
in sui generis attitudes.
I proceed as follows: section one clarifes the normative attitude problem. In
section two, I argue that meta-normative representationalism faces an analogous and
equally pressing problem. Here I also explain what strategies representationalists have
developed to address it, and argue that expressivists can use the same strategies to
address the normative attitude problem. Moreover, I argue these strategies not only
allow the more typical expressivist approach—on which normative judgements are
reducible to attitudes fully describable in non-normative terms—to address the
normative attitude problem. They also reveal how we might develop an expressivist
approach according to which normative judgements consist in sui generis attitudes. In
section three, I sketch just enough of  one such non-standard expressivist position to
provide at least some license for optimism that adopting the dilemma’s frst horn is in
principle feasible.
1 This chapter draws heavily on my Köhler 2013.
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1. EXPRESSIVISM AND THE NORMATIVE ATTITUDE PROBLEM
The normative attitude problem is an objection to expressivism’s second thesis.1
Recall that this thesis consists in two claims, namely,
NON-REPRESENTATIONALISM ABOUT NORMATIVE JUDGEMENTS: The mental
states which constitute normative judgements do n o t consist in
representational states such that a normative judgement is true if  and
only if  the representational state it consists in is true.
and
CONATIVE NATURE OF NORMATIVE JUDGEMENTS: The mental states which
constitute normative judgements (at least partially) consist in conative
attitudes. 
The normative attitude problem has, in varying forms, been pressed by several
philosophers, although these philosophers have mostly concentrated on the more
narrow moral attitude problem, which is a form of  the normative attitude problem
applied to a sub-class of  normative judgements, namely, moral judgements.2 Applied
to moral judgements Judith Jarvis Thomson, for example, presents the objection in
the following remarks:
“[T]he [expressivist] needs to avail himself  of  a special kind of
approval and disapproval: these have to be moral approval and moral
disapproval. For presumably he does not wish to say that believing
Alice ought to do a thing is having toward her doing it the same
attitude of  approval that I have toward the sound of  her splendid new
violin. The problem I point to here is a familiar one; [...] It pays to
stress its seriousness, however. For if  there is no way of  saying what the
attitude of  moral approval consists in other than by saying that having
it toward a thing just is believing a favorable moral sentence, then this
[expressivist] thesis is uninformative [...].”3
Similarly, Michael Smith writes, this time about normative judgements in general:
1 For the purposes of  this chapter I will bracket, for simplicity’s sake, hybrid views according to
which normative judgements consist in bo th representational states a n d conative attitudes. Of
course, such views also face the normative attitude problem, as they have to give an account of  the
attitude partly constituting normative judgements (in fact, they face the normative attitude problem
both as it applies to representationalism and as it applies to expressivism). Everything I say about
how to address the normative attitude problem, however, should be available to hybrid theorists
too.
2 For authors who have pressed the moral attitude problem, see e.g. D’Arms and Jacobson 1994
Harth 2008: 51-53, Kauppinen 2010: 225-257, Kirchin 2012, McDowell 1998: 158-59, Merli
2008, Miller 2003: 43-51 and 88-94, Smith 2001: 107-114, and Thomson 1996: 104-111.
3 Thomson 1996: 110.
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“[Expressivists] insist that it is analytic that when people sincerely
make normative claims they thereby express desires or aversions. But
which desires and aversions [...], and what special feature do they
possess that makes them especially suitable for expression in a
normative claim? How do they differ from mere desires and aversions
that aren’t suitable for such expression? The diffculty involved in
supposing that there are any such desires or aversions at all cannot be
overestimated. It is, after all, agreed on all sides that the psychological
state we express when we make a normative claim has many of  the
functional features of  [representational states]. The diffculty, to
anticipate, is that it is hard to see how desires or aversions could have
exactly these functional features [...].”4
The argument can be set up in the form of  a dilemma in three steps.
The frst is to note that the conative attitudes supposed to constitute normative
judgements do signifcant explanatory work on the expressivist account: both the
meaning of  normative sentences and the nature of  normative judgements are
explained in terms of  these attitudes. Without an account of  the nature of  these
states, which shows how they do this explanatory work, expressivism would,
consequently, be objectionably incomplete. So, expressivists must provide such an
account. Meeting this challenge is especially important because it is not obvious that
normative judgements do consist in conative attitudes, which makes the challenge to
give an account of  the specifc nature of  such attitudes all the more pressing. First, as
Crispin Wright has pointed out, for the case of  moral judgements, which seems
equally true for normative judgements in general, the phenomenology of  normative
judgements is not decisively like that of  any of  the familiar conative attitudes, so we
will not be able to use phenomenology to tell us something about the nature of  the
attitudes that constitute normative judgements.5 Second, as Michael Smith has noted
for the case of  moral judgements, which again seems true for normative judgements
in general, normative judgements seem to have a functional role that is (at least
partially) like that paradigmatically associated with representational states—for
example, normative judgements behave in inferences like representational states and
they seem to be governed by similar epistemic norms—and like that paradigmatically
associated with conative attitudes—for example, normative judgements have
4 Smith 2001: 107-108.
5 Wright 1988: 11-13.
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motivational power and a close connection to emotions.6 Smith’s point is particularly
crucial for expressivists, since they accept a broadly Humean theory of  motivation
according to which mental states cannot have both the functional role of
representational states a n d that of  conative attitudes and, consequently, need to
explain this appearance differently.
The second step is to note that expressivists have only two routes to give an
account of  the nature of  the normative attitude. First, they can hold that to account
for normative judgements, we need to introduce an additional type of  conative attitude
into our theory of  mind, over and above those already part of  an account of  non-
normative thinking such as emotions, desires, or intentions. Following this approach,
expressivists will hold that normative judgements consist (characteristically) in a
distinctive, sui generis type of  conative attitude which cannot be (completely) reduced
to attitudes already part of  an account of  non-normative thinking.
The second route is to hold that in order to account for normative judgements,
we do not need to introduce an additional type of  conative attitude into our theory of
mind over and above those already part of  an account of  non-normative thinking.
Instead, normative judgements can be completely accounted for in terms of  attitudes
that are already part of  an account of  non-normative thinking. Of  course, since the
relevant conative attitudes will in themselves not be normative attitudes, expressivists
taking this approach must identify some feature that distinguishes normative
instances of  these attitudes from non-normative instances. This could, e.g., be that
they play a distinctive functional role or result from distinctive causal processes.
Finally, we can note three conditions expressivist accounts of  the normative
attitude must satisfy. First,
INFORMATIVITY: The expressivist account of  the normative attitude must be
informative.
Imposing INFORMATIVITY is justifed by those considerations that raise the challenge to
provide an account of  the normative attitude in the frst place. Since those conative
attitudes that supposedly constitute normative judgements pull signifcant
explanatory weight for expressivists, they must give an informative account of  these
6 See e.g. Smith 1994a: 4-11.
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attitudes that pulls this weight. Without such an account, expressivists have asserted,
but not shown that the relevant features of  normative language and thought can be
accounted for in terms of  conative attitudes.
The second condition that needs to be satisfed is, 
NATURALISM: The expressivist account of  the normative attitude must be
compatible with a naturalistic world-view.
Although expressivism is not necessarily tied to a naturalistic world-view, two
considerations support imposing NATURALISM on expressivist accounts of  normative
judgements. First, all expressivists in the meta-normative debate endorse a
naturalistic world-view, so NATURALISM applies to all actual expressivists challenged
with the normative attitude problem. Second, as explained in the frst chapter, a main
argument in favour of  expressivism is its ability to ft normative judgements into a
naturalistic framework, while preserving what is distinctive about normative
judgement. The rejection of  NATURALISM would deprive expressivists of  this argument
for their view.
The third condition is,
PLAUSIBILITY: The expressivist account of  the normative attitude must, at least in
clear cases, agree with competent speakers’ intuitions about what
is, and what is not, an instance of  normative judgement.7
PLAUSIBILITY is justifed as follows: expressivists give a systematic and informative
analysis of  a phenomenon of  which we already have some (rough and mostly
implicit) understanding. This understanding is exemplifed by competent speakers’
intuitions about possible cases. Since these intuitions are our best epistemic guide to
the phenomenon in question, agreement with these intuitions is required just to avoid
changing the subject: if  the expressivist analysis disagreed substantially with
7 One worry that one might have about PLAUSIBILITY is that “normative” is not a term that is part of
ordinary discourse, but a technical term that philosophers have introduced for specifc purposes. If
this is the case, however, it will be mistaken to assume that ordinary speakers have intuitions about
what judgements are “normative” and so imposing PLAUSIBILITY on accounts of  normative
judgements is mistaken. My response to this worry is that philosophers use the term “normative”
to pick out a specifc phenomenon for which I assume that ordinary speakers do have a—mostly
implicit and rough—understanding, even if  ordinary speakers do not use the label “normative” to
talk and think about this phenomenon, but might only be able to pick it out by ostensive means e.g.
as “what is distinctive about moral judgements, judgements about reasons, etc.”. What we are
concerned about with PLAUSIBILITY is only that accounts of  normative judgements satisfy ordinary
speakers’ intuitions about this phenomenon.
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competent speakers’ intuitions about normative judgements, it would become
plausible that the analysis is not of  normative judgements, but of  something else.
Therefore, for the expressivist analysis to be plausible as an analysis of  normative
judgements, it must agree with competent speakers’ intuitions, at least in clear cases.
With these remarks in place, we can now present the dilemma that constitutes the
normative attitude problem.
If, on the frst horn of  the dilemma, expressivists claim that the normative
attitude is a sui generis attitude irreducible to conative attitudes already part of  an
account of  non-normative thinking, they will fail to satisfy INFORMATIVITY and
NATURALISM: what can they say about the normative attitude on this approach? They
can say that it is expressed by normative language, constitutes normative judgements,
and that its functional role seems like that of  both representational states and of
conative attitudes. However, neither of  these claims is informative, nor does this kind
of  account satisfactorily explain any of  the features of  normative judgements that call
for an explanation. For example, it merely presupposes, without explanation, that
there could be attitudes with the functional role of  both representational states and
conative attitudes. It also fails to explain what normative judgements are. As an
explanatory account of  how normative language and thought ft into a naturalistic
world-view this seems unsatisfactory and to violate both INFORMATIVITY and
NATURALISM.
If, on the second horn of  the dilemma, expressivists say that the normative
attitude can be analysed in terms of  attitudes already part of  our theory of  non-
normative thinking they will—according to proponents of  the normative attitude
problem—violate PLAUSIBILITY. Ironically, there seems to be some support for this
thesis in an argumentative device expressivists use to argue for their position, namely,
the OQA.8
8 Alexander Miller introduced the OQA in the context of  the moral attitude problem (Miller 2003:
47-51). He proposes two versions of  the OQA one could use against expressivism: the frst just
relies on the intuition that competent speakers will hold the question to be open whether some
conative attitude already part of  our account of  non-moral thinking is an instance of  moral
thinking. The other identifes some feature FM characteristic of  moral thinking and then argues that
competent speakers will hold the question to be open whether some conative attitude already part
of  a theory of  non-moral thinking has FM. Since the difference between these versions is irrelevant
for what follows, I will present the argument in its simpler form.
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How might the OQA be used to press the second horn of  the dilemma?
Although proponents of  this line of  argument have only concentrated on moral
judgements, it seems that it also works for the case of  normative judgements in
general. Remember that on the second horn of  the dilemma, expressivists want to
analyse normative judgements in terms of  some conative attitude C that is already
part of  a theory of  non-normative thinking and has some non-normative feature X
that distinguishes it from non-normative instances of  the same kind of  attitude. Such
an analysis succeeds only if  competent speakers hold the question “S has attitude C
with feature X, but is that an instance of  normative judgement?” to be conceptually
closed: they must hold that we could not coherently imagine someone who has
attitude C with feature X, but where this is not an instance of  normative judgement.
However, it is plausible that, for any conative attitude C already part of  our account
of  non-normative thinking, when combined with some non-normative feature X,
competent speakers will hold this question to be conceptually open. Absent further
explanation of  why this intuition is mistaken or another way to justify this divergence,
expressivist analyses of  normative judgements in terms of  conative attitudes already
part of  a theory of  non-normative thinking will, therefore, fail. And so, this second
route to an account of  the normative attitude fails to satisfy PLAUSIBILITY.
In sum, whichever route they take, expressivist accounts of  the nature of
normative judgements seem to violate at least one of  the conditions such accounts
should satisfy. Of  course, as it stands, this dilemma is not a knock-down argument
against expressivism, but rather a challenge to escape the dilemma. Until now
expressivists have mostly reacted to the normative attitude problem insofar as it
applies to moral judgement. And, for that version of  the problem, they have generally
tended to pursue the second horn of  the dilemma by giving analyses of  moral
judgement in terms of  conative attitudes already part of  an account of  non-moral
thinking that are supposed to agree with competent speakers’ intuitions.9 However, I
think that approaching the normative attitude problem in this way, independently of
whether we consider the general version or some narrow application of  it, is
wrongheaded: in my view, expressivists must recognize that they can use resources
9 See, for example, Blackburn 1998a: 8-14, 51, Gibbard 1992: 126-150 and Kauppinen 2010.
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meta-normative representationalists have made available when representationalists faced
the same dilemma. Let me explain what I have in mind and then explain how
expressivists can beneft from lessons representationalists learned.
2. REPRESENTATIONALISM AND THE NORMATIVE ATTITUDE PROBLEM
Anyone working in meta-normative theory (or anyone who has read the frst
chapter of  this dissertation) should be familiar with an argument that is structurally
similar to the normative attitude problem, but actually applies to expressivists’
opponents. The problem of  specifying the nature of  the mental state constituting
normative judgements is clearly not restricted to expressivists: it also applies to meta-
normative representationalists. Normative judgements have many features which,
prima facie, do not ft with the features representational states exemplify. After all, that
normative judgements display the functional role of  both representational states and
conative attitudes, should be problematic for both expressivists and representationalists.
Of  course, representationalists normally try to explain the nature of  normative
judgements—what is distinctive about normative judgements as opposed to other
kinds of  judgements—not in terms of  their psychological features, but in terms of  their
representational content: they try to explain the nature of  normative judgements in terms
of  the nature of  the states of  affairs normative judgements represent.10 Nevertheless,
to provide a successful explanatory account of  the nature of  normative judgements,
representationalists must also give an account of  normative judgements, or, more
10 An exception to this rule might be those who reject the Humean theory of  motivation and accept
that normative judgements consist in (non-hybrid) sui generis states which are both representational
states and conative attitudes at the same time (this view has been accepted, in one form or another,
by e.g. Dancy 1993, McDowell 1988, McNaughton 1988, Nagel 1979, Scanlon 1998, and Shafer-
Landau 2003). The view claims that it is not only their representational content, but also their
specifc psychological nature that sets normative judgements apart from other kinds of  judgements.
This kind of  view might be able to escape the normative attitude problem as presented later, but it
does so at the signifcant cost of  rejecting the Humean theory of  motivation which is often
regarded as our most plausible account for the role of  psychology in the production of  action. Of
course, it is also an open question whether views of  this kind actually d o escape the normative
attitude problem, as such accounts still owe an account of  both the specifc psychological nature
and the representational contents of  the relevant judgements in a way that satisfes the three
constraints. For the purposes of  the dialectic of  this chapter, however, it will not be fruitful to delve
into such issues. It is only relevant that a signifcant proportion of  expressivism’s dialectical rivals
face a structurally similar problem to the normative attitude and that expressivists can draw on the
ways in which these positions respond to that problem to address the normative attitude problem.
Consequently, I will bracket theories of  the above kind here, when I talk about representationalists.
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specifcally, of  the kind of  representational content that explains the nature of
normative judgements.
Representationalists, like expressivists, can proceed in two ways. First, they can
hold that accounting for the representational content of  normative judgements
requires introducing an additional type of  fact into our ontology over and above
those that are already the objects of  non-normative descriptive judgements. Following
this approach, representationalists will hold that normative facts consist
(characteristically) in a distinctive, sui generis type of fact, which cannot be (completely)
reduced to those types that are the objects of  non-normative descriptive judgements.
The second route for meta-normative representationalists is to hold that accounting
for the representational content of  normative judgements does not require
introducing an additional type of  fact into our ontology over and above those that are
already the objects of  non-normative descriptive judgements. Instead, the
representational content of  normative judgements can be completely accounted for
in terms of  facts that are the objects of  non-normative descriptive judgements.
Furthermore, we can specify three conditions that representationalist accounts
of  normative judgements must satisfy, which mirror the three conditions expressivist
accounts must satisfy. First, 
INFORMATIVITY: The representationalist account of  the representational content
of  normative judgements must be informative.
The justifcation for INFORMATIVITY also follows from the considerations that make it
plausible that representationalists (like expressivists) must provide an account of
normative judgements in the frst place. Without such an account, representationalists
have asserted, but not shown that we can account for the features of  normative
language and thought in terms of  representational states with certain
representational contents.
The second condition that needs to be satisfed is, 
NATURALISM: The representationalist account of  the representational content of
normative judgements must be compatible with a naturalistic
world-view.
Imposing NATURALISM on representationalist accounts of  normative judgement can be
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justifed along the following lines: there is good reason to adopt a naturalistic world-
view and one of  the greatest challenges of  contemporary meta-normative theory is to
explain how normativity fts into such a framework. Dialectically speaking,
representationalist views according to which the representational content of
normative judgements does not ft into a naturalistic framework will, therefore, be at
an explanatory disadvantage to expressivism or those representationalist views
according to which the representational content of  normative judgements does ft
into a naturalistic framework. This is so because the former kinds of
representationalist accounts will effectively either have to reject the truth of  a
naturalistic world-view, or posit an error-theory. So, representationalists should avoid
rejecting NATURALISM.
The third condition is,
PLAUSIBILITY: The representationalist account of  the representational content of
normative judgements must, at least in clear cases, agree with
competent speakers’ intuitions about what is, and what is not, an
instance of  a normative fact.
The justifcation for imposing PLAUSIBILITY on representationalist accounts again
mirrors the justifcation for imposing it on expressivist accounts: representationalism
gives a systematic and informative analysis of  a phenomenon we already have some
(rough and mostly implicit) understanding of, an understanding exemplifed by
competent speakers’ intuitions about possible cases. Since these intuitions are our best
epistemic guide to this phenomenon, agreement with these intuitions is required just
to avoid changing the subject: if  the representationalist analysis were to disagree
substantially with competent speakers’ intuitions about the representational content
of  normative judgements, it would become plausible that the analysis is not one of
the content of  normative judgements, but of  something else. So, the analysis should
be in agreement with competent speakers intuitions, at least in clear cases. With these
remarks in place, however, we can now generate the following dilemma.
If, on the frst horn of  the dilemma, representationalists claim that the
representational content of  normative judgements consists in irreducible, sui generis
normative facts, they will be unable to satisfy INFORMATIVITY and NATURALISM: what can
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someone taking this route say about the representational content of  normative
judgements? She can say that it is what is represented by normative language and
thought and that because of  this representational content normative judgements have
a functional role that seems to be like that of  both representational states and
conative attitudes. However, as with the expressivist account, these claims are neither
informative, nor do they satisfactorily explain any of  the features of  normative
judgements (or of  the facts they are about) that call for an explanation. For example,
it merely presupposes, but does not explain, that there are facts which provide
representational states about them with the functional role of  both representational
states and conative attitudes, nor does it explain what normative judgements are. As
an explanatory account of  how normative language and thought ft into a naturalistic
world-view this is unsatisfactory and violates INFORMATIVITY and NATURALISM.
On the second horn of  the dilemma, if  representationalists take the second
approach, they will be unable to satisfy PLAUSIBILITY. The OQA can be used again to
support this claim: representationalists who take the second approach want to analyse
the representational content N of  instances of  normative judgements in terms of  the
representational content D of  certain non-normative descriptive judgements. Such an
analysis succeeds, only if  competent speakers hold the question “x is D, but is x M?”
to be conceptually closed. But, it is plausible that for any representational content D
of  certain non-normative descriptive judgements, competent speakers will hold this
question to be open. Absent further explanation of  this divergence, representationalist
analyses of  the representational content of  normative judgements in terms of  the
representational content of  certain non-normative descriptive judgements will,
therefore, fail. The second route will not satisfy PLAUSIBILITY.
It should be clear that this is exactly the dilemma that I have presented in the
frst chapter as providing motivation for expressivism. However, as I have already
explained in the last chapter, meta-normative representationalists can respond to the
second horn of  their “normative attitude problem”, if  it is pressed using the above
version of  the OQA, in at least two ways. It will now be worthwhile to elaborate on
two prominent responses that representationalists have given to this problem.
First, consider the approach of  some of  the “Cornell Realists” as applied to
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normative judgements (I will call this the “Cornell approach”).11 According to this
approach, we must take into account that two concepts F1 and F2 can refer to the
same property ПF not only because there is a reductive analysis of  one in terms of  the
other, but also as a matter of  synthetic a posteriori fact. If  two concepts refer to the
same property in the second way, however, this can be discovered only through
empirical inquiry and not solely through competence with the concepts in question.
Consequently, competent speakers will hold the question “x is F1 but is it F2?” to be
conceptually open, although, as a matter of  metaphysical fact, it is not. A good
example here are the concepts WATER and H2O: although WATER and H2O refer to the
same thing, this cannot be grasped solely by being competent with these concepts.
Instead it was an empirical discovery that WATER and H2O refer to the same thing. At
least prior to this discovery, competent speakers would, therefore, have held the
question “This is water, but is it H2O?” to be open, even though the two concepts, as
a matter of  empirical fact, refer to the same thing.
According to the Cornell approach as applied to normative judgements, the
same can hold for normative concepts: it is possible that the properties normative
concepts re fe r to are identical with properties certain kinds of  non-normative
descriptive judgements refer to, but that this is a synthetic a posteriori fact, not because
there is a reductive analysis of  normative concepts in terms of  non-normative
descriptive concepts. In this case, competent speakers will hold “x has non-normative
property D, but does it have normative property N?” to be open, although as a matter
of  metaphysical fact it will not be. If  this is true, however, the OQA is not damaging
for reductionists. They can hold that the representational content of  normative
judgements is identical to facts that are already familiar as the representational
content of  certain kinds of  non-normative descriptive judgements, but that
competent speakers cannot determine this merely through refection because it is an a
posteriori matter. Which means, of  course, that the reductionist’s proposal regarding
11 Proponents who apply the following approach to moral judgements are Boyd 1988 and Brink 1989:
163-167. Peter Railton also seems to accept such a view (see e.g. Railton 1986: 170-173 and
Railton 1990: 157/158), although his view is not, strictly speaking, a form of  “Cornell realism”, a
label reserved for the views of  a group of  philosophers based in or closely affliated with the
Cornell University. Although Cornell realism for all normative judgements has not been defended
in print, there is nothing that would prevent it from being applicable to all normative judgements.
52
the content of  normative thinking cannot be tested with the OQA.
The second approach for reductionists to evade the OQA is to follow the
approach that philosophers of  the “Canberra-Plan” developed for moral judgements
(I will call this the “Canberra approach”).12 According to this approach, there can be
a reductive analysis of  some concept F1 in terms of  another concept F2 the truth of
which is non-obvious. On this account, any conceptual analysis of  F1 will frst aim at
giving a characterization of  that x that realizes F1 in purely non-F1 terms (where x is
e.g. a property if  F1 is a predicative concept). We do this by observing that our concepts
are plausibly seen as being characterized by our dispositions to apply them and that
these dispositions should, consequently, reveal what we would, and would not, take to
be a realization of  the relevant concepts.13 So, we start an analysis by testing how
competent speakers apply F1 to real and hypothetical cases, trying to determine that
set of  conditions characteristic of  the application of  F1. Call these conditions the
“platitudes” that characterize the realizer of  F1 and the set of  platitudes central to
our uses of  F1 our “folk-theory of  F1”. However, since how competent speakers use
concepts might to some degree be inconsistent or rest on false assumptions, we should
not aim through conceptual analysis to capture every way competent speakers apply F1.
Rather, we should aim to fnd an analysis that does the job of  F1, but is free from
inconsistency, mistaken assumptions, etc. So, not only will we explicate the platitudes
that characterize competent speakers’ use of  F1, but also try to ft these platitudes into
a maximally coherent, systematic, and comprehensive framework. Call the set of
platitudes that characterize that x which realizes F1 arrived at in this way our “mature
folk-theory of  F1”.
Having arrived at this mature folk-theory, we can transform it into a non-circular
characterization of  the realizer of  F1 as follows. First, we reformulate the platitudes
that constitute our mature folk-theory so that all mentionings of  the realizer of  F1
12 The Canberra approach applied to moral judgements has been championed by Frank Jackson
(Jackson 1998: 28-37) and Frank Jackson and Philip Pettit (Jackson and Pettit 1995: 20-40, 22-29).
The approach develops ideas of  David Lewis. See e.g. Lewis 1970a: 427-446, Lewis 1972: 249-258,
and Lewis 1989: 113-137, 129-132. Although the Canberra approach for all normative judgements
has not yet been explicitly defended in print, nothing in the approach prevents it from being
applicable to all normative judgements.
13 For such views on concepts, see e.g. Lewis 1989: 129-132, Smith 1994a: 36-39, Jackson 1998: 28-
37 and Jackson and Pettit 1995: 22-29.
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come out as names (or noun-phrases). For example, if  F1 is a predicative concept, we
reformulate the platitudes in property-name style. Note that depending on the
complexity of  F1 we might have to introduce more than one name. For example, the
platitudes surrounding our concept COLOUR will make reference to certain colours,
mentionings of  which need to be stripped out for the characterization of  the realizer
of  COLOUR to be non-circular. To do so, however, we might need to introduce names
for all such colours. In what follows I will only present how the approach proceeds in
cases in which we need to introduce only one name, but keep in mind that, mutatis
mutandis, it will also work for more complex cases.
Once we have reformulated the platitudes, we form a conjunction out of  them,
which can be represented as a relational predicate true of  the realizer of  F1. Call this
relational predicate “TF” and let “a” stand for the name we introduced to refer to the
realizer of  F1. We can now formulate what Lewis called a “postulate” of  our mature
folk-theory of  F1, namely,
TF[a]
The postulate characterizes the realizer of  F1 in virtue of  its relations to other things,
namely, in virtue of  how it satisfes TF. This allows us to say that the realizer of  F1 is
exactly that phenomenon characterized by TF: TF gives us the functional role of  the
realizer of  F1. To get a non-circular characterization of  the realizer of  F1 we now
exchange the name for a free variable “x”, which yields
TF[x]
We then restate our theory of  F1 with the following Ramsey-sentence:
∃x{TF[x] ˄ (∀x*TF[x*] ↔ (x = x*))}.
According to the Ramsey sentence, there is one thing x which is such that it satisfes
the functional role stated by TF and any other thing x* satisfes this functional if  and
only if  it is identical with x. With this Ramsey-sentence, we have derived a
description of  what realizes F1 solely in non-F1 terms. Indeed we can use the Ramsey-
sentence to defne F1 in non-F1 terms. Most importantly, however, this description can
be used to determine whether F1 is realized by some unique set of  entities captured by
a theory expressible in terms of  some other set of  concepts F2. If  it is, then there will
be a true bi-conditional that identifes F1 with F2. This way we will have provided a
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reductive analysis of  F1 solely in terms of  another set of  concepts F2.
However, we should not assume that such reductive analyses can be tested in the
way presupposed by the OQA, because the truth of  such reductive analyses might be
non-obvious. First, whether some characterization of  the realizer of  F1 in non-F1 terms
is appropriate can already be non-obvious: the dispositions that characterize our
concepts need not be immediately accessible on refection, just as the rules of
grammar underlying our uses of  language reveal themselves in our dispositions to use
that language, but are not immediately explicable by competent speakers. Second,
such a characterization can be non-obvious because it need not capture every way the
concepts are used, but only their core in a way that is free from inconsistency, mistaken
assumptions, etc. However, such a characterization might well appear false to
competent speakers, both on frst sight and refection, since it sometimes yields
different applications at odds with speakers’ intuitions. Third, the possibility of  an
analysis of  F1 in terms of  F2 might be non-obvious if  F2 is part of  an empirical theory
arrived at using only a posteriori means. In this case, competent speakers will be unable
to determine on refection that F1 is analysable in terms of  F2, although this is, in fact,
possible.
So, there can be two sets of  concepts where one is analysable in terms of  the
other, but where the equivalence is non-obvious to competent speakers, even upon
refection. If  this is true, however, the OQA is not damaging for reductionists. They
can hold that there is a true reductive analysis of  the representational content of
normative judgements in terms of  the representational content of  certain kinds of
non-normative descriptive judgements but that, for reasons similar to those given
above, this is non-obvious for competent speakers even upon refection and so cannot
be tested using the OQA. So, there can be a true reductive analysis of  the
representational content of  normative judgements in terms of  the representational
content of  non-normative descriptive judgements, even if  no such analysis passes the
OQA.
As we see, there are at least two ways representationalists can escape the second
horn of  the dilemma: they can say that the OQA does not damage their theory,
because the identity postulated by this theory can either be synthetic a posteriori or be
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a conceptual truth, but non-obvious. But, if  representationalists can use these
resources to escape the second horn of  the dilemma given above, expressivists should
also be able to use them to escape the second horn of  the normative attitude
problem. That is, I want to suggest that expressivists can use either of  these
approaches to argue that normative attitudes are identical to certain kinds of
attitudes already part of  an account of  non-normative thinking. They can claim that
this identity is either synthetic a posteriori, or that it is conceptual, but non-obvious. So,
expressivists can, for example, use the resources of  the Cornell approach and claim
that the question after the specifc nature of  the normative attitude is a synthetic a
posteriori question subject to discovery in the empirical sciences, e.g. psychology and
cognitive science. What philosophers do is to work with the understanding we have of
normative judgements and psychology and then propose as an empirical hypothesis, that
whatever mature empirical psychology and cognitive science will discover about the
nature of  normative judgements, they will also discover that normative judgements
are identical with some kind of  conative attitude already part of  our theory of  non-
normative thinking. Alternatively, expressivists can follow the Canberra approach and
say that we can analyse the normative attitude in terms of  certain attitudes already
part of  an account of  non-normative thinking: they can hold that conceptual analysis
allows us to derive a description of  normative judgements in terms not mentioning
normative judgement (which need not be obviously true) and then propose, as a
hypothesis, that the mental states so characterized are realized by certain conative
attitudes already part of  the theory of  non-normative thinking that will be developed
by empirical psychology and cognitive science. In this case, there will be a true
reductive analysis of  normative judgements in terms of  certain conative attitudes
already part of  an account of  non-normative thinking, but it will be non-obvious.
Of  course, in the last chapter I have also pointed out that even with these
resources available, representationalists still face a modifed version of  the second
horn of  the above dilemma, based on predictions such views must make about
normative disagreement. Following this, someone might worry that a modifed version
of  the second horn of  the normative attitude problem based on disagreement would
be applicable to expressivists even after they have adopted either of  the above
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approaches. In fact, an argument t h a t expressivists face similar problems with
disagreement has already been suggested, namely, by David Merli, although he
argues this only for the case of  moral judgements, and he does n o t consider
expressivist views that endorse either of  the above approaches to moral judgement,
but only considers approaches of  a more traditional kind.14 Adopting the objection to
the case of  normative judgements in general, one might use Merli’s objection in our
context as follows: the expressivist account of  the attitudes which constitute
normative judgements will make certain predictions about when two parties disagree
in their normative judgements. But, so the suggestion goes, for any expressivist
proposal that argues that normative attitudes are identical to certain kinds of
attitudes already part of  an account of  non-normative thinking it seems plausible
that people with those attitudes can agree or disagree in the relevant normative judgements
with people who do not have the attitudes in question. In fact, Merli suggests that we
can use a twin-earth case to argue for this (he suggests this for the case of  moral
judgements, but if  the suggestion works it should work for normative judgement in
general):
“[W]e might follow the example of  Terence Horgan and Mark
Timmons by constructing a sort of  ‘Conative Twin Earth’ where
people engaged in something very much like moral discourse without
any tie to the expressivist’s mental state of  choice. To do this, we would
need to construct a twin-earth scenario in which the only differences
between our home planet and its twin are those entailed by changing
the conative state at the core of  the Twin Earthers’ twin-moral
practice. All other details remain the same. If, once the details are
flled in, we think we have robust moral disagreement, rather than
equivocal miscommunication, with our twins, the expressivist is in
some trouble.”15
But now the worry is that if  representationalists still face a problem with disagreement in
twin-earth cases after they have employed the resources that deal with the original
version of  the OQA, then employing these resources will also not help expressivists to
account for disagreement in such cases. So, a version of  the second horn of  the
normative attitude problem prevails.
I should say that I am not fully convinced that this kind of  worry is as
14 See Merli 2008.
15 Merli 2008: 35.
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damaging for the reductionist expressivist, as it is for the reductionist
representationalist. Note, for example, that reductionist expressivism still would not
close any substantive normative questions just in virtue of  its account of  the nature
of  normative judgements. Furthermore, it seems perfectly feasible for the reductionist
expressivist to hold that her claim about normative judgements reducing to conative
attitudes fully describable in non-normative terms is a contingent claim and that
normative judgements might be realized by other kinds of  mental states in other
possible worlds. After all, it is already a common thesis that reductionists in the
philosophy of  mind should hold that the relevant identity—of  mental states with
brain states for example—is a contingent matter.16 So why should a similar response not
be feasible for reductionist accounts that want to reduce one kind of  mental state to
another? For reductionist representationalists, however, it seems that it is not an
option to say that it is a contingent matter which properties fully describable in non-
normative terms are represented by normative concepts: representationalists
plausibly have to see normative concepts as rigid designators,  representing the same
things in all possible worlds. This means, though, that there is an important dis-
analogy regarding the force a twin-earth case would have against either approach.
However, we can also think of  these problems as motivating an alternative
expressivist response to the normative attitude problem that I personally fnd quite
attractive. I want to suggest that in addition to the above approaches to the second
horn, the resources representationalists made available open up another route for
expressivists to escape the normative attitude problem: expressivists can use those
resources to treat normative attitudes as sui generis attitudes which are not reducible to
attitudes already part of  an account of  non-normative thinking, but nevertheless ft
into a naturalistic framework. Such an approach has at least three advantages. First, it
allows expressivists to evade suspicions about normative judgements being reducible
to conative attitudes already part of  our theory of  non-normative thinking. Second, it
helps capture the impression that normative judgement ‘is what it is and not another
thing.’ Third, it should enable expressivists to escape the worry that expressivist
accounts of  the nature of  normative judgement face twin-earth type objections. So, if
16 See, for example, Chalmers 1996, Jackson 1998: 13, Lewis 1966, Lewis 1972, and Lewis 1995,
Papineau 1993, and Smart 2007.
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we fnd expressivism attractive, but think that reductionists have a problem with the
worries presented further above, this should motivate us to follow this alternative
route to an expressivist account. To show that such approaches are, in fact, feasible
and to provide some license for optimism regarding the chances of  success along this
route for expressivists, I will explain in the next section how one such account, based
on the Canberra approach, might proceed.17
3. SUI GENERIS NORMATIVE ATTITUDES FOR EXPRESSIVISTS
Let me start by noting that it is not necessary for an expressivist account of
normative judgements to be compatible with naturalism that it can account for
normative judgements in terms of  other mental states. Instead, it is suffcient that an
informative and non-circular characterization of  normative judgements can be given
that allows us to single out normative judgement as a phenomenon and to show that
the mental states so characterized ft into our best naturalistic philosophical theories of
psychology. So, to vindicate that an expressivist account on which normative
judgements are sui generis is feasible, I will explain how such an account can give the
relevant kind of  characterization and how it can show that normative judgements so
characterized ft into our best naturalistic philosophical theories of  psychology.
3.1. CHARACTERIZING NORMATIVE JUDGEMENTS
I take it that a characterization of  normative judgements needs to provide two
things. First, a characterization of  the distinctive kinds of  normative judgements (that
is each kind that is not reducible to other kinds of  normative judgements plus other
17 In addition to using the Canberra approach, expressivists might, to provide an account of  sui generis
moral attitudes, also draw on Nicholas Sturgeon’s work, a Cornell Realist who argues that moral
facts are irreducible natural facts (see e.g. Sturgeon 1988). According to Sturgeon entities are natural
entities, if  and only if  they play an ineliminable role in our best explanatory account of  the world.
Using this principle, expressivists could argue that normative judgements consist in sui generis
attitudes as follows. First, normative psychology and the entities it postulates, namely, normative
judgements, play an explanatory role in our best explanatory account of  human behaviour and
mental life. Second, these entities cannot be fully accounted for in terms of  mental states
introduced by our account of  non-normative thinking. So, normative psychology and the entities it
postulates play an ineliminable role in our best explanatory account of  the world. However, so the
fnal step of  the argument goes, normative psychology provides good reasons to see normative
judgements as consisting in conative attitudes. Therefore, normative judgements consist in
naturalistically respectable sui generis attitudes. To satisfy INFORMATIVITY we might then argue that
normative psychology will make interesting discoveries about these attitudes.
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relevant kinds of  judgements, for example, descriptive or modal judgements), e.g.
thinking that something is morally wrong, thinking that something is prudentially
required, thinking that something is what we have all things considered reason to do,
etc. Second, a characterization of  normative judgement in general, namely, of  what
the distinctive kinds of  normative judgements have in common in virtue of  being
normative judgements. How do we give the relevant characterization? We can do so,
by using exactly that style of  conceptual analysis developed by the Canberra
approach. Clearly we already have an understanding of  normative judgement in
general and of  the different kinds of  normative judgements, although this
understanding is mostly implicit and rough. This is our “folk-theory of  normative
judgement”. Using our folk-theory of  normative judgement, we can derive a
characterization of  normative judgement in general and of  the different kinds of
normative judgements, the functional role of  normative judgement. This should be
possible, even if  normative judgements are sui generis. However, if  we follow the
Canberra approach, the functional role is all we need for the kind of  characterization
we are looking for. So, as long as the Canberra approach to normative judgements
can be developed, we should be able to give the relevant kind of  characterization,
even if  normative judgements are sui generis. To vindicate that such an approach to
normative judgements can be developed, I will now fesh out the details of  how the
necessary steps for doing so are to be carried out.
3.1.1. EXPLICATING THE PLATITUDES
The frst crucial step in carrying out the Canberra approach to normative
judgements is to explicate our implicit understanding of  normative judgement in
general and the different kinds of  normative judgements, making explicit the claims
that—according to our folk-theory—characterize them. These are the “platitudes”
that characterize normative judgement in general and the different kinds of
normative judgements in particular. In explicating these platitudes, we must bear in
mind that we are explicating our pre-theoretic understanding of  normative judgements.
Since we should abstain from thinking that our folk-understanding of  normative
judgements has strong implications favouring one philosophical theory over another,
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we should, consequently, formulate the platitudes as theory-neutral as possible,
especially regarding the theories relevant for the inquiry at hand, namely, meta-
normative representationalism and expressivism.
Candidates for platitudes characterizing normative judgement in general would
be, e.g.
(a) For any x, judging that x is morally wrong, judging that x is
prudentially required, judging that x is what we have all things
considered reason to do, …, are instances of  normative judgement.
(b) Any instance of  normative judgement can stand in the rational and
inferential relations expressed by the logical and sentential
connectives with all other mental states that can so stand.
Taking as an example judgements of  the form “x is morally wrong”, candidates
for platitudes that characterize particular modes of  normative judgement would be e.g.
(c) For any x, someone can judge x to be morally wrong, only if  x is an
action, intention, …, desire.
(d) For any x, if  someone judges x to be morally wrong, then she will
ceteris paribus be disposed to avoid x, to be angry with those who x,
…, to feel guilty for x.
(e) For any x, the mental state of  judging x to be morally wrong can
stand in all the rational and inferential relations expressed by the
logical and sentential connectives with all other mental states that
can so stand.
To avoid problems that will become manifest shortly, I suggest the following
procedure for the explication of  the relevant platitudes: begin with explicating
platitudes surrounding atomic instances of  normative judgements, what I will call
“atomic normative judgements”, and platitudes surrounding normative judgement in
general, in so far as those concern only atomic normative judgements. As I said in the
frst chapter, I take atomic normative judgements to be those normative judgements
expressed by normative sentences that can no longer be broken down into logically
less complex sentences. Examples of  atomic normative judgements might be “x is
morally wrong”, “x is what we have all things considered reason to do”, etc. If  we
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want to use the Canberra approach to give a characterization of  normative
judgements, our theoretical purposes require that all platitudes be formulated so that
all mentionings of  normative judgements come out as names (or noun-phrases) for
mental states. It does not really matter at which stage of  our investigation we do this:
we can do it when we frst explicate the platitudes, or reformulate them later when all
other theoretical work is done and we are about to form the Ramsey-sentence. For
convenience’s sake, however, let me say at this stage how this should be done for
mentionings of  normative judgement in general and of  atomic normative
judgements.
We can refer to normative judgement as a general phenomenon by using the
name “normative judgement”. But how do we refer to atomic normative judgements
using only names? We do not, of  course, want to introduce a new name for any x and
for any kind of  atomic normative judgement one could make about x, so that e.g. we
have to introduce a distinct name for judging murder to be morally wrong, judging
stealing to be morally wrong and judging stealing to be what there is all things
considered reason to do. My suggestion to avoid this is the following: we treat atomic
normative judgements as relational states between subjects (the subjects making those
judgements) and objects (broadly speaking, meaning whatever the respective kinds of
normative judgements can conceivably be about; the relevant restriction will be
determined by platitudes surrounding those modes).18 And we refer to atomic
normative judgements by introducing names for these relational states. We must,
thereby, treat each distinctive kind of  atomic normative judgement as a distinctive
18 This notational treatment is inspired by Lewis’ suggestion that functional role accounts of  beliefs
treat beliefs as relations between subjects and propositions to avoid the problem of  having to
introduce a new noun-phrase for any proposition which can be believed (see Lewis 1972: n. 13).
Note that on notational treatments of  this kind the platitudes about the states so characterized will
contain universally quantifed variables—variables standing for propositions on views like Lewis’ or
objects on my notational treatment. Although inspired by Lewis’ proposal, let me emphasize that
my proposal is not supposed to come with philosophical commitments about the nature of  the
objects to which moral thinking relates subjects. For example, a common philosophical assumption
is that we can only be related to, or quantify over, things that exist (or vice versa that we are
committed to the existence of  everything we quantify over or say we stand in relation to). My
account is not supposed to share this assumption, because “objects” are supposed to be “whatever
normative judgements could conceivably be about”, where this is determined by our folk-theory of
what these modes could be about and it is implausible that our folk-theory is committed to robust
philosophical assumptions. So, “objects” could be things the existence of  which is only possible or
even metaphysically impossible, if  the folk are committed to that (which might even be
philosophically feasible. See e.g. Salmon 1989 and Soames 2007).
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relational state, introducing a distinct name for each. On this notational treatment,
the platitudes about atomic normative judgements (taking again the example of
judgements about something being morally wrong) would look as follows:
(c*) For any x, someone can be in the state of  making a moral wrongness
judgement with regard to x, only if  x is an action, intention, feeling,
…, desire.
(d*) For any x, if  someone is in the state of  making a moral wrongness judgment
with regard to x, then she will, ceteris paribus, be disposed to avoid x,
to be angry with those who x, …, to feel guilty for x.
(e*) For any x, the state of  making a moral wrongness judgment with regard to x
can stand in all the rational and inferential relations expressed by
the logical and sentential connectives with all other mental states
that can so stand.
It should be noted that this notational treatment is theory-neutral: expressivists
can claim that the states so characterized are realized by conative attitudes towards
the relevant objects, while meta-normative representationalists can claim that they
are realized by representational states towards incomplete propositions, where
incomplete propositions are functions from the relevant objects to full propositions.
With the question of  how to refer to atomic normative judgements using only
names resolved, we must now address further diffculties that arise when we explicate
the platitudes surrounding those judgements. According to some of  those platitudes,
atomic normative judgements can stand in the rational and inferential relations
expressed by logical and sentential connectives such as negation, disjunction, modal
operators, etc. with other mental states. The following, e.g. will be platitudes about
the state of  judging something to be morally wrong:
(f) For any x, judging x to be morally wrong is inconsistent with
judging x to be not morally wrong.
(g) For any x, and any descriptive concept F, judging x to be morally
wrong or F is inconsistent with judging x to be not morally wrong
and judging x to be not F.
(h) For any x, judging x to be morally wrong and prudentially required
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is inconsistent with judging x to be not morally wrong or judging x
to be not prudentially required. 
There will obviously be many platitudes of  this kind for any kind of  atomic
normative judgement.19 These platitudes do two important things in the context of
developing a Canberra approach for normative judgements. First, they introduce
mentionings of  logically complex mental states into our platitudes, e.g. judging x to be
not morally wrong, judging x to be morally wrong or F, judging x to be wrong and prudentially
required, etc. Roughly speaking, logically complex mental states are states expressed by
complex sentences formed by means of  logical and other sentential connectives. Any
such mental state stands in certain inferential and rational relations to other mental
states, namely, those mental states expressed by the parts of  the sentence that
expresses the logically complex mental state. Call mental states expressed by the parts
of  sentences that express logically complex mental states the “parts” of  the logically
complex states.20 
The second important thing such platitudes do is to reveal that for any kind of
logically complex thought (thoughts expressed by negation, thoughts expressed by
disjunction, etc.) there can be logically complex mental states of  that kind of  which
atomic normative judgements are parts.
These two features of  such platitudes are important in our context, because
they generate two complications for the kind of  characterization of  normative
judgements the Canberra approach aims at. The frst complication arises because we
can use the Canberra approach to give a non-circular characterization of  normative
judgements only if  we can substitute any reference to normative judgements in our
fnal characterization for a variable. This is achieved by using names to refer to
19 We might reduce the number of  platitudes about logically complex mental states required for a
characterization of  normative judgement, by giving recursive compositional rules for mental states
instead of  listing one-by-one in what rational and inferential relations atomic normative
judgements can stand to what mental states (see e.g. Davis 2005: 222-226). Going into detail about
how this might work, however, is beyond this chapter’s scope.
20 Note that by calling mental states “logically complex” and others their “parts” I do not want to
commit myself  to the picture that mental states expressed by logically complex sentences are
constituted by, or constructed out of, combinations of  mental states which are literally the parts of
those states. Instead, my calling mental states “logically complex” or “parts” is merely supposed to
pick out that they stand in certain rational and inferential relations to other mental states.
Specifcally, rational and inferential relations of  a kind such that they are legitimately expressed by
logically complex sentences in the former and rational and inferential relations of  a kind that they
are legitimately expressed by the parts of  logically complex sentences in the latter case.
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normative judgements. Mentionings of  logically complex mental states with atomic
normative judgements as parts, however, make reference to normative judgements
that must be stripped out of  the fnal characterization for the characterization to be
non-circular, namely, to the atomic normative judgements that form their parts. For
example, mentioning the logically complex state “Judging x to be not morally wrong”
makes reference to the atomic normative judgement “Judging x to be morally wrong”
in a way that cannot appear in the fnal characterization of  normative judgements, if
it is to be non-circular. And the crucial question is how to strip away such references.
It would be very bad if  we could only do this by removing any reference to logically
complex mental states themselves: that would require introducing a name for every
possible logically complex thought that has an atomic normative judgement as its
part, making the number of  names required for our characterization of  normative
judgements grow out of  hand. So, we need a different way to address this issue.  The
second complication is that some logically complex mental states will themselves be
normative judgements. For example, the thought “If  someone lies, then they did
something morally wrong” seems to be a normative judgement. So, some logically
complex mental states will be among the things that a theory of  normative
judgements needs to characterize.
How do we deal with these two complications? Before I explain how this is
done, let me frst make some crucial preliminary remarks about the role of  logically
complex thoughts in our theory of  normative judgements. It is important to note that
while some logically complex mental states will be characterized by a theory of
normative judgements, certain logically complex mental states (e.g. logically complex
non-normative thoughts), as well as the general nature of  logically complex thoughts,
will play a role within our theory of  normative judgements only as things characterizing
normative judgements. This has an important consequence, namely, that our
characterization of  normative judgements will successfully pick something out, only if  we
have a robust theory of  logically complex mental states. After all, functional
characterizations identify phenomena in virtue of  their relations to other things. So,
without knowing what these other things are, we cannot identify the phenomena we
are after.
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It is unlikely, of  course, that representationalists and expressivists will subscribe
to the same theory of  logically complex mental states. Note, however, that in giving
the characterization of  normative judgements we do not need to presuppose such a
robust theory of  logically complex mental states. After all, even without a robust
theory of  logically complex thoughts, we should be suffciently aware of  the
connections between normative judgements and logically complex thoughts and of
the characteristics of  logically complex thoughts relevant in the context of  giving an
account of  normative judgements. We only need to keep in mind two things when
using logically complex mental states in giving a characterization of  normative
judgements. First, that we need to do so in a way compatible with all plausible
theories of  the nature of  logically complex thoughts and second, that our
characterization of  normative judgements has to be supplemented with a robust
theory of  logically complex mental states before we can determine what states realize
our theory of  normative judgements. With these remarks out of  the way, let me now
explain how to handle the two complications with logically complex thoughts,
starting with the frst.
The frst thing needed to handle the frst complication is a theory-neutral
characterization of  logically complex mental states. Let us call logically complex
mental states “commitments”. “Commitment” is here to be read as weakly as
possible. A commitment is any mental state C being in which rationally commits
someone to be (or not be) in a set of  other states S1, S2,…, Sn in the sense that being
in C and failing (or continuing) to be in S1, S2,…, Sn when one could (and perhaps
believes one could) would manifest irrationality. There will be a distinct kind of
commitment for each distinct logical or sentential operator. This characterization
should be compatible with any plausible approach to the nature of  logically complex
mental states.
We can now use this notion of  a commitment to treat logically complex mental
states as relational states relating subjects and mental states (that is whatever states are
the parts of  the relevant logically complex thought). Note that this treatment is
neutral between different approaches to the nature of  logically complex mental
states: representationalists can say that commitments are realized by representational
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states towards incomplete propositions (where here these are functions from
propositions of  the parts to the relevant logically complex propositions), but
commitments understood along these lines should also be realizable by whatever
states expressivists identify as the thoughts expressed by logically complex sentences.
The important thing about this treatment of  logically complex states for
developing a characterization of  normative judgements using the Canberra approach
is that it allows us to treat normative judgements as the relata of  commitments when
we formulate the platitudes about normative judgements that involve logically
complex mental states. This will enable us to strip out all mentionings of  atomic
normative judgements in those platitudes and to substitute them for variables,
without having to strip out mentionings of  logically complex mental states
themselves. For example, the platitudes about how atomic normative judgements can
stand in rational and inferential relations I gave above can now be formulated as
follows:
(g*) For any x, being in a state of  making a moral wrongness judgement
with regard to x is inconsistent with being in a negation
commitment with regard to the state of  making a wrongness
judgement with regard to x.
(h*) For any x, and any state of  descriptive thinking F, being in a
disjunction commitment with regard to the state of  making a moral
wrongness judgement with regard to x and F is inconsistent with
being in a negation commitment with regard to the state of  making
a moral wrongness judgement with regard to x and a negation
commitment with regard to F.
(i*) For any x, being in a conjunction commitment with regard to the
state of  making a moral wrongness judgement with regard to x and
the state of  making a prudentially required judgement with regard
to x is inconsistent with being in a negation commitment with
regard to the state of  making a moral wrongness judgement with
regard to x or being in a negation commitment with regard to the
state of  making a prudentially required judgement with regard to x.
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And as we can see, these formulations allow us to strip out all mentionings of  atomic
normative judgements and substitute them for variables, without having to strip out
mentionings of  logically complex mental states themselves. This deals with the frst
complication.
How do we deal with the second complication, namely, that some
commitments are normative judgements? First, we need a notational treatment that
allows us to separate instances of  a kind of  logically complex judgement that are
normative judgements from those which are not.21 Let us call logically complex
normative judgements “normative commitments” and logically complex non-normative
judgements “non-normative commitments”. So, we will have, e.g., normative and non-
normative negat ion commitments, no r ma t i v e a n d non-nor mative conjunction
commitments, etc. Normative commitments—like commitments in general—can,
thereby, be treated as relational states between subjects and other mental states. Note
that this notational treatment is not supposed to suggest that the logical and sentential
connectives are ambiguous: it only serves, for our theoretical purposes, to identify and
separate a subclass of  those states we have called “commitments”. Indeed, there will
be platitudes about normative commitments sharing those features with their non-
normative counterparts necessary to make them instances of  the same kind of
21 Let me now return to a question I already raised in footnote seven in the frst chapter, namely, the
question how we actually distinguish normative from non-normative logically complex mental states.
Previously, I claimed that answering this question would actually be part of  the project that meta-
normative theories engage in. I now want to give a rough suggestion of  how meta-normative
theories could go about answering this question, if  they followed the proposal given here. On the
approach presented here, what distinguishes normative and non-normative logically complex
mental states will be determined by explicating our folk-theory of  normative judgement. It seems
clear to me that we have an intuitive grasp on what distinguishes normative from non-normative
judgements in general and normative from non-normative logically complex thoughts in particular,
since it is often clear whether to categorize thoughts (logically complex or not) as normative or non-
normative. So, our folk-theory of  normative judgement includes platitudes regarding what
characterizes normative judgements in general and distinguishes them from non-normative
judgements, as well as regarding what characterizes normative logically complex mental states and
distinguishes them from non-normative logically complex thoughts. In the case of  normative
logically complex mental states, a candidate for such a platitude is, e.g., that someone in them is,
ceteris paribus, disposed to praise those sharing them, be angry with those not sharing them, feel
guilty for not adjusting their mental states in accordance with them, etc. It is these platitudes that
determine how to distinguish normative from non-normative logically complex thoughts and have
to be considered to settle unclear cases. Of  course, interesting questions can be raised about this
proposal, especially about the extent to which it works. Answering such questions, however, is
beyond this chapter’s scope and not required for its purposes, given that diffculties with
systematically distinguishing normative from non-normative thinking are problematic for
expressivists and representationalists alike.
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logically complex judgement.
With this notational treatment in place, we can now, in our characterization,
single out those commitments that need to be characterized by our theory of
normative judgements, namely, the normative commitments, and start collecting the
platitudes surrounding those commitments. Among these will be platitudes regarding
which features distinguish normative commitments from their non-normative
counterparts, platitudes about the relations between normative commitments and
other kinds of  mental states, general platitudes about the nature of  logically complex
thoughts and the characteristics normative commitments have in virtue of  being such
thoughts, and so on. Because normative commitments, like all commitments, are
treated as relational states, we should, consequently, have no diffculties to refer to
normative commitments by introducing names for these relational states, which can
later be substituted for variables. This deals with the second complication. Given that
we now know how the platitudes about normative judgements are to be explicated,
let me explain how a Canberra approach to normative judgements proceeds from
here.
3.1.2. DERIVING OUR MATURE FOLK-THEORY OF NORMATIVE JUDGEMENTS
Once we have collected all the platitudes surrounding atomic normative
judgements, normative commitments and what characterizes any of  these modes of
thinking as instances of  normative judgement in general,—our “folk-theory of
normative judgements”—the next step of  a Canberra approach to providing a
characterization of  normative judgements is to subject these platitudes to our best
epistemological methods, ftting them into a coherent and systematic framework and
working out any principles underlying and general connections between them. This
will enable us to give a more specifc and systematic characterization of  normative
judgements in general and the distinctive kinds of  normative judgements, help to
eliminate errors underlying our assumptions about these phenomena and enable us
to derive claims about them we might not have been aware of  when we started the
analysis. Subjecting our implicit understanding to this treatment makes sense: since
we regard our implicit understanding as an epistemic device to get at the
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phenomenon in question, applying our best epistemological methods to our implicit
understanding of  the relevant phenomenon will provide a much deeper grasp and
understanding of  that phenomenon and help to prevent errors we would otherwise
have made.
The coherent and systematic framework of  platitudes derived this way is our
“mature folk-theory of  normative judgements”. With this framework in hand we can
now give the characterization of  normative judgements we are looking for.
3.1.3. GIVING A NON-CIRCULAR AND INFORMATIVE CHARACTERIZATION
The frst thing to do is to form a conjunction out of  the platitudes that form
our mature folk-theory. This conjunction can be represented as a relational predicate
that is true of  normative judgements in general and the various distinctive kinds of
normative judgements in particular. Let us call this relational predicate “TN” and let
n1, n2, …, nn stand for the names we introduced for normative judgement in general
and for the various kinds of  normative judgements. We can now formulate the
postulate of  our mature folk-theory of  normative judgements, namely,
TN[n1, n2, …, nn]
The postulate characterizes normative judgement in general and the different kinds
of  normative judgements in virtue of  their relations to each other and other things,
namely, in virtue of  how they satisfy TN. This allows us to say that normative
judgements are exactly that phenomenon characterized by TN: TN gives us the
functional role of  normative judgements. To get a non-circular characterization of
normative judgements we now exchange all the names for mental states with free
variables, which yields
TN[x, y, …, n]
We then restate our theory of  normative judgements with the following Ramsey-
sentence:
∃x∃y … ∃n {TN[x, y, …, n] ˄ (∀x*, ∀y*, …, ∀n* TN[x*, y*, …, n*] ↔ (x =
x*, y = y*, …, n = n*))}.
With the transformation of  our mature folk-theory of  normative judgements
into this Ramsey-sentence, there will now be no mentioning of  normative judgement
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in general or the distinctive kinds of  normative judgements in our theory of
normative judgements. Indeed we can defne normative judgement in general or any
of  the distinctive kinds of  normative judgements with the Ramsey-sentence. The
characterization given by this Ramsey-sentence or any defnition derived from it will,
thus, be non-circular: we defne normative judgements in terms that do not mention
normative judgements.
Will this characterization be informative? I think it is very plausible that it will
be. Obviously, generating the relevant characterization of  normative judgements
requires substantial philosophical work. Coincidently, I think this is a project meta-
normative theorists are already partially engaged in, namely, identifying the features
of  normative judgements in general and the particular features of  the distinctive
kinds of  normative judgements. However, the kind of  philosophical work required is
very insightful. First, explicating our implicit understanding of  some phenomenon
often itself  yields surprising results about (and grants deep insights into) the
phenomenon in question. The history of  philosophy is replete with examples:
Hume’s discovery of  the problem of  induction plausibly resulted from his explication
of  our implicit understanding of  causality, and Plato’s discovery of  the Euthyphro
dilemma seems to have derived from an explication of  our implicit understanding of
moral concepts. Second, if  we subject our implicit understanding to an exhaustive
process of  inquiry using our best epistemic methods, this will likely yield a far better
understanding of  the phenomena in question than would have been obtained
through mere reliance on implicit understanding. Again, the history of  philosophy
supports this: consider, for example, the growth in our understanding of  the concept
KNOWLEDGE that the post-Gettier debate produced, or how much our understanding
of  the nature of  mental states has improved since the days of  behaviourism. Such
considerations strongly support that the theory we will have arrived at will be
informative in any reasonable sense of  the word. Thus, it seems possible to give a
non-circular and informative characterization of  normative judgements that allows
us to single them out as a phenomenon, even if  one thinks that normative
judgements are constituted by a distinctive, sui generis type of  mental state.
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3.2. FITTING NORMATIVE JUDGEMENTS INTO OUR BEST THEORIES OF PSYCHOLOGY
Importantly, however, all of  this theorizing leaves one task unfulflled:
expressivists must show that normative judgements so characterized are constituted
by conative attitudes. How can they show this? I will not endeavour to carry out this
major research program here, but as an application for a license for optimism, let me
note the basic structure I think it should take.
In my view, expressivists can establish that normative judgements as
characterized by the Ramsey-sentence are constituted by conative attitudes by doing two
things. First, by developing a plausible, empirically informed, and naturalistic
philosophical theory of  psychology that gives (i) a characterization of  the general
nature of  conative attitudes and what features they can have in principle, (ii) a
characterization of  the general nature of  representational states and what features
they can have in principle, and (iii) a theory of  the psychological laws governing the
interaction between these two kinds of  mental states, their interaction with other
relevant kinds of  mental states, and the role of  mental states in the production of
action. Second, by arguing on the basis of  this theory that, given the characterization
of  normative judgements derived by philosophical theorizing, the best account of
normative judgements is to regard them as constituted by a distinctive kind of
conative attitude. This will be the place, for example, at which expressivists need to
show that they can give a plausible general theory of  logically complex thoughts that
coheres with their thesis about normative judgements. To do so, they need plausible
theories about the nature of  commitments in general and the nature of  non-
normative commitments in particular and they need to explain how these theories ft
with their thesis about the nature of  normative judgements. Expressivists have several
options here, namely, all of  the options given to solve the Frege-Geach Problem, but
this dissertation is neither the place to go into detail with regard to, nor to argue for,
any of  these options.22
Note, however, that on this approach it will not be necessary for expressivists
that they can point out any specifc kinds of  familiar conative attitudes as candidates
for normative judgements in order to establish that the best account of  normative
22 See e.g. Blackburn 1988, Gibbard 1992: 83-102, Ridge 2006a, and Schroeder 2008a.
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judgements as characterized by the Ramsey-sentence is to regard them as being
constituted by a distinctive kind of  conative attitude. Instead, it will be suffcient to
show that conative attitudes can in principle have the characteristics possessed by
normative judgements and that—given our characterization—it is more plausible to
think of  normative judgements in terms of  conative attitudes than in terms of
representational states. Indeed, certain ways in which expressivists have proceeded
are already compatible with this approach: their arguments often do not require that
normative judgements consist in e.g. desires or plans, but only that they are desire- like
or plan-like, meaning that their behaviour can be explained by pointing to ways that
conative attitudes could in principle behave. For example, Blackburn’s and Gibbard’s
solutions to the Frege-Geach problem (however plausible they are) do not require that
normative judgements consist in those mental states they claim can stand in the
relevant inferential relations, but could be merely used to show that conative
attitudes, and so normative judgements if  they were conative attitudes, can in principle
stand in those relations.
Once this further task in the philosophical theory of  psychology is completed,
expressivists who hold that normative judgements consist in sui generis attitudes will
have done everything necessary to answer the question after the nature of  those
conative attitudes that constitute normative judgements. They will have done so by
giving a characterization of  normative judgements and then by arguing that the
mental states so characterized can only be a kind of  conative attitude. A remaining
question is whether—and by what natural facts—these mental states are realized. But
this task is for psychology, cognitive science and neuroscience, not philosophy.
Nevertheless, if  we establish, based on a plausible naturalistic philosophical theory of
psychology, that there can be attitudes that satisfy the characterization of  normative
judgements, we can be optimistic that normative judgements will be realized by
natural facts.
4. SUMMARY
In this chapter I have argued for two conclusions. First, that there is an
important symmetry between the normative attitude problem and a problem meta-
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normative representationalism faces, and that this symmetry puts expressivists and
representationalists on an equal footing regarding important theoretical resources
they can use to address these problems. Second, that those resources allow
expressivists not only to take the normative attitude problem by its second horn—
holding that normative thinking is reducible to attitudes fully describable in non-
normative terms—, but also to take it by its frst horn—holding that normative
thinking consists in sui generis attitudes. To support this contention, I sketched just
enough of  one such non-standard expressivist position to both vindicate that
adopting such an approach is feasible and to provide some “license for optimism”
regarding the chances of  success along this route for expressivists.
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CHAPTER III: EXPRESSIVISM AND ALL THAT
0. INTRODUCTION
This chapter and the next two are concerned with a neglected challenge to a
particular expressivist project: quasi-realism. Part of  this project is to show that
expressivism is fully compatible with certain assumptions underlying our ordinary
practice, namely, that normative thought and discourse are truth-apt and that
normative judgements are beliefs. While quasi-realists have suggested ways in which
expressivists can allow normative sentences and judgements to be truth-apt and
normative judgements to be beliefs, they have generally neglected a central
phenomenon in this context. These are those uses of  that-clauses associated with
propositional contents. In this chapter and the following two I will develop an
expressivist friendly, defationist account of  those uses of  that-clauses. In this chapter I
both explain in greater detail why quasi-realists require an account of  the relevant
uses of  that-clauses and discharge worries meta-normative theorists might have that
such an account is in principle impossible. In the fourth chapter I develop a
defationist account of  that-clauses on which the relevant attributions of  that-clauses to
normative sentences are compatible with expressivism. In the ffth chapter I explain
how this account can be generalized to the use of  that-clauses in attributions of  belief
and other propositional attitudes.
The present chapter proceeds as follows. In the frst section, I present the
challenge according to which expressivism undermines central assumptions
underlying our ordinary practice, namely, the assumptions that normative sentences
and judgements are truth-apt and that normative judgements are beliefs. In the
second section, I explain what the quasi-realist project is and introduce the standard
package which quasi-realists use to respond to the challenge. In the third section, I
explain why the quasi-realist needs an account of  certain uses of  that-clauses to fully
respond to the challenge. In the fourth section, I remove worries that it is in principle
impossible for expressivists to give such an account which satisfes the quasi-realist’s
theoretical demands. This clears the way for the account given in the fourth and ffth
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chapter. Finally, in section fve, I outline my strategy for what follows.
1. EXPRESSIVISM, TRUTH-APTITUDE AND BELIEF: THE PROBLEM
One major worry about expressivism is that it undermines certain central
assumptions underlying our ordinary practice, namely, those that lend support to
some form of  meta-normative realism.1 I take any view to be a form of  meta-normative
realism (or just “realism” in what follows) if  and only if  it subscribes to
REPRESENTATIONALISM ABOUT NORMATIVE JUDGEMENTS: The mental states
which constitute normative judgements consist in representational
states such that a normative judgement is true if  and only if  the
representational state it consists in is true.
SUCCESS-THEORY ABOUT NORMATIVE JUDGEMENTS: At least some
substantive normative judgements are true.2
and
OBJECTIVITY OF NORMATIVE FACTS: At least some substantive normative
judgements are true independently of  our beliefs, attitudes, social
norms or conventions.
Two assumptions underlying our ordinary practice that seem to support realism that
expressivism allegedly undermines are
TRUTH-APTITUDE OF NORMATIVE JUDGEMENTS: Normative sentences and
judgements can be true.
and
NORMATIVE JUDGEMENTS ARE BELIEFS: Normative judgements are beliefs
and assertoric use of  normative sentences conventionally expresses
beliefs.
Indeed, in the past expressivism was often defned as the view which denies these
1 This kind of  objection to expressivism is pressed by e.g. Brink 1989, Cuneo 2006 and Cuneo 2007,
Enoch 2011, Shafer-Landau 2003, Smith 1994a, and Wedgwood 2008.
2 The restriction to “substantive” normative judgements is supposed to rule out that views would
count as forms of  realism just in virtue of  accepting that tautological judgements involving
normative concepts or negative judgements such as “There are no practical reasons to give to
charity”  can be true. Of  course, it is diffcult to determine how we should distinguish “substantive”
from “non-substantive” normative judgements. For the purposes of  this dissertation, however, our
rough intuitive understanding should suffce.
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assumptions.3 This was based on three assumptions about truth, truth-aptitude, and
belief  that used to go mostly unchallenged in meta-normative theory. First, that what
it is for the assertoric use of  declarative sentences or judgements to be true is for those
utterances or judgements to correctly represent—in some theoretically robust sense—
the world as being a certain way. Second, that, consequently, what it is for sentences
or judgements to be truth-apt is for them to potentially represent the world as being a
certain way. Third, that what it is for mental states to be beliefs just is for them to be
representational states. 
However, expressivists deny that the meaning of  normative sentences, or the
nature of  normative judgements, are to be explained in terms of  those sentences or
judgements standing in some theoretically signifcant representation relation to the
world. So, given the above assumptions, expressivists must hold that normative
judgements and normative sentences are not even in the business of  being true and
that normative judgements are not beliefs.
Note that these assumptions strongly embody representationalist commitments.
Since declarative sentences plausibly just are the sentences that are truth-apt and
beliefs just are the judgements expressed by the assertoric use of  declarative
sentences, the above assumptions ft exactly with representationalist commitments:
that declarative sentences and the judgements their assertoric uses express are to be
accounted for in terms of  some robust representation relation. Acceptance of  such
commitments on both sides of  the debate explains why expressivism has been defned as
the view which denies that normative thought and discourse are truth-apt and that
normative judgements are beliefs.
2. EXPRESSIVISM, TRUTH-APTITUDE AND BELIEF: QUASI-REALISM TO THE RESCUE
While these assumptions have long shaped meta-normative theory and
expressivism, they have come under attack. Simon Blackburn’s project “quasi-
realism” has led the way in providing a challenge to these assumptions.4 Quasi-Realism
aims to show that expressivism is fully compatible with those central assumptions
underlying our ordinary practice that seem to support realism. The project is born
3 See e.g. Gibbard 1992, Smith 1994a, Smith 1994b or Smith 1994c, and Wright 1992.
4 The frst occurrences of  quasi-realism are in Blackburn 1984a and Blackburn 1984c.
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out of  the methodological maxim that the best philosophical underpinning of  our
ordinary practice is the one that best preserves the legitimacy of  that practice at the
least theoretical cost. Quasi-realism promises to undermine realism’s claim to
supremacy regarding the preservation of  our ordinary practice, while preserving
these assumptions without any of  the theoretical costs of  realism.
A crucial tool in the quasi-realist’s tool-box is to apply a three-step strategy I
call the “quasi-realist manoeuvre” to those assumptions expressivism allegedly
undermines. The frst step of  this strategy is to point out that meta-normative debate
aims to provide a philosophical underpinning of  the phenomena characterizing our
ordinary normative practice. When one debates whether some meta-normative theory
accounts for, or undermines, certain commitments underlying that practice, this
means that one needs to proceed on a suffciently theory-neutral understanding of
the issues in question. After all, which philosophical understanding of  these
phenomena underlies our ordinary practice is exactly what is at issue in this debate.
So, one needs to avoid begging any questions with the characterizations one gives of
the phenomena that meta-normative theories are supposed to capture. Rather, meta-
normative debate must start from a platitudinous understanding of  the commitments
in question, and then look for the best theoretical underpinning of  this
understanding. This is even more important, as it is simply implausible to assume
from the outset that our ordinary practice comes with any robust theoretical
assumptions.
The second step is to point out that to determine whether expressivism is
incompatible with any assumptions underlying our ordinary practice, what needs to
be considered is how these assumptions would have to be understood if  expressivism
were true. At this point, expressivists refuse to let representationalists dictate how to
understand terms such as “true” when assumptions like
TRUTH-APTITUDE OF NORMATIVE JUDGEMENTS: Normative sentences and
judgements can be true.
are under consideration. Instead, they urge that one consider whether there are
plausible accounts of  the relevant notions on which expressivism is compatible with
these assumptions. Note again that the target notions here are the notions as they fgure
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in our ordinary practice. After all, the relevant assumptions are assumptions underlying
our ordinary practice and so, need to be understood as they are understood in that
practice.
The fnal step of  the quasi-realist manoeuvre is to give an account of  the
notions at play in the problematic assumptions on which expressivism is in fact
compatible with those assumptions. At least with regards to truth, truth-aptitude, and
belief, the standard approach for quasi-realists here is one that fts very naturally with
expressivism, namely, to endorse a mix of  what I am going to call “defationist” and
“minimalist” accounts of  the relevant notions.5 Let me quickly explain for what kinds
of  approaches I will use the labels “defationist” and “minimalist” in this context.6
Defationist and minimalist approaches share a commitment to “defating”
certain kinds of  linguistic phrases that it is tempting to read in theoretically very
committing ways. According to defationists and minimalists, the more conventional
“infationary” approaches to these phrases should be avoided, because they entail
strong ontological commitments and bring with them unnecessary theoretical
problems. Rather, everything that needs accounting for when it comes to these
phrases can be accounted for on ontologically and theoretically slim grounds. This is
why these approaches are natural partners for expressivism: not only do they offer a
way to make expressivism compatible with certain relevant assumptions, but they do
so in a way that connects to expressivism’s theoretical sentiments. After all,
expressivism itself  is committed to a similar project—accounting for problematic
5 Blackburn originally suggested a non-defationist account for truth that was supposed to allow the
expressivist to say that normative judgements and sentences can be true (Blackburn 1984a), but has
since changed his view to an endorsement of  a defationary account of  truth, combined with a
minimal account of  truth-aptitude (Blackburn 1998a). Michael Ridge has suggested that hybrid
expressivists can, in fact, remain neutral regarding the account of  truth they accept, although he
does endorse a minimalist account of  truth-aptitude as well (Ridge Forthcoming). Horgan and
Timmons have suggested an account of  belief  which is not minimalist, but which nevertheless is
compatible with expressivism (Horgan and Timmons 2006).
6 Of  course, the labels “defationism” and “minimalism” are used in a variety of  ways in the
philosophical debate (for example, Crispin Wright and Paul Horwich use the label “minimalism”
in different ways (see Horwich 1998a and Wright 1992)), and my use of  these labels might
sometimes cut across the use of  other people. The characterization that follows is supposed to
capture what I take to be the most important distinction between two kinds of  “non-infationary
views” and a distinction that is important for my purposes. While it is desirable, to avoid confusion,
to try to capture the same views with those labels that others are trying to pick out, I fnd it much
more important for reasons of  clarity to fx specifc meanings for these terms than to have a use for
the labels that overlaps to the largest degree with the use of  others. When I use those labels I will
do so to pick out the positions characterized in what follows.
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linguistic phrases, namely, the normative ones, on ontologically and theoretically slim
grounds. However, defationary and minimalist approaches differ from each other in
the way in which they approach this project.
Defationary accounts reject the representationalist order of  explanation for the
phrases in question. Recall that on the representationalist order of  explanation,
questions about the facts a domain of  thought and discourse represents are given
explanatory priority when it comes to accounting for the nature of  that domain of
thought and discourse. According to a defationary account of  some phrase, the best
account of  that phrase does not proceed in terms of  invoking any entities which that
phrase functions to represent. Instead, a defationary explanation has two parts. First,
an account of  the patterns of  use that characterize the phrase in question in our
linguistic practice, where those patterns can be characterized by a limited number of
platitudes that can be specifed without invoking any entity that is represented, in some
theoretically robust sense, by that phrase. For example, these platitudes might only
characterize an intra-linguistic role that is played by the phrase. Such platitudes exhaust
what can be said by means of  analysis about the phrase.7 
Second, this account of  the patterns of  use of  the phrase is combined with an
account of  why our vocabulary includes this phrase, which proceeds in terms of  some
non-representational function. According to defationists we can completely explain what
function the relevant phrase has in our linguistic practice without invoking any entity
that is represented, in some theoretically robust sense, by that phrase. The account of
the non-representational function will explain why and vindicate that the phrase in
question is exhaustively characterized by the platitudes surrounding that phrase. It
7 It is sometimes assumed, inspired by the most well-known form of  defationism—defationism
about the truth-predicate— , that defationism is characterized by being committed to these
platitudes taking a certain form. Specifcally, it is sometimes assumed that any form of  defationism
about any concept must be able to identify some sort of  equivalence schema similar to the schema
that famously governs the truth predicate. Such a tendency can, for example, be observed in
Cuneo 2013 and Dunaway 2010. However, I do not think that holding some sort of  equivalence
schema to be central to the relevant concept should be seen as a characterizing feature of
defationism. Rather, what is important for a view to be defationist, is that the platitudes
characterizing the concept have the named characteristics. This could be possible, even if  we
cannot identify a schema of  the kind that governs truth as governing the concept in question. As an
example for forms of  defationism which do not operate by way of  such schemas, but with a
limited set of  platitudes about inference schemas take some other form, see e.g. Michael Williams’
defationary reading of  Sellars’ account of  modal claims (Williams 2010: 324) or Stephen Schiffer’s
defationary account of  propositions (Schiffer 2003).
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will also explain why those platitudes are limited in number and why they do not
invoke any entity that is represented, in some theoretically robust sense, by that
phrase. This leads defationary accounts to be ontologically conservative regarding
the relevant phrase: adding that phrase with all its theoretical commitments to our
vocabulary does not expand our ontological commitments, or expands them only
conservatively.
Does this mean that if  the target of  a defationary account is a predicate, for
example, that the account has to deny that there is a property corresponding to that
predicate? Defationists can take different approaches here. First, they can deny that
—despite appearances—the target phrase is a genuine predicate.8 Second,
defationists can accept that the predicate is a genuine predicate, but hold that it is
misguided to talk about the property it corresponds to, or that doing so is only a
convenient way of  speaking that can be rephrased without theoretical loss so that no
property is mentioned.9 Third, they can hold that the predicate corresponds to an
“insubstantial” property. This might then be cashed out, e.g. in terms of  the property
playing no fundamental explanatory role.10
Minimalist accounts, on the other hand, endorse the representationalist order of
explanation for the phrase in question. However, on minimalist accounts, the
theoretical requirements for the represented entity to be instantiated will not be very
theoretically demanding, and the entity will not be of  a kind that would be an
interesting object of  investigation for science or metaphysics. Rather, the theory will
assign those features to the entity that explain why the relevant phrase has those
features any plausible theory of  that phrase must account for and will go no further. So,
while minimalist accounts will not be ontologically conservative, their theoretical
demands will be minimal.
Note that of  these two kinds of  approaches, defationary approaches are even
more natural allies for expressivists than minimalist approaches. Both expressivists
8 This is, for example, what pro-sentential theories of  truth do, since they deny that the truth-
predicate is a genuine predicate. For pro-sentential theories of  truth, see e.g. Brandom 1988 and
Belnap, Camp, and Grover 1975.
9 Certain kinds of  “fctionalist” versions of  defationism might fall into this camp. See e.g.
Woodbridge 2005. Hartry Fields’ position about propositions as articulated in Field 2001b might
also be understood along these lines.
10 This is the position of  Paul Horwich (Horwich 1998a: 37-40).
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and defationists hold that it is wrong to adopt the representationalist order of
explanation for all phrases that are of  special interest to philosophers and both
approaches highlight the importance of  paying attention to non-representational
functions of  areas of  thought and discourse in accounting for their nature. More
specifcally, both expressivist and defationist approaches suggest that we should
approach problematic vocabulary by focusing on language and thought in that
respective domain frst, rather than metaphysics. In a sense, they can be seen as
extensions into different domains of  the same project. This is the project which gives
priority to questions about language and thought when it comes to accounting for
vocabularies that are of  distinctive philosophical interest and which urges us to
provide non-representational accounts for those vocabularies for which a
representationalist order of  explanation runs into signifcant problems. With this
cleared up, let me present what I take to be the standard quasi-realist package
regarding our ordinary notions of  truth-aptitude and belief.11
Let’s begin with truth-aptitude. Combining expressivism with the assumption
that normative judgements are truth-apt requires two things. First, an account of  the
truth-predicate on which expressivists can allow its application to normative
sentences and judgements. Second, an account of  truth-aptitude on which
expressivists can allow normative sentences and judgements to be truth-apt. Let us
consider the truth-predicate frst. 
Regarding the truth-predicate, quasi-realists are normally defationists.12
Defationism about truth consists in a family of  theories sharing two assumptions.13 First,
that the truth-predicate is characterized by patterns of  use that can be fully captured
by the “equivalence schema”. According to the equivalence schema, for any p assessable
in terms of  truth, all (non-paradoxical) instances of
(T) <p> is true if  and only if  p.
11 The “standard package” is accepted at least by Simon Blackburn and Allan Gibbard, who are the
prime proponents of  quasi-realism (see e.g. Blackburn 1998a and Gibbard 2003).
12 A notable exception here is Mike Ridge, who has argued that his hybrid expressivism can remain
neutral regarding the correct account of  the truth-predicate (see Ridge 2009a o r Ridge
Forthcoming).
13 For proponents of  defationary theories of  truth, see e.g. Ayer 1935 and Ayer 1963, Belnap, Camp,
and Grover 1975, Brandom 1988 and Brandom 1994, Field 1972, Frege 1891, Horwich 1998a,




Second, that the truth predicate exists because of  its non-representational
functions.15 One such function, for example, is as a syntactic device that allows certain
kinds of  quantifcations and generalizations.16 Due to the equivalence schema, for
any declarative sentence S asserting that S is true is equivalent to asserting S. This
allows to use the truth predicate to assert a number of  sentences by quantifying over
them and asserting that they are true. This way the truth predicate enables us e.g. to
report acceptance of  a number of  sentences without having to list them or to accept
sentences without knowing what those sentences are. 
These commitments lead defationary theories of  truth to ontological
conservativeness: adding the truth-predicate to our vocabulary does not expand our
ontological commitments, or only expands them conservatively. On the question
whether there is a truth-property, different defationists then take one of  the above
named responses.
This account of  truth is very attractive for quasi-realists. First, it does not
require judgements and sentences to be robustly representational for the truth-
predicate to apply to them. In fact, on this account attributing truth to judgements
brings with it no more robust theoretical commitments than making those
judgements themselves. Second, defationism offers an account of  the truth-predicate
on which our ordinary practice would need the truth-predicate, even if  expressivism were
true. For example, it will often be quite useful to be able to quantify over normative
sentences or judgements in the way the truth predicate allows.
What about truth-aptitude? Here it is best to proceed in two stages, considering
frst the quasi-realist’s account of  truth-aptitude for sentences and then her account
of  the truth-aptitude of  normative judgements. This is best, because the quasi-
14 The brackets here stand for an appropriate device to mention those things that can be assessed in
terms of  truth (e.g. quotation marks in the case of  declarative sentences or the operator “the
proposition that x” in the case of  propositions) and “p” stands for that declarative sentence by
means of  which we can represent p (e.g. the declarative sentence “Manfred is a welder.” in the case
of  the proposition MANFRED IS A WELDER or the declarative sentence “Manfred is a welder.”).
15 Certain early proponents of  versions of  defationism about truth actually held that the truth-
predicate is redudant. See e.g. Ayer 1935, Frege 1891, Ramsey 1927, and Ramsey 1991. This view,
however, is no longer endorsed, after defationists realized that the truth-predicate, even if  it is
characterized by the limited patterns of  use defationists identifed, can perform very useful
functions. See e.g. Horwich 1998a, Quine 1970, and Strawson 1950.
16 See e.g. Quine 1970 and Horwich 1998a: 122/123.
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realist’s account of  truth-aptitude for normative judgements proceeds via her account
of  how normative judgements can be beliefs, which rests on her account of  truth-
aptitude for sentences.
Regarding the truth-aptitude of  sentences, the standard quasi-realist move is to
endorse “disciplined syntacticism”, a minimalist approach to truth-aptitude.17
According to disciplined syntacticism only two features are jointly necessary and suffcient
for sentences to be truth-apt. First, they need to have the right syntactic form, namely,
the syntactic form of  paradigmatic instances of  truth-apt sentences, which is that
syntactic form possessed by declarative sentences. Among other things, this means that
the sentence be embeddable under negation, in conditionals, in propositional attitude
ascriptions, and so on. Second, the sentences need to be disciplined which is being
governed by suffcient norms that regulate appropriate and inappropriate usage of
those sentences. According to disciplined syntacticism, these two features are all that
is required for sentences to be truth-apt.
Again, this account is attractive for the quasi-realist. Disciplined syntacticism
does not require that sentences stand in some theoretically signifcant representation
relation to the world for those sentences to be truth-apt. At least it is in principle
compatible with all kinds of  sentences being truth-apt, the meaning of  some of
which might not be best explained in representationalist terms. And the challenge
that disciplined syntacticism requires the quasi-realist to address to allow normative
sentences to be truth-apt is the Frege-Geach Problem, which expressivists are
committed to addressing anyways.
Of  course, disciplined syntacticism only provides the quasi-realist with an
account of  truth-aptitude for normative sentences. What, however, about the truth-
aptitude of  normative judgements? While normative judgements might be truth-apt
for other reasons, I take it that the quasi-realists’ approach is to establish that
normative judgements are truth-apt because they are beliefs.18 After all, beliefs are the
17 See e.g. See Blackburn 1998b, Lenman 2003, Ridge Forthcoming, and Sinclair 2006. Disciplined
syntacticism is a position that is also endorsed by authors who are not expressivists (or not
expressivists in the sense as I have defned it). See e.g. Boghossian 1990, Divers and Miller 1994
and Divers and Miller 1995, Price 1988 and Price 1998, and Wright 1992: 24-28; the label
“disciplined syntacticism” was introduced by Jackson, Oppy, and Smith 1994: 293-295.
18 It might be open for expressivists to hold that normative judgements are truth-apt, even though
they are not beliefs. This seems, for example, the strategy originally taken by Blackburn in Spreading
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paradigmatic examples of  truth-apt mental states. Furthermore, there is reason to
believe that even with disciplined syntacticism in place expressivists cannot allow
normative sentences to be truth-apt unless they allow normative judgements to be
beliefs. This is so, because of  a platitude that connects the truth-aptitude of  sentences
with belief. Here is Crispin Wright on the relevant platitude:
“Assertion has the following analytic tie to belief: if  someone makes
an assertion, and is supposed sincere, it follows that she has a belief
whose content can be captured by means of  the sentence used.”19
Michael Smith puts the same point as follows
“Everyone agrees that a sentence that is truth-assessable, if  uttered
sincerely, is an assertion. And everyone agrees that the function of
an assertion is to convey the fact that the utterer believes that what
the sentence uttered says is so is so.”20
I take it that the platitude Wright and Smith have in mind is
ASSERTION AND BELIEF: The mental state conventionally expressed by
assertoric use of  a truth-apt sentence is a belief, such that the content
of  the belief  is the content of  the sentence.
If  this is correct, truth-aptitude for sentences and those sentences expressing belief
are so closely connected that quasi-realists will be unable to allow normative
sentences to be truth-apt, unless they have shown that they can allow that normative
judgements—the states conventionally expressed by assertoric use of  normative
sentences—are beliefs. So, what can quasi-realists say about belief ?
Disciplined syntacticism and ASSERTION AND BELIEF provide the resources for a
minimal account quasi-realists can use.21 According to minimalism about belief,
the Word (Blackburn 1984a). I take it, however, that this is a line of  argument that quasi-realists
currently would not want to take, because I assume that the assumption underlying our ordinary
practice is that normative judgements are truth-apt because they are beliefs.
19 Wright 1992: 14. For the same platitude, see also Divers and Miller 1994 and Divers and Miller
1995, Jackson, Oppy, and Smith 1994, Lenman 2003, and Smith 1994b and Smith 1994c.
20 Smith 1994b: 3.
21 The account was frst explicitly suggested by Neil Sinclair (Sinclair 2006), although hints of  it can
be found in other places too (see e.g. Blackburn 1998a: 70/71 or Gibbard 2003: 180-184) . An
alternative suggestion to this minimal account is given by Michael Ridge (Ridge 2009b). According
to Ridge, we should see the term “belief ” as it fgures in our ordinary practice as a natural kind term
that should be given a semantics along the lines frst suggested by Saul Kripke and Hillary Putnam
(see Kripke 1980 and Putnam 1975). Following this proposal, we would say that the prime
commitment underlying our use of  the term “belief ” is that beliefs are whatever natural kinds
causally govern our use of  that term, where the natural kinds in question are those that fgure in a
mature psychology or cognitive science. However, so Ridge argues, cognitive science might discover
that our use of  the term “belief ” is actually governed by two different natural kinds, namely,
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mental states are beliefs if  and only if  they can be conventionally expressed by
assertoric use of  truth-apt sentences:22 those characteristics that mental states need to
possess to be suitable for conventional expression by the assertoric use of  a truth-apt
sentence are necessary and suffcient for those mental states to be beliefs.
Minimalism about belief  is attractive for the quasi-realist, because it does not
require beliefs to be representational states. As long as it can be shown that the use of
truth-apt sentences can conventionally express non-representational states, non-
representational states can be beliefs. And again, what this requires quasi-realists to
address is that the relevant characteristics of  declarative sentences can be explained
in terms of  assertoric uses of  those sentences conventionally expressing non-
representational states. This is the Frege-Geach Problem, a challenge expressivists are
committed to addressing anyways. However, minimalism allows expressivism to be in
principle compatible with normative judgements being beliefs, and, consequently, for
them to be truth-apt.
Of  course, once expressivists accept that normative judgements are beliefs,
expressivism can no longer be characterized along traditional lines. Specifcally, it
cannot be characterized as the view according to which the difference between
descriptive and normative judgements is that the former are beliefs, while the latter
are desires—at least not in the ordinary senses of  “belief ” and “desire”. Someone
used to this traditional characterization might worry how expressivism is then to be
characterized. However, my characterization in the frst chapter already suggests that
these worries are misplaced. Expressivists should merely characterize their view about
representational states and those states which, according to expressivists, constitute normative
judgements. It is not a given, however, that in this event ordinary speakers would revise their usage
of  the term “belief ”, as long as the states still have suffcient features in common (as was the case
when it was discovered that our use of  the term “jade” is actually governed by two natural kinds).
And in this case, expressivists can legitimately hold that normative judgements are beliefs.
22 Note that this account is compatible with the fact that even if  not all beliefs are representational
states, all representational states are beliefs, and is also compatible with representational states
being paradigm examples of  beliefs, even though by itself  it does not explain this latter fact (for
explanations why representational states are paradigm examples of  beliefs, even though they are
not the only kinds of  mental states that are beliefs, see Lenman 2003, Sinclair 2006, and Ridge
2006b). On this account, the only difference between beliefs that are representational states and
beliefs that are not is that beliefs that are representational states are beliefs in the sense given by
minimalism about belief and have some additional property R, where R is that property which,
according to expressivists, the mental states paradigmatically expressed by descriptive sentences
have but the mental states paradigmatically expressed by normative sentences lack. So, R just is the
property of  standing in some theoretically robust representation relation to the world.
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normative judgements as consisting in two theses, namely,
NON-REPRESENTATIONALISM ABOUT NORMATIVE JUDGEMENTS: The mental
states which constitute normative judgements do n o t consist in
representational states such that a normative judgement is true if  and
only if  the representational state it consists in is true.
and
CONATIVE NATURE OF NORMATIVE JUDGEMENTS: The mental states which
constitute normative judgements (at least partially) consist in conative
attitudes.
And they should say that what makes states representational states or conative
attitudes, in the senses mentioned in these theses, is cashed out in terms of  a robust
theory of  psychology, not in terms of  our ordinary notions of  “belief ” or “desire” as
they fgure in folk-psychology.23
This completes my presentation of  the standard quasi-realist package for
combining expressivism with 
TRUTH-APTITUDE OF NORMATIVE JUDGEMENTS: Normative sentences and
judgements can be true.
and
NORMATIVE JUDGEMENTS ARE BELIEFS: Normative judgements are, and
assertoric use of  normative sentences conventionally expresses, beliefs.
This package comes with a signifcant commitment to solving the Frege-Geach
Problem. Even bracketing this commitment, however, the package is incomplete in a
problematic way, as I will explain in the next section.
3. WHY QUASI-REALISTS NEED AN ACCOUNT OF THAT-CLAUSES
It is important to highlight that the quasi-realist package is only successful in
combining expressivism with TRUTH-APTITUDE OF NORMATIVE JUDGEMENTS and NORMATIVE
JUDGEMENTS ARE BELIEFS if  two conditions hold. First, the package provides plausible
accounts of  our ordinary notions of  truth, truth-aptitude and belief  and second, all
of  the commitments that a plausible account of  truth, truth-aptitude, and belief
23 This is also suggested by Gibbard 2003, Ridge 2006b and Sinclair 2006.
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brings with it are compatible with expressivism. However, a plausible account of  our
ordinary notions of  truth, truth-aptitude, and belief  at least needs to capture all of
the platitudes characterizing these notions. But, there are platitudes characterizing
belief  and truth-aptitude that make mention of  a phenomenon for which no account
has been given yet for how it fts with expressivism. Consider again,
ASSERTION AND BELIEF: The mental state conventionally expressed by
assertoric use of  a truth-apt sentence is a belief, such that the content
of  the belief  is the content of  the sentence.
This platitude points towards further claims about belief. For example, it implies
BELIEF IS A PROPOSITIONAL ATTITUDE: Belief  is a state with content.
It also implies
BELIEF, ASSERTION AND CONTENT: The content of  a belief  is the content
of  any declarative sentence assertoric use of  which conventionally
expresses that belief.24
and
DECLARATIVE SENTENCES HAVE CONTENT: If  a sentence is truth-apt, then
the sentence has a content. 
These platitudes make reference to the contents of  sentences and beliefs, or more
specifcally to what I will call their “propositional contents”. What do I mean, in this
context, by the “propositional contents” of  sentences and beliefs? It should be clear
from the outset that “propositional content” is a technical term. Insofar as ASSERTION
AND BELIEF, BELIEF IS A PROPOSITIONAL ATTITUDE, BELIEF, ASSERTION AND CONTENT, and
DECLARATIVE SENTENCES HAVE PROPOSITIONAL CONTENT are assumptions that underly our
ordinary practice, they are technical ways of  capturing certain phenomena
surrounding belief, assertion, and declarative sentences. I take these roughly to be the
following.
24 While BELIEF, ASSERTION AND CONTENT is regarded as a platitude in meta-normative theory, it is
worthwhile to highlight that there is actually a debate in the philosophy of  language about the
question whether the assertoric content of  the utterance of  a sentence (what is said by use of  that
sentence) and the semantic content of  a sentence (its meaning in the sense relevant e.g. for
compositionality) are the same thing (that these come apart is defended by e.g. Michael Dummett
(e.g. Dummett 1973 or Dummett 1991), Dilip Ninan (Ninan 2010), Brian Rabern (Rabern 2012),
Jason Stanley (Stanley 1997 and Stanley 2002), and Seth Yalcin (Yalcin 2007)). This dissertation is
not the place to go into this debate. Given that the dissertation moves in a dialectic in which BELIEF,
ASSERTION AND CONTENT is generally accepted, I will do so, in what follows, as well.
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First, that belief  is a propositional attitude. Where there is belief  there is
something that is believed, which is something that can also be the object of  other
propositional attitudes, such as hopes, desires, fears, etc. For example, if  we say of
someone that they believe that there are monsters hiding in the closet, we say that
what they believe i s that there are monsters hiding in the closet, which is also what someone
hopes, when they hope that there are monsters hiding in the closet or what someone fears,
when they fear that there are monsters hiding in the closet. 
Second, that for any meaningful declarative sentence, there is something that
this sentence means, which is also what is said by literal assertoric use of  this sentence. For
example, “There are monsters hiding in the closet” means that there are monsters hiding
in the closet, and when I use “There are monsters hiding in the closet” literally, what I
say is that there are monsters hiding in the closet. 
Third, that when someone expresses a belief  by asserting a sentence, there is
something that belief  and assertion have in common: what is said and what is believed
are the same. So, for example, when I sincerely say, “There are monsters hiding in
the closet” what I say is that there are monsters hiding in the closet, and I also express a belief
in something, namely, that there are monsters hiding in the closet. 
All of  these phenomena point to certain uses of  that-clauses: those uses that
people employ when they attribute literal meaning to declarative sentences, specify
what is said by use of  a sentence, and which they use in the context of  belief-
attributions and propositional attitude ascriptions more generally. These are (a subset
of) the uses that philosophers associate with the attribution of  “propositional
contents”. Because of  the aforementioned connections of  such uses of  that-clauses to
our ordinary notions of  belief  and truth-aptitude, quasi-realists require an account of
these uses of  that-clauses, that is, an account of  what goes on when people employ
that-clauses in these ways. Only then can quasi-realists legitimately claim to have
given an account that can capture all of  the platitudes characterizing these notions,
and to have done so in a way that is compatible with expressivism.
However, the standard quasi-realist package does not provide an account of
these uses of  that-clauses. Consequently, quasi-realists have failed to give an account
of  how expressivism is compatible with the assumption that normative judgements
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are beliefs with such contents or the assumption that assertoric uses of  normative
sentences have such contents. In this respect, the quasi-realist package is incomplete,
and must be supplemented with an account of  the relevant uses of  that-clauses. 
It is crucial to note that for an expressivist this account has to take a specifc form.
The expressivist wants to explain the meaning of  sentences in terms of  the mental
states expressed by their use. So, she has to give us an account of  the contribution
that-clauses make to the mental states expressed by sentences in which they fgure.
This is no trivial challenge, and one quasi-realists often neglect when it comes to
“earning the right” to certain ordinary assumptions. For example, quasi-realists have
long tended to not be very explicit on the question what mental state is expressed by
truth-attributions and only recently suggestions have been made.25 Such a neglect is
problematic, insofar it leaves unclear whether acceptance of  the conjunction of
defationism and expressivism forces one to endorse assumptions that are signifcantly
more problematic than mere acceptance of  defationism. I take it that a neglect of
this challenge for that-clauses would be problematic for similar reasons, and that to
fully discharge our theoretical requirements, an account of  the contribution of  that-
clauses to the mental states expressed by use of  sentences that employ them needs to
be developed. Before I can turn to developing such an account, however, I should frst
remove worries about the very possibility of  an expressivist account that preserves
our ordinary practice regarding the use of  that-clauses in the context of  normative
thought and discourse.
4. EXPRESSIVISM AND ALL THAT: CLEARING THE WAY
Many philosophers working in meta-normative theory will be (and have been)
surprised by the suggestion that expressivism could even be compatible with our
25 Simon Blackburn has made at least a rough suggestion for the mental state expressed by truth-
attributions in Blackburn 2010. More detailed proposals of  the contribution which the truth-
predicate makes to the mental state expressed by use of  sentences in which it fgures have been
given by Michael Ridge (Ridge 2009a and Ridge Forthcoming) and Mark Schroeder (Schroeder
2010b). Note that while Blackburn and Schroeder give an account of  truth-predicate on a
defationary reading, Ridge actually gives an account of  the truth-predicate that is supposed to be
compatible with any conception of  truth. Note also that the requirement is only particularly
pressing for the expressivist if  he adopts a defationary, rather than a minimalist, account of  some
notion. For minimalist accounts, the expressivist can just be a representationalist with regards to the
contribution the notion makes to the mental states expressed by sentences in which it fgures.
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ordinary practice of  assigning meaning to normative sentences using that-clauses and
specifying what is believed by someone with a normative belief  using a that-clause. In
fact, for many this will be as much a surprise as the thesis that expressivism could be
compatible with our ordinary practice of  taking normative judgements to be beliefs
and normative thought and discourse to be truth-apt. These worries derive from two
sets of  assumptions common in meta-normative theory: assumptions about the
relevant uses of  that-clauses and assumptions about expressivism’s theoretical
commitments.
Further above I mentioned that philosophers tend to associate the relevant uses
of  that-clauses with propositional contents. More specifcally, the common assumption
among meta-normative theorists, and philosophers in general, is that that-clauses
designate propositions.26 According to this view, what we attribute to propositional
attitudes when we use that-clauses in propositional attitude ascriptions are
propositions as the contents of  those propositional attitudes. And what we attribute to
declarative sentences when we use that-clauses to attribute meaning to them are
propositions as well. That that-clauses designate propositions is, thereby, assumed to
make best sense of  our ordinary employment of  that-clauses: it is supposed to be a
view about the use of  that-clauses in our ordinary practice.27 So, why would one be
surprised by the suggestion that expressivism could be compatible with this practice?
This requires further explanation. 
One major part of  the relevant uses of  that-clauses in ordinary practice is the
attribution of  meaning to declarative sentences. What I have in mind here are the
ways of  talking at play when we—in ordinary discourse—interpret what a sentence
means in our own language, or some closely related idiolect, or when we try to fgure
out how to translate one sentence from one language into another. These are the
ways of  talking that employ sentences of  the form
(M) “S” (in language L, at time t) means that p.
It seems plausible that when we engage in these ways of  talking we employ that-
26 I use the term “designate” because there is a debate about the question whether that-clauses refer to
propositions or stand in some other relation to them. Following Matthew McGrath (who follows
Jeffrey King (King 2002)) I will “use the term ‘designate’ as a catch-all covering any sort of
semantic association between a linguistic item and an entity.” McGrath 2012.
27 See, for example, Horwich 1998a, McGrath 2012, Schroeder 2013b, and Schiffer 2003.
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clauses to assign literal meanings to sentences in one language in another language
competence with which is presupposed (which can, of  course, be the same language).
And it is natural to say that by doing this speakers are specifying the content of  (or, in
other words, what is meant by and what was said by use of) the sentence in question. In
fact, it seems that the notion of  “content” itself  plays at least some role within this
practice, as something that is attributed with a that-clause or made explicit when we
try to fgure out which that-clause corresponds to the literal meaning of  some
sentence.
It is very tempting for philosophers to associate this practice with the more
theoretical approach to meaning called “semantics”. Semantics is a project in which
certain branches of  linguistics engage, but some of  the theories philosophers develop
to account for the meaning of  sentences also fall into this project. This project is
concerned with specifying the literal meaning of  sentences in natural languages. In
semantics those literal meanings are called the “semantic contents” of  the sentences
in question. However, semantics aims at giving an account of  the literal meanings of
sentences in natural languages with the central aim of  systematically explaining the
compositionality of  natural languages. Recall that compositionality is the feature that
natural languages allow, with only a fnite amount of  resources, to form an infnite
number of  meaningful sentences.
It is easy to see why it is tempting to view semantics as just a more sophisticated
and theoretically feshed out version of  the practice we engage in when we, in
ordinary practice, specify the meaning of  sentences using that-clauses. After all, this
ordinary practice approach aims at specifying and explicating the literal meanings of
sentences and semantics aims at the same thing. So, perhaps semantics should be seen
as trying to unpack, explicate or provide an analysis of  those notions at play in our
ordinary practice, with the aim of  illuminating those notions further and making
their full explanatory potential accessible.28
28 Note that this view of  semantics is fully compatible with the fact that semantics does not fully
explicate the semantic notions in non-semantic terms. What semantics would be engaged in, on
this view, is not to provide a reductive analysis of  the semantic terms, but rather an analysis that tries
to explain some semantic terms in terms of  others which are taken as fundamental. This kind of
approach would be more similar to the kind of  analysis John Rawls offers, when he unpacks
“justice” in terms of  “unfairness”, rather than the kind of  analysis certain types of  utilitarians offer,
when they try to unpack “good” in terms of  “maximizes hedonic pleasure”.
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However, the most common, almost orthodox, way to pursue this project is
truth-conditional semantics. Part of  any approach in semantics is a theory of
interpretation. Given that natural languages are messy, clearer meanings need to be
assigned to the sentences of  the natural language for which one is developing a
semantics. To do this, one has to give an interpretation of  the relevant language, the
“object-language”, in a way that eliminates ambiguities, unpacks context-sensitivity,
etc. to derive a version of  that same language that wears its literal meanings on its
sleeve. One then uses another language, the “meta-language”, competence with
which is presupposed, to specify the semantic contents of  singular terms, predicates, and
logical and sentential connectives in a way that allows us to compute the semantic
contents for any arbitrary sentence from the semantic contents of  its parts and how
they are arranged. 
What is characteristic of  truth-conditional semantics, is that on this approach the
semantic contents of  sentences are their truth-conditions, and that the semantic values
of  singular terms, predicates, and the logical and sentential connectives are the
contributions they make to the truth-conditions of  sentences. For example, what a truth-
conditional approach might specify in the meta-language is what the singular terms
refer to, what the extension of  predicates is, and how the truth-conditions of  sentences
are determined by the semantic values of  their parts. Of  course, different approaches
to truth-conditional semantics will cash out the notion of  a “truth-condition”
differently. A very powerful approach, however, is to understand this in terms of
propositional contents.
The problems for expressivists start with the assumption that expressivism is
incompatible with this approach in semantics. Recall that expressivism’s frst distinctive
claim is
PSYCHOLOGIZED THEORY OF MEANING: The meaning of  declarative
sentences is to be explained in terms of  the judgements assertoric uses
of  those sentences conventionally express.
In the frst chapter I suggested that this claim situates expressivism within the
tradition of  ideationalism, according to which the meaning of  meaningful linguistic
items is explained by those linguistic items being related via linguistic conventions
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with certain mental entities. How is this commitment to be understood exactly
though? In meta-normative theory it is generally assumed that the expressivist’s
acceptance of  PSYCHOLOGIZED THEORY OF MEANING commits her to the view that the
mental states conventionally expressed by declarative sentences themselves are the
semantic contents of  those sentences, rather than propositions. That is, the best
interpretation of  PSYCHOLOGIZED THEORY OF MEANING in the expressivist’s mouth is held to
be
PSYCHOLOGIZED SEMANTICS: The semantic content of  declarative
sentences are the judgements assertoric uses of  those sentences
conventionally express.
This is how Gideon Rosen, for example, characterizes expressivism:
“The centerpiece of  any quasi-realist ‘account’ is what I shall call a
psychologistic semantics for the region: a mapping from statements in
the area to the mental states they ‘express’ when uttered sincerely.”29
Ralph Wedgwood gives a similar characterization of  expressivism:
“According to an expressivist account [...] the fundamental explanation
of  the meaning of  [normative] statements and sentences is given by
a psychologistic semantics. According to a plausible version of  the principle
of compositionality, the meaning of  a sentence is determined by the
meaning of  the terms that it is composed out of, together with the
compositional structure of  the sentence (perhaps together with certain
features of  the context in which that sentence is used). So assuming
this version of  the compositionality principle, this expressivist
approach will also give an account of  the particular terms involved in
these sentences in terms of  the contribution that these terms make to
determining what type of  mental state is expressed by sentences
involving them.”30
And, it is also how Mark Schroeder thinks it is best to understand expressivism:
“On the picture to which expressivists are committed […] [t]he
primary job of  the semantics is to assign to each atomic sentence a
mental state—the state that you have to be in, in order for it to be
permissible for you to assert that sentence. […] [The] primary
semantic values of  the sentences are the states that are expressed by the
sentences, in the minimal sense advocated by the interpretation of
expressivism as assertability semantics [...].”31
29 Rosen 1998: 387.
30 Wedgwood 2008: 35/36.
31 Schroeder 2008a: 33. In fact, Schroeder has explicitly developed a form of  expressivism under the
assumption that expressivism is committed to this claim. See, for example, Schroeder 2008a,
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What is the problem with PSYCHOLOGIZED SEMANTICS in our context? If semantics is
(at least partially) a theoretical extension of  our ordinary practice and our best
semantic theories tell us that ordinary speakers attribute propositions by means of
that-clauses, then expressivism is not only incompatible with our best semantic
theories, but also with our ordinary practice. The expressivist has to assume that this
practice is, at least partially, mistaken.
This problem extends to belief, because of  the assumption that the
propositional contents of  declarative sentences and of  the beliefs their uses
conventionally express interact very closely. More specifcally, those contents are
supposed to be the same. That this is a widely held view was already clear in the
quotes by Michael Smith and Crispin Wright that I gave further above. However, if
the expressivist has to deny that normative sentences have propositional contents, she
also has to deny that what we attribute with a that-clause to a normative belief  is a
propositional content. Again, this seems to confict with our ordinary practice.
It should be relatively obvious that if  there is a problem here for expressivism it
is generated by the assumption that expressivists are committed to PSYCHOLOGIZED
SEMANTICS. The crucial question though is whether expressivism should be seen as
committed to PSYCHOLOGIZED SEMANTICS. Note that it cannot not be mere acceptance of
ideationalism that entails this commitment. This comes out clearly when one
considers that it is thought that expressivists must only deny that normative sentences
have propositional contents. It is conceded that expressivists could allow descriptive
sentences to have propositional contents, which they would derive from the
representational states they express. Consequently, if  you thought that both
normative and descriptive sentences express representational states, you could hold
that the content of  a declarative sentence is a proposition, which it derives from being
appropriately related to a judgement with that same content.32 This kind of  approach
would be perfectly compatible with truth-conditional semantics. So, it must be
expressivism’s distinctive meta-normative commitments which generate commitment to
PSYCHOLOGIZED SEMANTICS. Specifcally, it must be assumed that expressivism’s distinctive
commitments about the nature of  normative judgement block this kind of  move.
Schroeder 2008b and Schroeder 2009: 264.
32 See e.g. Jackson and Pettit 1998: 244/245 and Schroeder 2008a: 24/25.
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Why would it be assumed that expressivism’s meta-normative commitments
bring with it such a commitment though? There are many explanations for why
people have assumed that expressivism is committed to this. First, some of  the remarks
expressivists have made over the years read like a commitment to PSYCHOLOGIZED
SEMANTICS. For example, Allan Gibbard says things like
“Roughly the normative content of  a statement is the set of  fully
opinionated states one could be in and still accept the statement.”33
or
“We can represent the meaning of  a claim by asking in which such
hyperstates a person would agree with it and in which she would
disagree.”34
These remarks read very naturally as an endorsement of  PSYCHOLOGIZED SEMANTICS.
Second, prima facie the very idea that expressivists could allow normative
sentences to have propositional contents actually appears puzzling. How, for example,
would this proposition interact with the attitude which determines the sentence’s
meaning? It seems that the expressivist cannot follow the straightforward line and say
that the content of  the attitude i s the content of  the sentence. But how do the
proposition and the attitude interact then? In the normative case it seems much more
straightforward for the expressivist to claim that the attitude i s the content of  the
sentence. If  the expressivist accepts this, however, she is forced to accept PSYCHOLOGIZED
SEMANTICS, which applies to all declarative sentences. This is because the expressivist
needs to give a unifed account for the contents of  normative and descriptive
sentences, in order to account for how they contribute to the semantic contents of
mixed complex sentences, that is complex sentences that have both normative and
non-normative parts.
The question though, is whether the best way to read expressivism is as
committed to PSYCHOLOGIZED SEMANTICS. In what follows, I suggest that the answer to
this question is “No”, because there is a much more plausible understanding of
expressivism’s commitments in the philosophy of  language. As it will turn out, on this
interpretation expressivivsts need not commit themselves to PSYCHOLOGIZED SEMANTICS.
33 Gibbard 1992: 94.
34 Gibbard 2003: 140.
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4.1. EXPRESSIVISM: SEMANTIC OR META-SEMANTIC?
The starting point is to distinguish semantics from another project in the
philosophy of  language, namely, “meta-semantics”.35 Recall that both semantics and
our ordinary practice which employs meaning-attributions, proceed to give the literal
meanings of  sentences in terms of  another language which is presupposed as meaningful
(namely, the meta-language). They also use semantic notions such as “content”,
“reference”, “truth”, “extension”, etc. at least some of  which are taken as theoretical
primitives by these approaches for the sake of  their investigation. In contrast, meta-
semantics attempts to give a deeper explanation of  the phenomenon “literal meaning”,
preferably in terms making no reference to literal meanings at all. This involves two
projects. First, giving an account in virtue of  what linguistic items have the literal
meanings or contents that they do. On this project one gives an account of  those
properties—let us call them the “meaning-constituting properties”—in virtue of
which terms, sentences, and phrases have the literal meanings they do.36 It involves
second, trying to cash out the semantic notions, in semantics and insofar as they
fgure in our ordinary practice, in non-semantic terms as far as this is possible. Not
only do meta-semantic accounts explain in virtue of  what sentences have their literal
meanings, but they will also tell us something about what is attributed when literal
meanings are assigned, truth-conditions or propositional contents specifed, extension
fxed, etc.
With this distinction in view, it should become apparent that even if
expressivism is understood as a theory in semantics, it has to make at least some
commitments in meta-semantics. PSYCHOLOGIZED SEMANTICS itself  is such a commitment
in particular, one about how to cash out the semantic notions. The crucial question,
however, is whether this is the best way to interpret expressivism’s commitment to
PSYCHOLOGIZED THEORY OF MEANING: The meaning of  declarative
sentences is to be explained in terms of  the judgements uses of  those
sentences express.
35 For authors who draw the same distinction, see e.g. Chrisman 2013 and Chrisman 2012, Lewis
1970b, Ridge Forthcoming, Speaks 2010, Suikkanen 2009, and Williams 1999. Meta-semantics is
the same approach which Jeff  Speaks calls “foundational theory of  meaning” (see Speaks 2010).
36 I borrow the phrase “meaning-constituting properties” from Paul Horwich. See Horwich 1998b: 5.
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After all, there is another option on the table, namely, to see expressivism’s
commitment to PSYCHOLOGIZED THEORY OF MEANING primarily as a commitment with
regards to the frst question relevant in meta-semantics, the question in virtue of  what
sentences have their meanings. Understood in this way, expressivism’s commitment in
the philosophy of  language would be
PSYCHOLOGIZED META-SEMANTICS: Declarative sentences have their
meaning in virtue of  the judgements assertoric uses of  those sentences
conventionally express.
which is quite different from PSYCHOLOGIZED SEMANTICS. An expressivist who accepts this
interpretation of  PSYCHOLOGIZED THEORY OF MEANING would hold that the difference
between normative and descriptive sentences lies in the properties in virtue of  which
they have their meaning, their meaning-constituting properties. On this account,
descriptive sentences have their meaning in virtue of  having the property that their
assertoric uses conventionally express representational states. Normative sentences,
on the other hand, have their meaning in virtue of  having the property that their
assertoric uses conventionally express non-representational states. Note that on this
interpretation of  expressivism, expressivism by itself  seems to come with no positive
commitment regarding how the notion of  a “literal meaning” is to be cashed out. It
could be propositions or something else entirely. The same goes for all other semantic
notions. Expressivism only comes with at least one negative commitment: the
semantic notions cannot be cashed out in a way that makes normative sentences
representational, in some theoretically robust sense.
What this reveals is that there are at least two forms of  expressivism: “semantic
expressivism” which is committed to PSYCHOLOGIZED SEMANTICS and “meta-semantic
expressivism” which is committed to PSYCHOLOGIZED META-SEMANTICS. Which of  these
two forms of  expressivism is more plausible? Let me be clear that this is not a
question about how expressivism is most often understood in meta-normative theory.
First, many authors are often remarkably unclear how they think expressivism is to be
understood.37 Second, while this exegetical question is interesting, the answer to it is
37 Of  course, there are notable exceptions to this rule. For example, as already mentioned above
Gideon Rosen (Rosen 1998), Mark Schroeder (M. Schroeder 2008a or M. Schroeder 2010a), and
Ralph Wedgwood (Wedgwood 2008) make very explicit that they understand expressivism as a
view in semantics. On the other hand, Matthew Chrisman (Chrisman 2012 and Chrisman 2013),
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not relevant in the systematic context of  this dissertation. Here the aim is to fgure
out what form of  expressivism is most plausible.
In answer to that question: meta-semantic expressivism is more plausible, for at
least three reasons.38 First, ideationalism in the philosophy of  language—which I
suggested as the natural home for expressivism in the frst chapter—is much more
plausibly read as a meta-semantic view of  this kind.39 Adopting meta-semantic
expressivism would align expressivism closely to this respectable philosophical
tradition, marking its distinctive position within the ideationalist camp only regarding
the distinction it draws between declarative and normative sentences. This makes
expressivism far less radical than it might initially appear.
Second, any form of  expressivism actually has to endorse
PSYCHOLOGIZED META-SEMANTICS: Declarative sentences have their
meaning in virtue of  the judgements assertoric uses of  those sentences
conventionally express.
given the dialectic in which it is situated. Expressivism’s dialectical rival is meta-
normative representationalism. According to representationalism, the
representationalist order of  explanation is correct for normative thought and
discourse. It seems, however, that any view committed to the representationalist order
of  explanation for a domain of  thought and discourse is, at least in part, a view in
virtue of  what declarative sentences in that domain have their meaning. On such a
view, those declarative sentences have their meaning in virtue of  standing in some
theoretically signifcant representation relation to the world. Since expressivism
denies the appropriateness of  the representationalist order of  explanation for
normative sentences, it must be a view about the meaning-constituting properties of
those sentences.
Third, it should not be the case that one must call the legitimacy of  truth-
conditional semantics into question just in virtue of  accepting expressivism, a meta-
Michael Ridge (Ridge Forthcoming), Nate Charlow (Charlow Forthcoming), Alex Silk (Silk 2013),
and Jussi Suikkanen (Suikkanen 2009), make explicit that they understand expressivism as a meta-
semantic view.
38 Here I follow arguments given by Matthew Chrisman and Mike Ridge. See e.g. Chrisman 2012
and Ridge Forthcoming.
39 See e.g. Davis 2003, Grice 1989, Schiffer 1972, and Speaks 2010.
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normative view. Truth-conditional semantics is a powerful, highly fruitful, and widely
accepted research program not only in philosophy, but also in linguistics. A
commitment to the rejection of  this program would be a signifcant theoretical cost.
But, semantic expressivism has to reject the legitimacy of  this research program, and so
it would be preferable if  expressivism as a meta-normative theory was not committed to
semantic expressivism. Instead, it would be best if  expressivism came with as few
commitments about semantics as possible.40 Of  course, meta-semantic expressivism
still comes with commitments about semantics, namely, regarding how the semantic
notions are not to be interpreted. By itself, however, this is surely neither problematic,
nor does it entail semantic expressivism or the denial of  the legitimacy of  truth-
conditional semantics.
Or does it? At this point, we should consider the worry that the distinction
between meta-semantic and semantic expressivism breaks down. Even if  one
concedes that meta-semantic expressivism is the most plausible form of  expressivism,
so the worry goes, expressivism would still not be saved from being committed to
semantic expressivism. To see whether this worry could be well founded, we need to
ask why we should think that meta-semantic expressivism has to be committed to
semantic expressivism. Although it is true that meta-semantic expressivism will have
some implications about semantics, why should it be seen as having such theoretically
robust implications? Two possible reasons come to mind. 
The frst reason would be that meta-semantic expressivism is committed to a
variant of  what Nate Charlow has called “meaning reductionism”.41 Specifcally, it
40 This is not to say that calling truth-conditional semantics into question cannot be legitimate or
fruitful. As certain semantic expressivists have argued, pursuing expressivism as a semantic project
can often yield powerful explanations in areas in which truth-conditional semantics seems to fail.
This is, for example, what expressivists about epistemic modals, such as Seth Yalcin, have argued
(Yalcin 2007). Mark Schroeder has also argued that semantic expressivism has some fruitful
applications, e.g. when it comes to giving a semantics for a defationary truth-predicate (Schroeder
2010b).
41 Charlow 2011: 207/208. According to Charlow, meaning reductionism is the claim that “If  things
of  kind K are fundamental in a theory of  Φ’s meaning (i.e. the “basic” theory of  meaning is given
in terms of  K’s), any facts about Φ’s meaning must be explained by appeal to features of  K’s.”
Charlow himself  identifes this as explaining why expressivism is often held as being committed to
semantic expressivism. While I agree mostly with Charlow, I do not think it is best to specify the
relevant claim in terms of  facts about the semantic contents of  sentences being explained by appeal to
the mental state in virtue of  which sentences have the meanings that they do. It seems quite plausible
that certain facts could be fundamentally explained in terms of  other facts, without those facts
being identical or reducible to the facts in terms of  which they are explained. Denying this seems to
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would have to be assumed that expressivists are committed to
SEMANTIC REDUCTIONISM: If  things of  kind K explain in virtue of  what
Φ has the semantic content that it does, then Φ’s semantic content is
defnable in terms of  K’s.
If  expressivists were committed to this, then meta-semantic expressivism would be
committed to semantic expressivism.
However, expressivists can resist any commitment to SEMANTIC REDUCTIONISM.
First, it is not the case that any plausible view has to accept SEMANTIC REDUCTIONISM, as
there are many plausible views that d e n y SEMANTIC REDUCTIONISM. Thus denying
SEMANTIC REDUCTIONISM is a viable option.42 Given that denial of  SEMANTIC REDUCTIONISM
is a viable option, however, it is unclear why specifcally an expressivist should be
committed to this view. It is surely neither part of  expressivism’s characterizing
theoretical commitments, nor does it follow from them.
The second reason why meta-semantic expressivism could be committed to
semantic expressivism, is that semantic expressivism is the only option—or at least the
best option—for meta-semantic expressivists. Maybe, for example, meta-semantic
expressivism rules out any plausible alternative semantic program, except for
semantic expressivism. Specifcally, it could be that meta-semantic expressivism is
incompatible with truth-conditional semantics, making semantic expressivism the
next best thing. What would make one inclined to hold this view about expressivism
though?
I can think of  only one possible reason to hold this view. Meta-semantic
expressivism comes with at least one negative commitment: the semantic notions
cannot be cashed out in a way that makes normative sentences, in some theoretically
robust sense, representational. Hence, for semantic expressivism to be the best option
for meta-semantic expressivists, all other plausible semantic approaches must violate
this restriction. More specifcally, the objection would have to be that in semantics the
notion of  a propositional content is cashed out in terms that a r e robustly
commit us to an overly strong reductionism about explanation. Rather, it is best to understand the
relevant kind of  reductionism in terms of  facts about the semantic contents of  sentences being
defnable in terms of  the facts in virtue of  which sentences have their semantic contents.
42 See e.g. Field 2001b, Greenberg and Harman 2007, Horwich 1998b, O’Leary-Hawthorne and
Price 1996, Sellars 1974, Williams 1999, and Williams 2010.
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representational.
This reason, however, holds no water. Although it is tempting to do so, we must
not read too many theoretical assumptions into theories in semantics. Specifcally, we
must not assume that theories in semantics are committed to a robustly representational
understanding of  their core concepts. For example, when notions such as “reference”,
“extension”, “truth-condition”, “proposition”, etc. fgure in semantics it is tempting
to read them in some robustly representational way. This, however, is a mistake. To
read such terms in this way is to make meta-semantic assumptions about the nature of
semantics. And while the success of  the best semantic theories might only be
explainable via such meta-semantic assumptions, this is obviously something that we
cannot presuppose, but must argue for. After all, there are legitimate ways of  reading
the relevant concepts that leave the legitimacy of  truth-conditional semantics as an
explanatory project intact, but do not require that we understand them as robustly
representational.43 So, while meta-semantic theories must explain the success of
semantic frameworks, we should not assume that engaging in semantics requires
taking on particular meta-semantic assumptions: for the purposes of  semantics, the
semantic notions should, as far as possible, be read in a way that is primitive and
neutral between different meta-semantic readings of  those notions.
Of  course, whether meta-semantic expressivism is in fact compatible with truth-
conditional semantics depends on whether the semantic notions can be cashed out in
expressivist friendly terms. So far, however, I can see no in principle objection to the
possible success to this project. Meta-semantic expressivism, thus, has at least a
chance to avoid the theoretical costs that come with rejection of  truth-conditional
semantics. Therefore, it is the more promising view. With this established, let us
return to the question of  whether expressivism is incompatible with our ordinary
practice which employs that-clauses.
4.2. EXPRESSIVISM AND THAT-CLAUSES
As we can see, there is no argument from truth-conditional semantics to an
incompatibility of  expressivism with our ordinary practice of  employing that-clauses.
43 See e.g. Davidson 1990, Field 1994 and Field 2001b, Horwich 1998b, Price 1988, Schiffer 1996
and Schiffer 2003, Sellars 1974, and Williams 1999.
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Because expressivism’s commitments in the philosophy of  language are in principle
compatible with truth-conditional semantics, expressivism should also be compatible
with this practice. In fact, now that we understand expressivism as meta-semantic
expressivism, it should be clear that completely independently of  any question
regarding truth-conditional semantics expressivism should be, at least in principle,
compatible with the use of  that-clauses in ordinary practice. It should be compatible
with such use even when they are used to assign meaning to normative sentences or
contents to normative judgements. This is so, because expressivism is mostly silent
with regard to what goes on in this practice. Expressivism only implies that we cannot
interpret this practice in a way that commits ordinary speakers to normative
sentences and the judgements they express being, in some robust sense,
representational.
Consequently, there would only be a problem if  our ordinary practice
presupposed that to attribute meaning to a normative sentence with a that-clause or to
attribute a content to normative belief  this way is to treat them as representational in
some theoretically robust sense. However, we cannot assume that our ordinary
practice presupposes this. After all, when we are engaged in meta-normative debate,
we are not entitled to make such robust theoretical assumptions about our ordinary
practice. We can only assume that our ordinary practice is committed to a number of
claims about that-clauses that we should read in a platitudinous, theoretically
uncommitted way. Everything else would be question-begging to the quasi-realist who
wants to provide an alternative theoretical underpinning of  our ordinary practice.
When we engage with the question of  whether expressivists can allow those uses of
that-clauses associated with propositional contents, we, consequently, cannot presuppose
that to attribute meaning to a normative sentence with a that-clause or to attribute a
content to normative belief  this way is to treat them as representational in some
theoretically robust sense. Rather, we need to ask ourselves frst how that-clauses, as
they fgure in our ordinary practice, have to be understood on an expressivist framework. 
This, of  course, is nothing more than another application of  the quasi-realist
manoeuvre. Once the availability of  this manoeuvre is visible, however, it should be
clear that there is no in principle incompatibility between meta-semantic expressivism
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and our ordinary practice of  explaining meaning in terms of  that-clauses, or any of
the other relevant uses of  that-clauses. Of  course, showing that such a view is not
impossible does not yet discharge the quasi-realist’s burden to provide an account of
that-clauses in their relevant uses that fts with expressivism. Before I turn to my
proposal for what account expressivists should endorse, let me frst make a note about
the relationship between this account of  that-clauses in our ordinary practice and
semantics.
When I introduced the worry that expressivism is incompatible with the way we
employ that-clauses in our ordinary practice, I assumed a particular view about the
relationship between ordinary practice and semantics. On this view, semantics is just
a more sophisticated version of  the way we assign meaning via that-clauses in our
ordinary practice. If  we accept this picture, any theory in meta-semantics that has the
terms at play in our ordinary practice as its targets will also have those of  semantics
as its targets. I do not think that this is problematic for the view about that-clauses I
develop in the next two chapters. However, now that I have shown how expressivism
would be compatible with the ordinary practice which employs that-clauses even if
this assumption is accepted, I want to note that it is not a signifcant problem if  it is
rejected. 
The main aims of  semantics and our ordinary practice of  specifying meaning
are quite different. While semantics aims to explain compositionality, the main aim of
using that-clauses to talk about meaning in our ordinary practice is to enable the
interpretation and translation of  linguistic items. And it seems that the resources
required to achieve these aims will, in the end, be quite different: semantics requires a
framework that can perfectly mirror the underlying complex structure of  natural
languages. In fact, on a plausible construal of  semantics, the semantic words that
fgure in it function as theoretical terms which semanticists introduce specifcally to
account for compositionality. This is why semantics can plausibly be seen as a
theoretical modelling exercise set up specifcally to capture very specifc features of
sentences in natural languages. The aim of  the ordinary practice use of  that-clauses in
the context of  attributions of  meaning, on the other hand, requires a framework that
provides fruitful heuristics, which allow speakers to feed on their existing linguistic
104
competence for the purpose of  interpretation and translation. 
So, while the approaches are superfcially similar, it should not surprise us when
the notions semanticists introduce and those that have developed in our linguistic
practice for the purpose of  assigning meaning are quite different and not (fully)
translatable into each other. Although many of  the same words are at play in
ordinary practice and semantics (e.g. “content”, “truth”, “reference”, etc.), it seems
that those words mean quite different things on these two approaches. For example,
according to the way “reference” is used in truth-conditional semantics, al l words
have denotations, even words such as “is”, “very”, or “not” which we would not
regard as referring terms in ordinary practice.
Of  course, even if  all of  this is true, there might still be ways to hook up the
technical terms of  semantics with those that fgure in our ordinary practice. But, it
should neither be a requirement that this is possible, nor a requirement that how
those notions “hook up” supports the picture of  the relation between ordinary
practice and semantics presented further above.44 In consequence, we can—and
should—for our purposes stay neutral on the question of  whether expressivist accounts
of  that-clauses as they fgure in our ordinary practice have implications for semantics
and vice versa. I will conclude this chapter by laying out what kind of  view I want to
develop in what follows, and how I will develop it in the following two chapters. 
5. EXPRESSIVISM AND ALL THAT: THE PLAN
My plan in what follows is to investigate the prospects of  developing a
defationary view of  that-clauses that fts the quasi-realist’s purposes.  While recent work
by Mark Schroeder and Michael Ridge has opened a space of  alternative options for
quasi-realists, the prospects of  combining expressivism with a defationary view about
propositions have been mostly unexplored.45 In fact, so far quasi-realists have not
developed such an account in any satisfying way. This is surprising for at least two
44 An author who thinks that we can “hook” up our ordinary notions with the technical notions used
in semantics is Max Kölbel (Kölbel 2008). An author who denies this is Seth Yalcin (Yalcin 2007).
45 Schroeder and Ridge each have argued for two alternative options for the expressivist (Ridge
Forthcoming and Schroeder 2008a and Schroeder 2013b). While their accounts differ in many
signifcant details, they have in common that they allow expressivists to be realists about
propositions, as long as they accept a relatively unorthodox view about propositions (in Ridge’s
cases this is a modifed version of  Scott Soames’ view (Soames 2010)).
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reasons. The frst reason is that certain remarks by well-known quasi-realists such as
Simon Blackburn and Allan Gibbard suggest that this is the option that they would
want to take when it comes to giving an account of  the relevant uses of  that-clauses.46
If  they think that this is the way expressivism can be made compatible with the
relevant uses of  that-clauses though, why have they not explained how this is supposed
to work? This is a surprising theoretical lacuna to say the least. The second reason is
that a defationary account of  that-clauses actually seems to be the most natural view
for a quasi-realist. I take it that it is no accident that the standard quasi-realist
package for “truth”, “truth-aptitude”, and “belief ” proceeds by giving defationary or
minimalist accounts of  these notions. Rather, this refects theoretical sentiments that
underly quasi-realism, sentiments shared by minimalist, and especially defationary
accounts.
First, these accounts share expresssivism’s commitment to defating notions at
play in our ordinary practice that tempt representationalist inclined philosophers to
expand our ontology in often problematic ways. The quasi-realist’s credo is that
mostly all is well with ordinary practice, and that this practice is far less ontologically
committed than philosophers often claim. A defationary view about that-clauses
would ft quite well with this sentiment.
Second, looking at the bigger picture, defationary and minimalist approaches
to those notions that seem to bar expressivism from preserving the “realist sounding”
surface features of  ordinary practice open the door for what Huw Price has called
“functional pluralism”.47 Functional pluralism is the view that declarative sentences and
judgements can legitimately play functions other than that of  representing reality.
Defationary and minimalist approaches open the door for functional pluralism, by
removing any representationalist commitment from exactly those notions
characteristic for declarative sentences and the judgements they express: they leave
the legitimacy of  the surface features intact without tying that legitimacy to
representationalism. But, expressivists should be sympathetic to functional pluralism,
as it is natural to assume that expressivists should accept non-representational
46 See e.g. Blackburn’s remarks in Blackburn 1998a and Blackburn 1998b and Gibbard’s remarks in
Gibbard 2003.
47 E.g. Price 2011 or Price 2013.
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accounts for domains other than the normative. After all, expressivists are expressivists
because they think that the representationalist order of  explanation encounters
signifcant problems in the case of  normative thought and discourse. And, it is likely
that the same holds for other domains as well.48 However, the quasi-realist credo
should also apply across the board: quasi-realist expressivists should have accounts of
the notions characteristic for declarative sentences and the judgements they express
which preserve their legitimacy independently of  the underlying functional story. Again,
a defationary account of  that-clauses would ft well with this requirement.
Third, I take it that a defationary account would be more attractive from the
outset than a minimalist account. Even if  we want to “defate” that-clauses, we still
need to admit that they do play an important role in our ordinary practice. Given
that the minimalist is still committed to the representationalist order of  explanation,
she must account for this role in terms of  features of  the entities designated by that-
clauses. However, it is not obvious that a minimalist account could hold its promise of
only introducing a theoretically “minimal” entity into our ontology while still
preserving all that needs to be accounted for when it comes to that-clauses. On the
other hand, an account that proceeds along non-representationalist terms promises
exactly that. Again, a defationary account of  that-clauses is the place to look. For
these reasons I think that it is a mistake that quasi-realists have not explored this
theoretical option, a mistake which I aim to rectify in what follows.
I will develop this view as follows. The aim is to give an expressivist friendly
account of  certain relevant uses of  that-clauses. I think that it will be best to approach
this project by frst focusing on a clear case of  such uses. I will start by focusing on the
role of  that-clauses in contexts in which they are used to attribute meaning. I will give
an account of  that-clauses in such uses that not only makes expressivism compatible
with such attributions to normative sentences, but also enables expressivists to allow
normative sentences to have propositional contents. I will undertake this task in the
next chapter. The account I give draws on the work of  Wilfried Sellars. Sellars has
48 Some expressivists have already argued this. Simon Blackburn, for example, has expressed
sympathy for functional pluralism and has defended non-representationalism about a variety of
other domains, including causal judgements, probability judgements, counterfactuals and modal
judgements (see e.g. Blackburn 1973, Blackburn 1984a, Blackburn 1998a, and Blackburn 1998b).
Allan Gibbard has defended non-representationalism about indicative conditionals (Gibbard 1980).
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not developed an account of  how his view can be generalized to the role of  that-
clauses in the attribution of  mental content though. This is what I will do in the ffth
chapter. I will argue that there is an ideationalist framework that allows us to
generalize the Sellarsian account and in which expressivism can also be situated. This
way the Sellarsian account benefts from being combined with expressivism, as this
allows to generalize the account to uses of  that-clauses in the context of  propositional
attitude ascriptions.
6. SUMMARY
Quasi-realists hold that expressivists can allow normative thought and discourse
to be truth-apt and normative judgements to be beliefs. In this chapter I have argued
that in order to allow this, expressivists must give an account of  how certain uses of
that-clauses associated with propositions ft with expressivism. I have then explained
how an expressivist can escape concerns that such an account is impossible, by seeing
expressivism as a meta-semantic, rather a semantic, theory. I have then outlined my
plan for developing a defationist account of  such uses.
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CHAPTER IV: EXPRESSIVISM AND ALL THAT. ILLUSTRATING WHAT WE
MEAN
0. INTRODUCTION
Quasi-realists need an account of  certain relevant uses of  that-clauses to make
good on their claim that expressivism is fully compatible with normative thought and
discourse being truth-apt and normative judgements being beliefs. In this chapter and
the next, I will develop such an account. Specifcally, I will set out to develop a
defationary view of  that-clauses on which our ordinary usage of  that-clauses to attribute
meaning to normative sentences and content to normative beliefs is fully compatible
with expressivism. I will begin in this chapter by giving a defationary account of  that-
clauses in the context of  attributing meaning to declarative sentences. I will complete
the account in the next chapter by explaining how this account can be generalized to
the role of  that-clauses in belief-attributions.
This chapter proceeds as follows: I will start, in the frst section, by taking a
closer look at the role of  that-clauses when they are used to attribute meaning. This
will give us a clearer view of  the phenomena that a plausible account of  that-clauses
in such uses needs to account for. In the second section I introduce a view about that-
clauses that accounts for these phenomena. Here I also show that on a plausible
reading this account is a defationary account of  that-clauses. I also give an account of
the sense in which that-clauses can be said to attribute propositional contents on this
account, and explain how the account’s claims about meaning relate to expressivism’s
commitments in the philosophy of  language. In the third section I will then give an
account of  the contribution that-clauses make to the mental state expressed by the
sentences in which they fgure.
1. The Role of That-Clauses in Attributions of Meaning
Not all uses of  that-clauses can plausibly be seen as relevant for our ordinary
notions of  “belief ” and “truth-aptitude”. That is, not all uses of  that-clauses are such
that they will be associated with the attribution of  propositional contents. However,
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there is at least one paradigmatic example for such a use, namely, the use of  that-
clauses in the context of  attributing meaning. These are the uses found at play in
translation, for example.
Translation is a situation in which one faces a sentence in a foreign language
and tries to assign meaning to it. In other words, it is a case in which one tries to
determine whether two sentences in two different languages mean the same thing. In
such contexts that-clauses are used as follows:
(1) “Heinrich ist ein Imker” (in German) means that Heinrich is a bee-
keeper.
Note that the use of  that-clauses in such contexts is not different for the translation of
descriptive sentences such as in (1) and of  normative sentences, such as in
(2) “Abtreibung ist moralisch erlaubt” (in German) means that abortion
is morally permissible.
What is going on in these contexts is that we mention a German sentence and then
give its meaning by introducing a that-clause. Specifcally, we consider a sentence in a
language to be assigned meaning to—the object language. In our cases, the object
language is German. We then assign meaning to that sentence by pairing it with a
sentence in the language in which meaning is to be assigned—the meta-language. The
meta-language is English in our cases. But, we do not pair those sentences in just any
way. Rather, in the meta-language we assign a sentence modifed by a that-clause to the
sentence in the object language. And, it seems that it is exactly this modifcation which
allows the sentence in the meta-language to play its meaning-giving role. Neither merely
mentioning nor using the sentence would straightforwardly do the job. Consequently,
in this kind of  situation that-clauses play a purely intra-linguistic role, as a tool for
semantic ascent. Their role is to allow assignment of  sentences of  the meta-language
to sentences in the object language in a meaning-giving way.
What goes for translation goes for interpretation generally. When interpreting
what certain sentences mean in the mouth of  other speakers of  English, we can
assign meaning in the same way. For example, when we interpret another speaker of
English, call her “Helene”, we can do so again by employing that-clauses. Interpreting
her utterances will look as follows:
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(3) “Heinrich is a bee-keeper” (in Helene’s idiolect) means that
Heinrich is a bee-keeper.
Note that here that-clauses also play the same role when we assign meaning to
descriptive sentences such as in (3), as they do for assigning meaning to normative
sentences such as in
(4) “Abortion is morally permissible” (in Helene’s idiolect) means that
abortion is morally permissible.
Again, these are cases in which we consider sentences in an object language and then
assign meaning to them by pairing them with a sentence modifed by a that-clause in
a meta-language. And, once more it seems that it is exactly this modifcation that allows
the sentence in the meta-language to play its meaning-giving role. So, in the case of
interpretation that-clauses play a purely intra-linguistic role as well, as a tool for
semantic ascent. Their role is to allow to assign sentences in the meta-language to
sentences in the object language in a way that is meaning-giving.
In what follows I will call sentences that employ that-clauses in this way
“meaning-attributions”. A meaning-attribution is any sentence of  the form
(M) “S” (in language L, at time t) means that p.
in which a that-clause is used to give the meaning of  another sentence. Meaning-
attributions partially answer what role that-clauses play in ordinary practice, namely,
they play an intra-linguistic, meaning-giving role in the context of  translation and
interpretation. This answer is only partial, of  course, because I have not considered
other relevant roles that-clauses might play. It seems quite clear, however, that the role
that-clauses play in the context of  translation and interpretation is one of  the more
central and characterizing roles of  talk invoking that-clauses, at least as they are used in
ordinary practice.
Having identifed this role the frst step towards developing a defationary
account of  that-clauses has been made. It should be clear, at least prima facie, that the
theoretical requirements for that-clauses to play this role are quite minimal and should
be compatible with a defationary account of  that-clauses. Furthermore, it also seems,
again at least prima facie, that there is nothing in this role of  that-clauses which might
prevent an expressivist from allowing their use when the target sentence is a
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normative one. Of  course, these are only promises. To cash them out a substantial
account of  that-clauses is still required.
This account must satisfy at least four desiderata. First, it needs to account for
the role that-clauses (and meaning-attributions generally) play in the context of
translation and interpretation (this is just a general condition of  adequacy on
accounts of  that-clauses and meaning-attributions). Second, the account must be
compatible with that-clauses playing their role in some non-representational fashion.
So, the account given of  that-clauses should in no way make reference to that-clauses
standing in some robust representation relation to certain entities. Third, the account
must ft with functional pluralism, and in particular be compatible with quasi-realist
expressivism about normative discourse. This means that the account should allow
the legitimacy of  meaning-attributions to declarative sentences, independently of
whether the deeper meta-semantic account for those declarative sentences is
representationalist or non-representationalist. Fourth, to be fully compatible with
expressivism, the account needs to proceed in terms of  the contribution of  that-
clauses to the mental state expressed by sentences in which they fgure.
The rest of  this chapter is dedicated to giving an account that ticks these boxes.
I proceed in two stages. First, in the second section, I introduce a defationary
account of  that-clauses that satisfes the frst three desiderata, and then, in the third
section, I provide additional details that allow the account to satisfy the fourth
desideratum. I will, consequently, go from a more general account, compatible with
all kinds of  meta-semantic theories, to a more specifc version of  that account
explicitly designed to ft with expressivism. Because I am interested in those kinds of
uses of  that-clauses of  which their use in meaning-attributions is a paradigmatic
example, my strategy will, thereby, be to focus frst on meaning-attributions in each
case. This will make it easier to give an account of  that-clauses in their relevant uses,
as it allows for a focus on how they fgure in such sentences.
2. DEFLATIONISM ABOUT THAT-CLAUSES
Let me start with the type of  account of  meaning-attributions that a defationist
about that-clauses needs to avoid. To get to that account, consider the following
112
question: if  one sets out to give an account of  meaning-attributions, what kind of
account is one trying to give? An answer can be given by looking back at the projects
involved in meta-semantics. Recall that meta-semantics involves two projects. First,
giving an account in virtue of  what linguistic items have the literal meanings they do.
Second, trying to cash out the semantic notions, in semantics and insofar as they
fgure in our ordinary practice. The project of  giving an account of  meaning-
attributions is part of  the second meta-semantic project. It attempts to understand
what goes on when we, in our ordinary practice, attribute literal meanings by means
of  that-clauses and tries to cash out the notion of  a “literal meaning”.
This notion of  a “literal meaning” is already associated with certain kinds of
properties of  sentences though. A suitably theory-neutral description of  these
properties can be given in terms of  the role meaning-attributions play in our ordinary
practice. We use meaning-attributions to give translations and interpretations, and it
seems very plausible to say that a meaning-attribution is correct or true just in case the
interpretation or translation it offers is correct. So, a good, theory-neutral way of
characterizing the properties associated with “literal meaning” is in terms of
interpretation or translation.1 More specifcally, I take it that the properties associated
with “literal meaning” are those properties of  sentences that have the following
feature: for any sentence S1 there is some relevant sub-set M of  those properties
possessed by S1 such that some sentence S2 is a good translation or interpretation of
S1 if  and only if  S2 has M. I will call these properties the “meaning-explananda”.
One way to account for the meaning-explananda is by introducing an entity
that is the meaning of  the relevant kinds of  sentences and which accounts for the
meaning-explananda because of  its various features. Because it is that-clauses which
attribute meaning, that-clauses would have to stand in some theoretically robust
representation relation to this entity. “Means” would then function to tell us that
whatever entity is picked out by the that-clause i s the meaning of  the sentence in
1 Of  course, taking interpretation and translation to be the central starting points for an investigation
into meaning is not new. In fact, it is very common in philosophy. It goes back at least to Quine’s
book “Word and Object” (Quine 1960). Other authors who have taken these phenomena to be
central to the explanation of  meaning are e.g. Donald Davidson (Davidson 1973) and David Lewis
(Lewis 1974). Given the centrality of  interpretation and translation for the phenomenon of
meaning, it should also be no surprise that semantic theory often takes the form of  a theory of
interpretation.
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question. A defationary view of  that-clauses must reject this view. On such a view, the
“literal meaning” of  sentences cannot be something to which that-clauses stand in
some theoretically signifcant representation relation.
However, even on a defationary account there should be something that
accounts for the meaning-explananda, which should be fully describable in terms that
do not mention contents or meanings. This might, for example, be certain use
properties of  sentences, maybe how they are normally used by competent speakers of
the language in question. I will call the properties that do all of  the relevant
explanatory work on an account on which the meaning-explananda can be fully
accounted for in terms not making mention of  literal meanings, the “basic
explanatory properties”. It is important to keep in mind that commitment to a view
of  this kind is perfectly compatible with commitment to the following claims. First,
that explanations of  the meaning-explananda that mention meaning are perfectly
legitimate. Second, that such explanations are the best explanations (currently or
ever) available to us (given our cognitive and other epistemic limitations, time
constraints, etc.).2 Third, that we could never engage in the practice of  interpretation
or translation solely in terms mentioning only basic explanatory properties instead of
using terms mentioning meaning. Fourth, that ordinary speakers could never fully
spell out what those properties are. All that this view amounts to is that what accounts
for the meaning-explananda fundamentally are facts fully describable in terms not
mentioning meaning.
If  you have a view of  this kind, however, what should you think about
meaning-attributions? A frst possibility is reductionism: facts about literal meanings are
nothing but facts about the relevant basic explanatory properties. A second option is
error-theory: literal meanings do not exist, and the practice of  meaning-attributions
should be abandoned for the practice of  interpreting and translating by specifying
the basic explanatory properties of  sentences. From the perspective of  our project,
namely, of  developing a defationary account of  that-clauses, neither of  these
approaches is appealing. However, another approach is possible towards meaning-
2 So, for example, this view is compatible with it being completely legitimate to carry out semantics
in terms of  the semantic notions, and also with such an enterprise being the best project that is
available to us to account for the compositionality of  natural language sentences.
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attributions. This is an approach based on the account of  meaning-attributions given
by Wilfried Sellars in his paper “Meaning as Functional Classifcations.”3
2.1. SELLARS’ ACCOUNT OF MEANING-ATTRIBUTIONS
It is plausible to read Sellars as adopting a view on which the meaning-
explananda can be fully accounted for in terms not mentioning meanings, namely, in
terms mentioning only rules about and patterns of  linguistic behaviour.4 However,
Sellars did not doubt the legitimacy of  meaning-attributions and the way they fgure
in translation and interpretation. Instead, he thought that this legitimacy could be
accounted for without expanding the metaphysical and theoretical commitments
already made by his explanatory account. How did he think this can be achieved?5
On Sellars’ account, meaning-attributions are illustrating sortals: “Means that p”
is a sortal phrase which illustrates particular basic explanatory properties and in this
way allows to classify sentences in accordance with those properties.6 What does this
3 Sellars 1974. Of  course, Sellars does not call the sentences that are the targets of  his account
“meaning-attributions”. However, Sellars is still interested in the same phenomenon, namely, in
how we can attribute meanings to sentences by means of  employing that-clauses.
4 See e.g. Sellars 1954a, Sellars 1954b and Sellars 1974.
5 Let me note two things about my presentation. First, the account Sellars develops is fully general in
being an account that is applicable to all linguistic items (words and sentences). So, his account is
not only an account of  how we use that-clauses to give the meaning of  declarative sentences, but
also an account of  similar ways in which we give the meaning of  words. However, since I am only
interested in the meaning-giving role of  that-clauses to declarative sentences, I will consider Sellars’
account only as an account of  those. Second, Sellars himself  phrases the account in terms of  his
own theory about the basic explanatory properties, but the account is fully general in the sense that
it could in principle be combined with many different views about the basic explanatory properties.
In what follows I will present the account in its general form and not the specifc formulation that
Sellars gives.
6 One question we might ask about this proposal is whether it is committed to “means” being
ambiguous, since the account implies that the sense of  “means” in sentences such as “Blood on his
hands means that he committed the murder” differs from the sense in sentences such as “‘Heinrich
ist ein Imker’ means that Heinrich is a bee-keeper”. Such a commitment might be thought
problematic since brute ambiguity does not seem entirely plausible for this case. However, I do not
think that a Sellarsian is committed to “brute” ambiguity. While she needs to say that “means”
means different things in these different contexts, she could tell a genealogical story about why we
have the phrase “means” which relates these two uses to each other. Although a full-blown account
would lead us too far astray, let me sketch shortly how such an account might look. “Means” in
meaning-attributions functions as a specialized copula on Sellars’ account. In sentences such as
“Blood on his hands means that he committed the murder”, on the other hand, it seems plausible
that “means” is appropriately understood along the lines of  “is a sign”, “indicates”, or “shows”.
How could those two usages be connected? Suppose language developed so that we could indicate
something about ourselves, e.g. our mental states. In this case, “means” might originally have been
used purely to mean “indication”, where a sentence following the “means” was used to make clear
what was indicated. As certain uses of  that-clauses became more refned as a way to pick out basic
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mean? On Sellars’ account, meaning-attributions allow us to attribute basic
explanatory properties to sentences without having to or even being able to explicitly
specify the properties in question.7 They do this by illustrating what the relevant basic
explanatory properties are, by using a particular sentence in the meta-language
(competence with which is presupposed) as an example for a sentence with those very
same basic explanatory properties. Let me cash out a little bit more how this is
supposed to work.
According to this account, meaning-attributions are a tool for semantic ascent:
by use of  a meaning-attribution we introduce a meta-linguistic phrase (“means that
p”) that allows us to classify sentences in the object language as having certain basic
explanatory properties. These are those (or at least relevantly similar) basic
explanatory properties as possessed by the sentence in the meta-language we have
transformed into a that-clause. However, meaning-attributions play this role not by
explicitly telling us what the relevant basic explanatory properties are. Rather they do
this by illustrating these basic explanatory properties using the sentence that has these
basic explanatory properties in our language as an example. It is the role of  that-clauses
in this context to pick out the basic explanatory properties of  sentences. To transform a
declarative sentence S into a that-clause, is to transform it into a meta-linguistic
predicate that picks out the basic explanatory properties that S has in our language,
where S serves as an illustration for the basic explanatory properties relevant in that
context. So, on Sellars’ account, that-clauses are linguistic tools that provide an easy
way to pick out the properties that determine whether one sentence would provide a
proper interpretation or translation of  another sentence. The word “means” in a
meaning-attribution, according to Sellars, functions merely as a special copula that
explanatory properties though, “means” in connection with such uses of  that-clauses slowly
transformed into a copula. This explains how the two uses of  “means” are related, while upholding
the claim that these two uses have different meanings.
7 On Sellars own view, it is always at least in principle possible to fully spell out the basic explanatory
properties of  terms (for example, Sellars says “Notice that instead of  ʻgiving’ the complex function
of  ‘und’ (in German) by using an illustrating functional sortal, we could, instead, have listed the
syntactical rules which govern the word ‘und’ in the German language. In general the rule
governed uniformities which constitute a language (including our own) can be exhaustively
described without the use of  meaning statements [...].” Sellars 1974: 431). However, this
commitment is optional for Sellars’ view of  meaning-attributions, as long as there are other ways
of  picking up on the basic explanatory properties that terms have. Because the view Sellars
develops can itself  stay neutral on this issue, I will not assume that it is committed either way in
what follows.
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tells us that the sentence in the object language has the basic explanatory properties
picked out by the relevant that-clause.
Let me make all of  this clear with an example. Take again,
(1) “Heinrich ist ein Imker” (in German) means that Heinrich is a bee-
keeper.
On the Sellarsian account, this sentence classifes the German sentence “Heinrich ist
ein Imker” as having certain kinds of  basic explanatory properties (i.e. it serves to
attribute certain basic explanatory properties to that sentence). The sentence does
this by using the English sentence “Heinrich is a bee-keeper” as an example to
illustrate the basic explanatory properties in question. Indicating that this is what the
sentence is used for is the job of  transforming the sentence into a that-clause. More
specifcally, by transforming the English sentence “Heinrich is a bee-keeper”, we are
introducing a predicate that serves to pick out the relevant basic explanatory
properties, by using the sentence as an illustrative example. “Means” in this context,
then merely functions to attribute those properties to the German sentence.
It is important to note that while Sellars’ account is compatible with a
reductionist understanding of  how that-clauses play their role, it does not entail that
that-clauses or meaning-attributions reduce to statements about or are analysable in terms of
the basic explanatory properties they pick out or assign. This is so, because of  the
particular relation in which that-clauses stand to those properties. On Sellars’ account,
that-clauses illustrate the relevant basic explanatory properties by using a sentence in
some presupposed language as an example for something with those basic
explanatory properties. This means that they pick out the relevant basic explanatory
properties via similarity relations that are identifed in a quasi-demonstrative way: that-
clauses pick out basic explanatory characteristics of  sentences not via covert or
explicit descriptions, but by example. Consequently, they function comparably to how
we tell people about the appearance of  a person unknown to the audience by
pointing to a particular person that has suffciently similar or identical characteristics
than it is to giving a description of  that appearance. However, it is an open question
whether it is best to understand this in terms of  reduction or in terms of  some other
relation. In fact, as I will argue later, there are good reasons to not understand this in
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terms of  reduction. For our purposes we only need to consider the non-reductionist
version of  Sellars’ account, which I will call the “Sellarsian account” in what follows.8
Because meaning-attributions allow us to assign basic explanatory properties in
this rough and ready way on the Sellarsian account, they provide resources to talk
about those properties (and all this involves), without having to explicitly invoke them.
Given that ordinary speakers’ knowledge of  the basic explanatory properties of
sentences will mostly be implicit, meaning-attributions, consequently, play a valuable
and, most likely, indispensable role in our ordinary practice. This can be seen as the
raison d’être of  meaning-attributions, as Sellars himself  notes:
“In practice, the use of  meaning statements (translation) is
indispensable, for it provides a way of  mobilizing our linguistic
intuitions to classify expressions in terms of  functions which we would
fnd it diffcult if  not (practically) impossible to spell out in terms of
explicit rules.”9
We now know the details of  the Sellarsian account of  meaning-attributions and that-
clauses. How does this account help in the search for a defationary account of  that-
clauses though? Let’s investigate.
2.2. DEFLATIONISM
The Sellarsian account satisfes at least the following two of  our desiderata.
First, it accounts for the role that-clauses play in the context of  translation and
interpretation. In fact, I take it that for someone who wants to preserve the legitimacy
of  this practice, but who thinks that the fundamental explanatory work is done in
other terms, an account like Sellars’ is the best option. The account connects the
ordinary practice of  translation and interpretation with the basic explanatory
properties in a way that gives that practice some independent and legitimate work. It
seems that something in this ballpark must be right, if  a defationary account of  that-
clauses in this context is correct.
Second, the account fts with functional pluralism, and in particular, with quasi-
realist expressivism about normative discourse. Indeed, even though I have not
8 I use the label “Sellarsian” to indicate that Sellars himself  should not be seen as committed to a
non-reductionist version of  his view.
9 Sellars 1974: 432.
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mentioned this, the account was explicitly designed to ft with functional pluralism, as
Sellars himself  was committed to that view.10 That the account fts with functional
pluralism should be clear: it allows the legitimacy of  meaning-attributions to
declarative sentences, independently of  whether the deeper meta-semantic account for
these declarative sentences is representationalist or non-representationalist. All that is
required for us to employ meaning-attributions within an area of  discourse, is that
sentences in this area take the form of  declarative sentences. And as we already know,
this requirement is in principle compatible with different kinds of  deeper explanations
for different domains of  thought and discourse.
What about the third requirement though, namely, that the account must be
compatible with that-clauses playing their role in some non-representational fashion?
Nowhere in the Sellarsian account of  that-clauses are entities mentioned in a way that
would play into a representationalist’s hand. The only entities mentioned on the
Sellarsian account are basic explanatory properties. However, that-clauses stand in a
relation to basic explanatory properties, which is such as to foreclose a reduction of
that-clauses in terms of  those properties. So, that-clauses do not stand in the relevant
representation relation to basic explanatory properties. But, the Sellarsian
explanation of  that-clauses makes no mention of  any other entities either!
Consequently, while we can give an account of  that-clauses in terms of  how they
function, this function will not be the kind of  function a representationalist about
that-clauses would assign to them. According to the Sellarsian account, the best
explanation of  that-clauses makes no reference to that-clauses functioning to
represent, in some theoretically signifcant sense, entities of  some sort.
Note also, that on the Sellarsian account, there will be no informative analysis
o f  that-clauses. All that we can do is characterize that-clauses in a relatively
platitudinous way similar to the way I did in section three of  the last chapter and in
the frst section of  this chapter. The same goes for the verb “means” in the context of
meaning-attributions. While “means” functions as a specialized form of  the copula in
a meaning-attribution, it will not be the case that “means” can be analysed in terms of
10 For example, Sellars rejected the representationalist order of  explanation for modal statements,
causal statements, and (arguably) normative statements and gave explicitly non-representationalist
accounts for these statements (see in particular Sellars 1958).
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this function. So, according to the Sellarsian account, there will not be much of  an
informative answer to the question what it is that is assigned to the sentence “Helene
is a great cook” in
(5) “Helene is a great cook” means that Helene is a great cook.
except for the answer that that Helene is a great cook is assigned to “Helene is a great
cook” as its meaning. 
What this means, of  course, is that the Sellarsian account of  that-clauses i s a
defationary view about that-clauses. We have found what we were looking for. How
about propositional contents on this view though? The view on the table does not
make reference to such contents at all. Does this mean that the view is a form of
eliminativism about propositional contents? Not so fast.
Let me frst note that the Sellarsian view is perfectly compatible with that-
clauses legitimately functioning syntactically as referential terms.11 On the Sellarsian
account, that-clauses pick out basic explanatory properties by using some sentence as
an example for something with those very same (or relevantly similar) properties. This
has the consequence that what will be most salient in the context of  using a that-
clause are those features of  sentences relevant for its having particular basic
explanatory properties. Thus, that-clauses will behave in a way that is structurally
isomorphic to the basic explanatory properties of  the sentence following the “that”.
This has two important consequences.
First, as long as we are competent with the language in question, we can use
sentences modifed by that-clauses as stand-ins to talk about and think about basic
explanatory properties. This signifcantly increases the expressive power of  that-
clauses as a means to talk and think about basic explanatory properties. After all,
short of  talking or thinking about basic explanatory properties directly, the best thing
to talk or think about those properties is to use stand-ins that behave structurally
isomorphic to those basic explanatory properties. This ties up nicely with the raison
d’être of  meaning-attributions, namely, to provide a convenient tool to assign basic
explanatory properties to sentences. Most of  the work that is done by meaning-
11 There is some linguistic evidence that that-clauses in those uses we are interested in do actually
work linguistically like referential singular terms. See, for example, Horwich 1998a: 86-90,
McGrath 2012, and Schiffer 2003: 11-15.
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attributions is done by the way that that-clauses function to pick out basic explanatory
properties. “Means” only pins down the purpose for which those properties are
picked out. But, the better that-clauses allow us to engage with those basic
explanatory properties the better they can serve this function in the context of
meaning-attributions.
Let us turn to the second consequence of  that-clauses behaving in a way that is
structurally isomorphic to the basic explanatory properties of  the sentence following
the that-. This is that in this case that-clauses will behave linguistically exactly like
referential singular terms that refer to something that supervenes on, but does not
reduce to, basic explanatory properties. Consequently, the Sellarsian account offers
an explanation of  why that-clauses function syntactically this way, even though the
explanation of  why that-clauses are in our vocabulary makes no reference to such
entities. Furthermore, even though that-clauses function syntactically as referential
singular terms, there will be no informative account of  the kinds of  entities to which
that-clauses refer. At most we can give platitudinous answers that derive from the
characteristics of  that-clauses and their intra-linguistic role in the context of
interpretation and translation.
I f  that-clauses linguistically behave like referential singular terms that refer to
something that supervenes on basic explanatory properties though, we can introduce
other ways of  talking about what that-clauses refer to. In particular we can use the
label “propositional contents” to refer to what is attributed by that-clauses. So, for
example, rather than saying
(M) “S” (in a language L, at time t) means that p.
we might now, at least in some contexts, be able to say
(C) “S” (in a language L, at time t) has the content that p.
We might even be able to say, at least in some contexts,
(P) “S” (in a language L, at time t) expresses the proposition that p.
It is important to note, however, that claims made by sentences such as (C) or
(P) will not go beyond what is claimed by sentences such as (M). For example, the way
in which sentences such as (C) or (P) fgure in giving the meaning of  sentences must
be derivative from the way sentences such as (M) fgure in giving the meaning of
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sentences. In fact, it does not seem too far fetched to say that in contexts in which it is
appropriate to use (C) or (P), they simply provide alternative ways of  saying what is
said by (M).
What should we say about the status of  these “propositional contents”,
however? I take it that we have two options. First, we can hold that talk of  such
contents is useful and harmless in many cases, but that we should be cautious not to
think that such talk has any metaphysical implications.12 Talk of  propositional
contents is generally OK, because it can be a useful way of  speaking. It is also
dangerous though if  we start to take it too seriously. Thus, it needs to be taken with a
grain of  salt. Second, we could hold that propositional contents are “insubstantial”
entities, the “shadows” of  declarative sentences, which have no “interesting
metaphysical nature”. We might cash this out further by claiming that such contents
play no independent or fundamental explanatory role.13
Of  these two options I prefer the frst for two reasons. First, recall that we are
giving an account of  that-clauses as they fgure in our ordinary practice. Talk of
“contents” or “propositions”, however, is not prevalent in our ordinary practice.
Consequently, I fnd that a view on which talk of  propositional contents is merely a
convenient way of  speaking fts much better with our ordinary practice.14 Second, the
view avoids tricky questions regarding what it even means to say of  an entity that it is
“insubstantial”, “metaphysically boring” or a “shadow”. Of  course, there might be
ways of  cashing this out, e.g. in terms of  explanatory or causal roles. However, such
questions take us too far from the main topic. Consequently, for the sake of  this
dissertation, I will take the frst stance towards propositional contents.
With the Sellarsian account of  that-clauses, we now have a general defationary
account of  that-clauses in place, one that even allows talk of  propositional contents.
Furthermore, this account has no particular commitments that would rule out that
that-clauses or propositional contents could be attributed in a meaning-giving way to
normative sentences even if  expressivism was true. One remaining question is how
12 I take that this is the position taken by Hartry Field regarding propositional contents (see e.g. Field
2001b).
13 This seems to be position of  Stephen Schiffer (see e.g. Schiffer 1996 and Schiffer 2003).
14 This also fts quite nicely with the picture of  semantics as a modelling exercise. At least insofar as
we believe that scientifc models are plausibly understood as being useful fctions.
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this account can be combined with meta-semantic expressivism. The Sellarsian account
brings with it particular commitments about meaning, and it is an open question how
these relate to expressivism’s commitments about the nature of  the meaning-
constituting properties. I address this in the next section.
2.3. SELLARSIAN MEANING-ATTRIBUTIONS AND META-SEMANTIC EXPRESSIVISM
How does the Sellarsian account of  meaning-attributions combine with
expressivism’s claims about meaning? In the last chapter I argued that expressivism is
best understood as a view about the meaning-constituting properties, the properties
in virtue of  which sentences have their meaning. This form of  expressivism
subscribes to a particular claim in the theory of  meaning, namely,
PSYCHOLOGIZED META-SEMANTICS: Declarative sentences have their
meaning in virtue of  the judgements assertoric uses of  those sentences
conventionally express.
On the Sellarsian account of  meaning-attributions, meaning-attributions are a
tool that allows us to pick out basic explanatory properties and assign them to
sentences without being able to specify them. In particular, the function of  that-
clauses in such sentences is to pick out these basic explanatory properties. The basic
explanatory properties are, thereby, properties that are fully describable in terms not
mentioning meaning, and in terms of  which all of  the meaning-explananda can be
fully explained. If  we accept this account of  meaning-attributions then what is the
relation between the meaning of  sentences, their basic explanatory properties, and
their meaning-constituting properties though?
On the Sellarsian account, the meaning of  a sentence does not reduce to its
basic explanatory properties. Nor will it reduce to anything that is fully describable in
terms that do not mention meaning.15 However, the meaning of  a sentence will
supervene on the basic explanatory properties of  that sentence. This makes these basic
explanatory properties the most plausible candidate for those properties for which it is
15 That we can say that the meaning of  a sentence is a propositional content, and then give its
meaning in those terms is not incompatible with this, as on this account to “reduce” a sentence’s
meaning to its content is not, strictly speaking, reducing it to something describable in terms not
mentioning meaning.
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true that a sentence has its meaning in virtue of  those properties. Consequently, the
relationship between the meaning of  a sentence, its basic explanatory properties, and
its meaning-constituting properties is that the sentence’s basic explanatory properties
just are its meaning-constituting properties. In what follows, I will, consequently, use
the labels “basic explanatory properties” and “meaning-constituting properties”
interchangeably.
That the basic explanatory properties and the meaning-consituting properties
turn out to be identical on the Sellarsian account is good news in our context, as it is
now clear how we can combine this account of  meaning-attributions and that-clauses
with meta-semantic expressivism. On the combination of  those two accounts, the
meaning-explananda of  declarative sentences would be fully accounted for in terms
of  the mental states that assertoric uses of  those sentences conventionally express.
That-clauses would then have the function of  picking out the mental states
conventionally expressed by the assertoric use of  those sentences followed by the
that-. Meaning-attributions would be a means to use that-clauses to assign the property
of  expressing a mental state to sentences. However, the meaning of  a declarative
sentence, on this account, would consist in a propositional content, where this is to be
understood along defationary lines as presented in the last section. Furthermore, the
sentence will have this propositional content in virtue of  it’s assertoric use
conventionally expressing a mental state, which means that the property of
expressing a mental state will be the meaning-constituting property of  that sentence. 
It should be very clear, however, that on this account an expressivist can easily
allow normative sentences to have propositional contents which constitute the
meaning of  those normative sentences. So, it seems that the Sellarsian account can
be combined with expressivism in a way that yields the desired result. Of  course, to
complete combining those two accounts, we still need to see what account of  the
mental state expressed by meaning-attributions an expressivist could give and of  the
contribution which that-clauses make to this mental state. I will turn to this in the next
section.
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3. THAT-CLAUSES AND THE MENTAL STATE EXPRESSED BY MEANING- ATTRIBUTIONS
If  an expressivist adopts a Sellarsian account of  meaning-attributions, what
should she say about the mental state constituting thinking about the meaning of
sentences in terms of  that-clauses? Obviously, the role of  this mental state will be to
categorize sentences as having certain relevant meaning-constituting properties (which,
it turns out, are also their meaning-constituting properties). Specifcally, it will be a
mental state which does two things. First, it directly picks out the meaning-
constituting properties of  some sentence in our own language. Second, it then
categorizes other sentences in accordance with whether they have the same (or
relevantly similar) meaning-constituting properties. The crucial question is how
exactly to fesh this out. Before I turn to my answer to this question though, let me get
a couple of  issues out of  the way frst. 
First, I take it that the central issue here is not whether meaning-attributions
express beliefs or some other kind of  mental state. If  the project is successful, then
meaning-attributions just will, on the Sellarsian account, express beliefs with a sui
generis content. Of  course, this would not tell us much about those mental states. So,
the issue must be something else. I take it that the central issue is how we are to
characterize those mental states in terms of  that robust theory of  psychology that also
serves the expressivist to distinguish normative and descriptive beliefs. Here, I am
going to assume that this comes down to specifying the functional role of  the mental
states in question (it will become clearer in the next chapter why I choose this path).
Second, there is actually signifcant debate about whether meaning itself is
normative. This question can be understood both as a question about the nature of
meaning itself, or about the nature of  the meaning-constituting properties (i.e. the
project of  specifying either of  those).16 Of  course, even if  meaning is normative, it is
plausible that judgements about meaning will not be practically normative. So, at least
for the purposes of  this dissertation, we need not be committed to expressivism about
meaning-attributions (in the sense that we need to be committed to the claim that
16 For authors who can plausibly be understood as arguing that meaning is normative, in some sense of
“normative”, see e.g. Boghossian 1989, Gibbard 2012, and Kripke 1982. For authors who can
plausibly be understood as arguing that meaning is not normative, see e.g. Horwich 1998b and
Lewis 1970b. For an overview over the debate whether meaning is normative, see Glüer and
Wikforss 2010.
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meaning-attributions do not express judgements which consist in representational
states such that the judgements is true if  and only if  the representational state it
consists in is true and which do consist in conative attitudes).17 Independently of  this
though, it would be best to stay as neutral as possible on the matter of  whether
meaning is normative. In what follows I will thus try to formulate my account in
terms that are as neutral as possible on this issue. Again, I will do this by specifying
the nature of  the mental states involved in meaning-attributions in terms of  their
functional role only, a functional role for which it is an open question whether or not
it is most plausibly understood as constituting the functional role of  a normative
judgement (and which should even be compatible with expressivism about meaning-
attributions, if  cashed out further along appropriate lines). With these remarks out of
the way, let us consider the nature of  the mental state expressed by meaning-
attributions.
The mental state expressed by meaning-attributions is a particular mode of
thinking about pairs of  sentences. First, a sentence S1 to be given a meaning. Second,
a sentence S2 that, modifed in a particular way by being transformed into a that-
clause, is to give the meaning of  the other. The relevant and distinguishing part of
that mode of  thinking about such pairs of  sentences seems to reside in how one is
thinking of  S2 as being meaning-giving for S1. And thinking this involves two parts: the
special way in which one is thinking about S2 on the one hand. And how one is then
thinking about S1 and S2 in relation to each other, on the other. Specifcally, thinking of  S2
as being meaning-giving for S1 involves a particular way of  picking out certain
properties by thinking about S2 in a distinct way and of  assigning those properties to
S1 by thinking of  S1 and S2 as standing in a particular relation. This gives us a starting
point to spell out further what is going on with this thought.
Let me start by considering how to cash out the special way in which this mode
of  thinking picks out properties. We know that the properties in question are
meaning-constituting properties on the Sellarsian account. The crucial question is,
17 Of  course, even if  an expressivist had to be committed to expressivism about meaning or content,
this result need not be problematic, as has been argued e.g. by Allan Gibbard (Gibbard 2012) or
Teemu Toppinen (Toppinen Forthcoming). In fact, some remarks by Simon Blackburn read, as if
he has been committed to such a version of  expressivism for quite some time now (see e.g.
Blackburn 1998a: 51-59).
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consequently, in what special way meaning-attributions pick out these meaning-
constituting properties. As I have been saying, on the Sellarsian account, we pick out
meaning-constituting properties by taking S2 as an illustrating example. So, on this
account of  meaning-attributions, the way in which thinking about S2 picks out
properties should be akin to the way in which the more general state of  taking as an
example of  picks out properties. This is the model along the lines of  which I want to
understand that part of  meaning-attributions that consists in the special way of
thinking about S2. The investigation should, consequently, turn frst to clearing up
what is involved in the state of  taking as an example of. 
First, taking some x as an example of  some F always seems to be taking x as an
example of  some general kind of  thing, as a member of  a set of  things that have
certain relevant properties in common. Assume, for example, that one takes the
papers of  David Lewis as an example of  the class of  papers that have a high chance
to get published in high quality philosophy journals. This is to take the papers of
David Lewis to be a member of  a set of  things that have certain relevant properties
in common, namely, those properties a paper requires in order to have a high
probability to get published in a high quality philosophy journal.
Second, to take some x as an example of  some F is to be in a state where
certain aspects of  x are salient to oneself  as those features something has in virtue of
being an instance of  F. Take again the case where one takes David Lewis’ papers as
an example of  papers with a high chance of  getting published in high quality
philosophy journals. In this case certain aspects of  David Lewis’ papers will be salient
to one as those features that papers have in virtue of  having a high chance of  getting
published in high quality philosophy journals. What, however, is involved in certain
aspects of  an object being “salient” to oneself  as those properties something has in
virtue of  being an instance of  some general kind, when one is in the state of  taking as
an example of? It means that one is disposed to give a special role to those aspects of  the
object in determining whether other objects are members of  the same general kind
(the kind the frst object is being taken as an example of). This special role is to treat
those aspects of  the object as a reference-point in determining whether other objects fall
within that general kind. This means that one’s judgements about objects being
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identical (or relevantly similar) to x in these aspects will have some weight in settling
one’s judgements with regards to whether some object falls within the relevant kind.
Of  course, what weight one gives to these judgements in particular cases can vary.
This tracks nicely that the particular role the state of  taking as an example of  plays in
our thought processes varies as well: in some situations one might already have
extensive and explicit knowledge of  the properties that instances of  a general kind
have and so needs to consider examples as reference-points only as a way to confrm
one’s judgements about a particular case. For example, as a big fan of  board games I
have a very good idea of  the properties that a board game should have to qualify as a
so-called “Eurogame”: it should involve little luck, emphasize strategy, have high
quality components, and not have player elimination. Nevertheless, to confrm
whether a particular game is a Eurogame, it will sometimes be useful for me to
compare it to paradigm examples of  such games. In other cases, however, the only
way one can explicitly think about a certain general kind is via certain reference-
points. This could be the case, for example, when one’s knowledge of  the properties
that characterize instances of  that kind is implicit and very rough, or when one is still
in the process of  learning about that kind. In such cases, the relevant aspects of  some
object picked out by taking it as an example of  an instance of  the relevant kind will
have a major role in settling one’s judgements.
This latter kind of  case brings me to an important third feature of  the state of
taking as an example of. Consider someone who is in the state of  taking as an example of,
and who takes certain aspects of  an object as a reference-point in her judgements
with regards to whether certain things belong to a general kind. In such a case, it
need not be accessible to that person on refection what those aspects are that she
takes as a reference-point, nor need the person be able to explicate what those
properties are. That is, one can take aspects of  an object as a reference-point in the
sense described above, without being able to explicate—in language or thought—
what those aspects are. There is nothing mysterious about this feature of  the state of
taking as an example of: our ability to pick up on features and aspects of  objects is
certainly far more extensive than our ability to make explicit, both in language and in
thought, what those features and aspects are. To take an extreme case, so-called
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“chicken-sexer”, for example, can pick out features of  newborn chicks that reliably
allow them to determine whether they are male or female. However, these individuals
can do this while being unable to explicate, both to themselves and to others what
those features are they pick out. There are other cases as well though that should be
more familiar: educated philosophers, for example, are often quickly able to identify
features that determine the quality of  undergraduate papers, but have a much harder
time making explicit what those features are. Or, to take another case, we can often
correctly pick out quite quickly the emotional state of  other people, without being
able to explicitly specify on the basis of  what features we have made our judgement.18
What the state of  taking as an example of does, is to feed on abilities such as these
to reliably pick out certain features of  objects to provide resources for new and often
quite economical ways of  thinking and talking about those features. Here I just want
to name two of  those resources provided by this state, two resources that also play a
relevant role in meaning-attributions. First, the state actually makes it easier for us to
deliberate about and determine whether some object x belongs to some general kind
F. As long as we can rely on certain reference-points with regards to that general kind,
we can determine whether x is an F by determining whether x is identical or
suffciently similar to the reference-points in relevant respects. Second, the state makes
it possible (via its expression or the invitation to others to come to be in that state) to
communicate to others that some x belongs to a general kind F, even when we cannot
spell out the features shared by instances of  F or the features of  x in virtue of  which it
is an instance of  F. The only thing required is that one can presuppose a common
reference-point, or give others a common reference-point by pointing out an object in
which, for example, the relevant features are easier to pick out than in x. Proceeding
from there one can then rely on one’s audience’s abilities to pick out similarities to
lead them to the conclusion that x is indeed an F.
Let me end this short sketch of  the relevant features of  the state of  taking as an
18 Of  course, in many of  such cases people’s judgements regarding some object x belonging to a
general kind F will already be based on their judgements regarding x’s identity or relevant
similarity with regards to certain features to another object y supposed to belong to F. However, it
still seems that in such cases people will still be quite bad at making explicit what the relevant
features of  the relevant reference-point are, even though those very same features seem to play a
signifcant role in their judgements about the identity or relevant similarity.
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example of  with a fourth feature of  this state that is worth highlighting in our context.
Given that the state of  taking as an example of  functions in the ways presented here, it
will not be appropriate to think that this state can be reductively analysed in terms of
the properties that are picked out by that state. The relationship that holds between
instances of  taking as an example of  and the properties picked out by instances of  this
state is importantly different from the relationship between ordinary descriptive
beliefs and the properties they pick out. Consequently, the former state is actually not
well understood in terms of  a reductive analysis in terms of  the properties indicated.
Of  course, there might be other ways of  making explicit what properties are picked
out by—and are communicated by expression of—the state of  taking as an example of.
However, sentences that express this state, for example, will not be open to
informative analysis.
Why is this feature worth highlighting in our context? Further above I said that
there is actually a very good reason to read Sellars’ account in a non-reductive way. I
am now in a position to say what this reason is. If  the mental state expressed by
meaning-attributions on Sellars’ account is well understood along the lines of  taking as
an example of, then the most plausible version of  that account is a non-reductive one.
In this way the detour we took, on behalf  of  the expressivist, through the mental state
expressed by meaning-attributions, consequently, gives us important information
about the best account of  meaning-attributions within a Sellarsian framework.
With these remarks in place, let us now turn back to meaning-attributions.
Recall that the mental state expressed by meaning-attributions is a particular mode of
thinking about pairs of  sentences S1 and S2, namely, thinking of  S2 as being meaning-
giving for S1. This involves two parts. First, the special way in which one is thinking
about S2 and second, how one is thinking about S1 and S2 in relation to each other. I
proposed that the special way in which one is thinking about S2 that is involved in
meaning-attributions is akin to being in the state of  taking as an example of. Since we
now know more about what is involved in being in the state of  taking as an example of,
we are now in a better position to understand what this means.
In one respect, the particular way of  thinking about the sentence S2 that is used
t o give the meaning of  another sentence S1 just i s an instance of  the more general
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state of  taking as an example of: in a meaning-attribution the sentence that is used to give
the meaning of  another sentence serves as a reference-point for a particular set of
properties. However, sentences might be taken as examples for all sorts of  general
kinds, for example, as instances of  things governed by conventions. In a state of  a
meaning-attribution though the sentence always and only serves as a reference-point for a
particular set of  meaning-constituting properties. What set of  meaning-constituting
properties this is will, thereby, be contextually specifed depending, for example, on
the language that is presupposed as known in the relevant context. Again though,
note that to be able to use sentences as reference-points in this way does not
presuppose either on the part of  the speaker or on the part of  the audience that
individuals are able to spell out what the relevant meaning-constituting properties are. All that it
requires is that they have implicit knowledge of  the meaning-constituting properties
and can reliably track similarity with regards to meaning-constituting properties. This
accounts for how meaning-attributions give us the ability to communicate and think
about meaning-constituting properties, without being able to explicitly spell out what
those properties are. Given that we will be often (maybe even always) unable to
explicitly spell out the meaning-constituting properties of  the sentences in our
language, this makes meaning-attributions a very useful tool for thinking and talking
about meaning-constituting properties. And, of  course, on the Sellarsian account that
they are such tools just is part of  the raison d’être for the existence of  meaning-
attributions.
This gives us an account of  the frst feature of  the state expressed by meaning-
attributions, namely, the particular way in which thinking about the sentence S2 picks
out meaning-constituting properties. What about the second feature of  the particular
way of  thinking involved in meaning-attributions, namely, how one thinks of  the two
sentences in relation to each other? This can be cashed out relatively straightforward
along the following lines: in a meaning-attribution, the relation in which we see S1
and S2 standing is just the relation of  some thing belonging to a kind of  which another
thing is an example. When in the state expressed by a meaning-attribution, we see S2 as
an example for things of  a relevant kind, namely, things with certain meaning-
constituting properties. And we think of  S1 as belonging to whatever kind S2 is an
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example of, so as being a thing with those same meaning-constituting properties. It is
i n this way that S2 i s meaning-giving for S1: it is meaning-giving in just the same way in
which something that is taken as an example of  some general kind functions to assign
properties to other things when those things are seen as belonging to the same kind.
Let me sum up what I have said so far, in order to give a clearer picture of  the
account on offer. The functional role of  the mental state expressed by meaning-
attributions is to provide a unique way of  thinking about pairs of  sentences S1 and S2.
This is a way of  thinking that allows us to pick out the meaning-constituting
properties of  S2 whose meaning-constituting properties we already have (implicit)
knowledge of  and to assign those properties to S1. This way of  thinking allows us to
do this frst by picking out the meaning-constituting properties of  S2 in the same way
in which the state of  taking as an example of  picks out properties in general. And second
by assigning those meaning-constituting properties to S1 in the same way that we
assign properties by thinking of  something as being of  a kind of  which another thing
is an example. 
Again, let me illustrate this with an example. On this account of  the mental
state expressed by meaning-attributions, the sentence
(1) “Heinrich ist ein Imker” (in German) means that Heinrich is a bee-
keeper.
will express the following mode of  thinking. First, it will express that one is thinking
of  the English sentence “Heinrich is a bee-keeper” as an example of  something that
belongs to a particular kind, namely, the kind of  sentences with certain meaning-
constituting properties. Second, it will express that one is thinking of  the German
sentence as being an instance of  that kind, and in this way assign the relevant
meaning-constituting properties to that sentence. With this picture about the state
expressed by meaning-attributions in place, we can now specify what contribution
that-clauses make to this state. This will allow us to draw general conclusions about
the nature of  that-clauses.
The attentive reader should by now have realized what the contribution of  that-
clauses must be to the mental state expressed by meaning-attributions. That-clauses
contribute the unique way in which such thoughts pick out meaning-constituting
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properties by taking S2 as an example. Specifcally, the role of  that-clauses in meaning-
attributions is to contribute a mode of  thinking about sentences as an example of
something with particular meaning-constituting properties. As I have argued above,
the particular way in which meaning-attributions pick out properties is just a
particular instance of  the way in which taking as an example of  picks out properties.
What is particular about meaning-attributions is that the sentence that is taken as an
example always and only serves as a reference-point for a particular set of  meaning-
constituting properties. It should be clear by now that this is so, because of  the that-clause: it
is the presence of  the that-clause, because of  which the sentences that are taken as an
example in meaning-attributions always and only serve as a reference-point for a
particular set of  meaning-constituting properties.
This paves the way for a hypothesis about the nature of  the relevant uses of
that-clauses, not only in meaning-attributions, but as parts of  other kinds of  sentences
as well: what that-clauses contribute to the mental state expressed by sentences in
which they fgure is a mode of  thinking about the sentence S transformed into the
that-clauses as an example of  things with particular meaning-constituting properties. In
particular, as an example of things with those meaning-constituting properties one takes
S to have in one’s own (or some other relevant presupposed) language. So, that-clauses
function as illustrating sortal terms that pick out meaning-constituting properties in a
specifc way, namely, in that way in which one picks out properties by taking
something as an example for some general kind. The distinctive feature of  meaning-
attributions is just that in uttering such sentences (or forming the mental state
expressed by such sentences) one not only picks those properties out by means of  a
that-clause. Rather, one also explicitly assigns them to another sentence as that
sentence’s meaning-constituting properties. This is achieved through the word
“means”. In a meaning-attribution this word functions to express a way of  thinking
that relates the sentence to be assigned meaning-constituting properties and the that-
clause. In particular, it relates them in just the same way that thinking of  something x
as being of  a kind of  which another thing y is an example relates x and y.
This concludes my account of  the mental state expressed by meaning-
attributions and the contribution that-clauses make to this mental state. I take it that
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with this account we have an account both of  that-clauses and of  meaning-
attributions that is fully compatible with expressivism’s commitments. Furthermore,
the account will allow normative sentences to have propositional contents on an
expressivist framework, propositional contents which give the meaning of  those
normative sentences. The crucial question is, whether and how this account could be
generalized to the use of  that-clauses in belief-attributions in a way that fully earns the
expressivist the right to say that normative judgements are beliefs. Answering this
question will be the subject of  the fnal chapter.
4. SUMMARY
In this chapter, I have started developing a defationary account of  those uses
of  that-clauses associated with propositional contents. The strategy I proposed was to
frst give an account for a clear case of  such uses and then see how this account
generalizes to other relevant uses. I followed this strategy by focusing on uses of  that-
clauses in meaning-attributions. I introduced and elaborated on Wilfrid Sellars’
account of  that-clauses in such uses and argued that on a plausible understanding this
account i s a defationary account of  that-clauses. The Sellarsian account, I have
argued, fts the expressivist’s purposes well, as it is compatible with the claim that
expressivists can allow the relevant uses of  that-clauses in meaning-attributions when
applied to normative sentences and that they can allow normative sentences to have
propositional contents. I concluded the chapter with an account of  the contribution
that-clauses make to the mental state expressed by sentences in which they fgure, to
complete my argument that nothing speaks against combining expressivism with the
Sellarsian account.
134
CHAPTER V: EXPRESSIVISM AND ALL THAT. BELIEF AND PROPOSITIONAL
MENTAL CONTENT
0. INTRODUCTION
This chapter is the last in a series of  chapters concerned with developing a
defationary account of  those uses of  that-clauses that are relevant for the
expressivists’ ability to make sense of  how normative thought and discourse is truth-
apt and normative judgements are beliefs. These are those uses of  that-clauses
associated with propositional contents, which we fnd in meaning-attributions and
attributions of  contents to propositional attitudes. In the last chapter, I gave a
defationary account of  the use of  that-clauses in meaning-attributions. This was the
Sellarsian account of  that-clauses as illustrative sortals. In this chapter I will now
consider whether—and how—this account can be generalised to the use of  that-
clauses in belief-attributions and other propositional attitude ascriptions in a way that
can serve the expressivist’s purposes. Sellars himself  never developed a detailed
account of  how his theory could generalize to the use of  that-clauses in propositional
attitude attributions.1 The discussion here should, consequently, be of  interest not
only for those concerned with expressivism, but also for those who have sympathies
for or an interest in Sellars’ account of  propositional contents as they fgure in the
theory of  meaning and mental content.
I will proceed as follows. In the frst section I will explain how the Sellarsian
account can be generalised so that it can account for the use of  that-clauses in
propositional attitude ascriptions. As we will see, the question of  whether the
Sellarsian account can be generalised to account for such use, can only be answered
1 In Empiricism and the Philosophy of  Mind Sellars makes the suggestion that to say of  someone that they
think that p, is to say that they are disposed to exhibit the patterns of  behaviour characteristic of
someone who says that p (see Sellars 1956: 186-189. See also DeVries 2011). While this account
might work for ascriptions for whatever state is expressed by use of  “p”, it cannot straightforwardly
explain what role that-clauses—insofar they mean the same thing in those contexts, which seems
very plausible—would play in the attribution of  other propositional attitudes. While the account I
offer below will, in some respects, resemble Sellars’ suggestion, it will differ insofar as it makes
commitments about the meaning-constituting properties that might confict with Sellars’
commitment and in that it will be constructed in a way that is supposed to explain how that-clauses
operate generally in propositional attitude ascriptions.
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relative to an account of  the meaning-constituting properties. I will then set out to
give an expressivist account of  the meaning-constituting properties that will allow a
suitable generalization of  the Sellarsian account—one which allows the expressivist
to say that normative judgements are beliefs. I will start developing this account, in
the second section, by making clear how the expressivist’s commitments about the
meaning-constituting properties should not be understood. These commitments need
to be formulated, so I argue, in terms of  a robust theory of  psychology. In the
remainder of  the chapter, I will then offer such a theory and argue that it fts the
expressivist’s purposes perfectly.
1. HOW TO GENERALIZE THE SELLARSIAN ACCOUNT
Can the Sellarsian account be generalized to the uses of  that-clauses in belief-
attributions, in a way that is compatible with an expressivist allowing normative
judgements to be beliefs? To answer this question, we should frst consider the
following question: what exactly is the phenomenon that is at issue here and in what
kind of  project is one involved when one is trying to account for it by giving a
defationary account? To answer this question, it will be good to start with taking a
look at belief-attributions.
I take belief-attributions to be all sentences of  the form:
(B) A believes that p.
Sentences of  this kind serve to attribute instances of  a particular type of  mental state
to a person, namely, instances of  that type picked out by “believes”. These sentences
do not just tell us that the relevant person is in a state of  this general kind though.
Rather, they tell us in what specifc instance of  that state the person is in. This is done
by the that-clause. It is, thereby, plausible to think of  the that-clause as specifying the
content of  the belief  attributed (or what is believed by the person with the belief), with
“believes” being a verb, a “propositional attitude verb”, which picks out a relation in
which the person stands toward that content (after all this is why belief  is regarded as
a “propositional attitude”). An account of  the role of  that-clauses in belief-attributions
should, consequently, be plausible as an account of  attributions of  contents to beliefs.
“Believes” is only a special case of  how that-clauses can be combined with
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propositional attitude verbs to attribute particular instances of  types of  mental states
though. There are many other propositional attitude verbs, such as “desires”,
“hopes”, “fears”, etc. that do exactly the same.2 Consequently, we would expect that
an account of  how “believes” functions in combination with that-clauses to be
generalizable to the case of  the other propositional attitude verbs. As it seems
plausible that the that-clause serves to specify the content of  these other propositional
attitudes in such cases (or what is desired, what is hoped, what is feared, etc.), an account of
the use of  that-clauses in belief-attributions must, therefore, be plausible as an account
of  attributions of  propositional mental content in general.
The uses of  that-clauses that are at issue here are, of  course, such uses as they
fgure in our ordinary practice. As it is their use relevant in the context of  attributing
mental states that is of  concern in this context, the project concerned with
accounting for such use is, hence, concerned with the role of  that-clauses in our folk-
theory of  psychology. More specifcally, the project is situated within the meta-theory of
content-attributions—talk and thought about the contents of  propositional attitudes
—as they fgure in our folk-theory of  psychology. While other forms of  content-
attributions might play a role in our folk-theory of  psychology, I will use the label
“content-attributions” in what follows, for simplicity’s sake, only for attributions of
propositional contents and the label “mental content” only for propositional mental
content, the content of  such attitudes.
Just as for the case of  the contents of  sentences, one can distinguish two
projects that would be of  concern for the meta-theory of  content-attributions. The
frst project is the project of  giving an account in virtue of  what mental states have the
contents they do. This will be the project of  giving an account of  the content-
constituting properties of  mental states, the properties in virtue of  which they have their
2 It is worthwhile to note that unlike “believes”, these other attitude verbs cannot only take
propositional complements, but also to-clauses or words which refer to objects. For example, we
cannot only fear that there are monsters hiding in the closet, but also fear the monsters who are
hiding in the closet, as well as fear to meet the monsters hiding in the closet. Here, I am only
interested in the use of  such attitude verbs when they are used to attribute propositional contents to
such attitudes, and whether the Sellarsian account of  that-clauses can be used to give an account of
such attributions. Of  course, a defationist about that-clauses is likely to want to endorse a
defationary account about these other content-attributions as well, although how such an account
would work is a relatively unexplored feld. Whether a variant of  the Sellarsian account could do
this job, however, is a question of  future research.
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content. The second project is to cash out those notions related to the contents of
mental states, such as e.g. “content”, “proposition”, “truth-condition” (in the case of
beliefs) or “satisfaction-condition” (in the case of  desires), and so on, ideally in terms
not themselves invoking such content related notions. Not only will the meta-theory
of  content explain in virtue of  what sentences have their contents, it will also tell us
something about what is attributed when contents are assigned, truth- or satisfaction-
conditions specifed, etc. Parallel to the case of  meaning-attributions, the project of
giving an account of  attributions of  mental contents is part of  the second project.
This will be the project that one is involved in when one is trying to develop a
defationary account of  the use of  that-clauses in propositional attitude ascriptions,
and, consequently, the project which will concern me in what follows.
A defationary account will be, primarily, an account of  attributions of  mental
contents, not an account of  what such content i s (after all, there is some relevant
sense on which, on a defationary account, mental content is not really anything). Just
as in the linguistic case, however, “mental content” is a notion that is already
associated with certain kinds of  phenomena regarding mental states. As opposed to
the case of  meaning-attributions where the notions of  interpretation and translation
gave us some leverage, however, it is diffcult to give a principled characterization of
these phenomena in a suitably theory-neutral fashion.3 What we can do, however, is
to give examples that illustrate the cluster of  theoretical jobs associated with “mental
content”. This should be suffcient for our purposes.
The phenomena associated with “mental content” are of  the following kind.
First, “mental content” is supposed to be what distinguishes different instances of
propositional attitudes of  the same kind. For example, it will be what distinguishes the
belief  that there are monsters hiding in the closet from the belief  that there are
jackets hanging in the closet or what distinguishes the desire that Hannelore be
visiting for coffee from the desire that Manfred lead a happy life. Second, it is
3 Of  course, the notion of  interpretation might arguably provide some leverage here as well: as some
philosophers have famously argued, attribution of  propositional attitudes also happens within a
practice of  interpretation (e.g. Davidson 1973, Dennett 1987, and Lewis 1974). If  this is the case, it
might be quite plausible to characterize mental content by pointing to the role which content-
attributions play in this context. While I am sympathetic to this suggestion, I will not pursue it
further here, as making a solid case for this approach would be beyond the scope of  this
investigation.
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regarded to be what instances of  propositional attitudes of  a different kind can have
in common or share. For example, it is supposed to account for what the belief  that
there are monsters hiding in the closet and the desire that there are monsters hiding
in the closet have in common. Third, “mental content” is thought to play a crucial
role in determining how propositional attitudes fgure in the production of  action.
For example, the content of  the belief  that there are jackets hanging in the closet and
the content of  the desire that one wear a jacket will fgure in an explanation of  why
having this belief  and this desire produces, among other things, the action of  opening
the closet. Fourth, “mental content” is associated with the behaviour and interaction
of  different propositional attitudes in processes such as inference and deliberation.
For example, the content of  the belief  that there are jackets hanging in the closet
explains, for example, why the belief  can fgure as a premise in the inference from the
belief  that if  there are jackets hanging in the closet, then the family has arrived to the
conclusion that the family has arrived. Let us call these phenomena that are
associated with the notion of  mental content the “content-explananda” of  the mental
states in question.
As in the case of  literal meanings, many philosophers will fnd it tempting to
account for these content-explananda by introducing entities, “propositional
contents”, to which that-clauses stand in some theoretically signifcant representation
relation. Propositional attitudes can then be seen as relations to these entities, and the
most crucial question for theories of  this kind to answer will be: what is the
metaphysical nature of  these propositional contents, such that they can fully account
for the content-explananda? Obviously though, this approach to attributions of
mental content would be to adopt the representationalist order of  explanation for
that-clauses as they fgure in our folk-theory of  psychology. So, a defationist about
that-clauses cannot endorse this kind of  view. However, even on a defationary
account there should be something that accounts for the content-explananda, which
should be something that is fully describable in terms that do not make mention of
contents. This is by no means an outlandish position. For example, one might hold a
view on which the content-explananda can be fully accounted for in terms of  certain
patterns of  the brain, or in terms of  certain causal relations in which individuals
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stand to their external environment. Let us call the properties which do all of  the
relevant explanatory work on an account on which the content-explananda can be
fully accounted for in terms not making mention of  contents the “fundamental
explanatory properties”.
Suppose that one accepts a view of  this kind, as the defationist would have to
do. What can one then say about the use of  that-clauses in propositional attitude
ascriptions? We could again adopt reductionism or an error-theory about content-
attributions, but neither of  these would be an option for a defationist. So, what can
the defationist say? It should be clear that regarding the use of  that-clauses in
propositional attitude ascriptions we are now in a situation which is exactly parallel to
the situation for the use of  that-clauses in meaning-attributions we encountered in the
last chapter. And the question is now whether in this situation the Sellarsian account
can help someone looking for a defationist account about content-attributions as
well. Given how parallel the situation seems for a defationist regarding both kinds of
uses of  that-clauses, it seems to be relatively straightforward what has to be the case
for the Sellarsian account to work in both cases.
I introduced the Sellarsian account as a way to preserve the legitimacy of
meaning-attributions without having to endorse any representationalist commitments
with regards to that-clauses. Assume one accepts that the properties associated with
meaning can be fully accounted for in terms of  properties of  sentences fully
describable in terms not mentioning meaning, their “basic explanatory properties”.
Then the most straightforward way to preserve the legitimacy of  meaning-
attributions without being a representationalist about them, is to “hook up” meaning-
attributions with the basic explanatory properties without having them represent
these properties. This is exactly what the Sellarsian account does. On the Sellarsian
account, meaning-attributions provide a convenient means to attribute basic
explanatory properties to sentences. They do this, because that-clauses are linguistic
tools that allow us to pick out basic explanatory properties via example: they allow us to
pick out basic explanatory properties by pointing to a sentence in some presupposed
language as an example for something with particular basic explanatory properties.
In this way, that-clauses allow us to assign those properties to other sentences via the
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verb “means”, which gives meaning-attributions a legitimate job within the
framework. Because they allow us to do this while leaving meaning-attributions
irreducible—so I suggested in the last chapter—those basic explanatory properties
are also the most plausible candidate for the properties in virtue of  which sentences
have their meaning. These are their meaning-constituting properties.
To illustrate again how this account works, recall the example from last chapter:
on the Sellarsian account, a sentence like
(1) “Heinrich ist ein Imker” (in German) means that Heinrich is a bee-
keeper.
classifes the German sentence “Heinrich ist ein Imker” as having certain kinds of
meaning-constituting properties. The sentence does this by using the English
sentence “Heinrich is a bee-keeper” as an example to illustrate the meaning-
constituting properties in question. Indicating that this is what “Heinrich is a bee-
keeper” is used for is the job of  transforming that sentence into a that-clause. More
specifcally, by transforming the English sentence “Heinrich is a bee-keeper” into a
that-clause, we are introducing a predicate which serves to pick out the relevant
meaning-constituting properties, by using the sentence as an illustrative example.
“Means”, then merely functions, in this context, to attribute those properties to the
German sentence.
With this picture in view, consider now the case of  the use of  that-clauses in
propositional attitude ascriptions. Assume that one thinks that the content-
explananda can be fully accounted for in terms of  properties not mentioning content,
certain “fundamental explanatory properties”. How would one then preserve the
legitimacy of  the use of  that-clauses in propositional attitude ascriptions without
endorsing representationalist commitments with regards to that-clauses? Again, the
most straightforward way of  doing so is to connect such attributions with the
fundamental explanatory properties, without having them represent those properties.
Could the Sellarsian account do this job? On that account, a sentence like (1)
attributes meaning-constituting properties to one sentence by using another sentence
to illustrate those properties. How could an account of  this form account for the use
of  that-clauses in sentences like
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(2) Helene believes that Heinrich is a bee-keeper.
though? The Sellarsian account can do this job, but only if  the meaning-constituting
properties of  declarative sentences and the fundamental explanatory properties of
propositional attitudes are identical, or at least related to each other in a relevant way.
In this case, that-clauses can serve, on the Sellarsian account, to pick out both kinds of
properties by using a sentence as an illustrative example. They can then be connected
with different kinds of  verbs for different purposes, e.g. to attribute meaning-
constituting properties to sentences, or to attribute fundamental explanatory
properties to mental states. In the above example, for instance, “that Heinrich is a bee-
keeper” could then be used to pick out certain properties by using “Heinrich is a bee-
keeper” as an illustrative example, either to attribute meaning-constituting properties
to the German Sentence “Heinrich ist ein Imker”, or to attribute fundamental
explanatory properties to Helene’s belief. This answers the question how the
Sellarsian account can be generalized to the use of  that-clauses in belief-attributions
and other kinds of  propositional attitude ascriptions.
Of  course, this means that there is no general answer to the question whether the
Sellarsian account can plausibly be generalized to the use of  that-clauses in content-
attributions. Rather, this question will have to be answered relative to an account of
the meaning-constituting properties and whether those properties can plausibly be
identical, or otherwise relevantly related, to the fundamental explanatory properties.4
Because this chapter is concerned with the question of  whether the combination of
the Sellarsian account and expressivism allows for an appropriate generalization of  the
Sellarsian account, two things, consequently, need to be considered. First, what the
meaning-constituting properties are, if  we endorse expressivism. Second, whether
these properties can plausibly do double duty as the fundamental explanatory
4 I can see two straightforward kinds of  approaches which would achieve a plausible connection
between the meaning-constituting properties and the fundamental explanatory properties. On the
frst, we explain the meaning-constituting properties without reference to propositional attitudes,
and then hold that propositional attitudes should be seen as relations to sentences such that the
meaning-constituting properties are the fundamental explanatory properties. On the second, we
give an account of  the fundamental explanatory properties in psychological terms—meaning we
hold that the fundamental explanatory properties are themselves concerned with something mental
—and then account for the meaning-constituting properties in terms of  relations to propositional
attitudes with the relevant fundamental explanatory properties. I assume that an endorsement of
ideationalism would block tacking the frst path, so an approach along the second lines is what I
will develop in what follows.
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properties of  propositional attitudes. So, let us take a look at what view about the
meaning-constituting properties fts with expressivism.
2. HOW NOT TO THINK ABOUT EXPRESSIVISM AND MEANING-CONSTITUTING 
PROPERTIES
Of  course, we already know what an expressivist says about the meaning-
constituting properties. In the third chapter, I argued that expressivism actually is
primarily a view about the meaning-constituting properties of  declarative sentences,
with a particular focus on the meaning-constituting properties of  normative
sentences. More specifcally, I argued that the most plausible form of  expressivism is
meta-semantic expressivism. In the philosophy of  language, meta-semantic expressivism
subscribes to
PSYCHOLOGIZED META-SEMANTICS: Declarative sentences have their
meaning in virtue of  the judgements assertoric uses of  those sentences
conventionally express. 
According to meta-semantic expressivism the meaning-constituting properties
of  sentences consist in those sentences being conventionally associated via some
theoretically signifcant “expression” relation with certain mental states. Whether or
not the Sellarsian account can be appropriately generalized to account for the use of
that-clauses in attributions of  mental content in a way that helps the quasi-realist
depends on whether these meaning-constituting properties could play the role of  the
fundamental explanatory properties. Of  course, to be able to make a considered
judgement about this, one needs to know how exactly the expressivist’s commitment to
PSYCHOLOGIZED META-SEMANTICS is to be understood in this context.
At this point it will be helpful to anticipate a certain complex worry regarding
how the combination of  these two accounts could appropriately generalize to get a
clearer understanding of  how the expressivist’s commitment should and should not
be understood. The worry I have in mind goes as follows: the fundamental
explanatory properties are those properties of  mental states which account for their
content-explananda. If  we hold that the meaning-constituting properties as conceived
by the expressivist constitute these fundamental explanatory properties, however, it
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seems that we would be committed to the view that what accounts for the content-
explananda relevant for the propositional attitudes itself involves a mental state. This
not only appears to give a highly unorthodox account of  the structure of
propositional attitudes, which might worry some, but it also raises certain diffcult
questions.5 Are the mental states that fgure in the expressivist account not themselves
propositional attitudes? Would this not mean, however, that the expressivist either has
to already presuppose a notion of  propositional mental content that is independent of
the Sellarsian account, which makes the Sellarsian account redundant, or that she
faces an infnite regress? On the other hand, if  those mental states are not
propositional attitudes how else would they be characterized?
If  this worry comes up at this point, I take it that it has a particular source:
meta-normative theorists are used to think of  expressivism in a certain way, namely, as
a position which characterizes normative judgements and distinguishes those
judgements from descriptive judgements in a distinctive way. More specifcally, on the
way meta-normative theorists typically think about expressivism, the expressivist
draws the distinction between normative and descriptive judgements in terms of
beliefs a n d desires. This understanding of  expressivism’s commitments in the
philosophy of  mind, however, a l s o informs they way in which expressivism’s
commitments in the philosophy of  language are understood.
In previous chapters I suggested that expressivism’s commitments in the
philosophy of  language are best understood as embedding expressivism within the
ideationalist tradition. According to ideationalism, linguistic items derive their
meaning from standing in a relevant expression relation to certain kinds of  mental
entities. While there are several ways one could understand this, a very specifc
understanding of  this claim is forced on the expressivist, if  expressivism is thought of
along traditional lines.6 According to this understanding of  ideationalism, the
5 Billy Dunaway and Mark Schroeder both express the worry that expressivists who accept a
defationary account of  that-clauses are committed to this unorthodox way of  viewing propositions
(see Dunaway 2010 and Schroeder 2014a).
6 This was recently highlighted by Mark Schroeder (Schroeder 2008b). This understanding of
expressivism is also relatively salient e.g. in the writing of  Simon Blackburn (see e.g. Blackburn
1984a, Blackburn 1988 and Blackburn 1998a; Blackburn is rarely clear on this matter though),
Allan Gibbard (Gibbard 1992 and Gibbard 2003), Michael Ridge (Ridge 2006a, although Ridge
has since then revised his view—See Ridge Forthcoming), and Ralph Wedgwood (Wedgwood
2008).
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meaning of  sentences is explained by being associated with a propositional attitude,
where it is both the psychological kind of  the attitude and the content of  the attitude
which are relevant for the meaning of  those sentences. Why is this understanding
forced on the expressivist? Because according to the expressivist—as traditionally
understood—what is distinctive about the meaning of  normative sentences is that the
mental states expressed by use of  those sentences are of  a particular psychological
kind: they are desire-like, rather than belief-like. Consequently, it seems that
expressivism as a meta-semantic theory must amount to the claim that sentences have
their meaning in virtue of  both a content an d an attitude towards that content.
Thinking about expressivism along these lines, however, clearly gives us a particular
picture about expressivism’s commitments regarding the nature of  the meaning-
constituting properties: on this picture, it is an attitude toward a content related in a
particular way to a sentence that constitutes the meaning-constituting properties of
that sentence. And it is this picture which raises the questions mentioned above.
In our context we should resist this picture though. As I have already suggested
above, the quasi-realist expressivist who accepts that normative judgements are beliefs
will not draw the distinction between normative and descriptive judgements in terms
of  our ordinary notions of  “belief ” and “desire” as they fgure in folk-psychology.
Instead, the theoretical work of  drawing that distinction would be done
fundamentally in terms of  a more robust philosophical theory of  psychology.7 But, if
this is the case, then it should also be the characterization that is given by that theory
which fundamentally fgures in the expressivist’s account of  the meaning-constituting
properties. Which means that it should also be the characterization of  the mental
states that is given by the expressivist’s chosen theory of  psychology which should be
considered, when one tries to determine whether the combination of  expressivism
with the Sellarsian view can be plausibly generalized to account for the use of  that-
7 This is not to say that the distinction between normative and descriptive judgements could not be
drawn in terms of  our ordinary notions of  “belief ” and “desire”. For example, it could turn out
that the difference between normative and descriptive judgements maps onto the fact that
normative judgements are beliefs which are type-identical with certain desires with non-normative
content, while descriptive beliefs are not type-identical to any desires. Even in this case, however,
the fundamental explanatory work would be done in terms of  a robust theory of  psychology which
explains why normative judgements consist in a state for which our folk-notions offer two ways to
conceptualize them, while descriptive judgements consist in a state for which our folk-notions offer
only one way to conceptualize them.
145
clauses in propositional attitude ascriptions.
This provides some indication how we should not understand the expressivist’s
commitment to PSYCHOLOGIZED META-SEMANTICS in our context and some indication how
we should understand this commitment. Unfortunately, at this point we still have no
clear idea what theory of  psychology expressivists who concede that both descriptive
and normative judgements are beliefs, would use to draw the difference between
normative and descriptive judgements. This is what now needs to change, if  progress
is to be made on the question of  whether the meaning-constituting properties as
construed by the expressivist could do the work of  those properties which explain the
content-explananda when it comes to the propositional attitudes. Is there a theory
that would suit the expressivist’s purposes?
I take it that in this context, the robust theory of  psychology that a quasi-realist
endorses should satisfy at least the following three requirements. First, the theory
should ft with a plausible form of  a scientifc, naturalistic world-view. This
requirement derives from the fact that at least some motivation for expressivism
comes from its compatibility with a naturalistic world-view and so, an expressivist
should not accept a theory of  mind that is in confict with such a world-view. Second,
the theory should not require a notion of  propositional content to explain the
content-explananda, at least not in a way which would confict with defationist
commitments. This is the requirement that the fundamental explanatory properties
actually are fully describable in terms that do not make mention of  propositional
contents. While it should be OK in the philosophy of  mind (or cognitive science) to
use a technical notion of  “propositional content” which is not the Sellarsian one for
theoretical purposes, just as this was OK for semantics, this notion should be
eliminable in the sense that the fundamental explanatory work is done in other terms.
Third, the theory should provide the necessary resources to draw the distinction
between normative and descriptive judgements that is fundamental to expressivism,
while being compatible with both being beliefs.8
8 Of  course, to make a full case for any theory of  psychology chosen by the quasi-realist, one would
also have to show that it is, if  not the best theory, at least among the best motivated theories in the
philosophy of  mind. While I think that there is very good motivation for the theory that I want to
suggest in what follows, this dissertation is not the place to make a full case. Rather, here I am
interested in the question whether there is a theory in the philosophy of  mind for which there is
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In what follows I will argue that “conceptual role semantics”, a certain school
with functionalism about the mind, satisfes these requirements, and that it will allow
us to appropriately generalize the Sellarsian account.9 I will argue for this by
developing the framework that combines conceptual role semantics, expressivism and
the Sellarsian view in a way that shows that it is in fact compatible with all of  our
theoretical requirements. I will develop the framework in three steps. In the frst step I
will focus only on the case of  belief, bracketing how the view deals with any other
propositional attitudes. I will argue, in the third section of  this chapter, that
conceptual role semantics could combine with the Sellarsian account of  that-clauses
to give us an account of  belief-attributions and of  the role that-clauses play in such
attributions. The second step of  my argument, located in the fourth section, will then
be to show that this framework can allow the distinction between normative and
descriptive judgements that lies at the heart of  expressivism, while being compatible
with both being beliefs. The third step is then to explain how the framework
developed for belief-attributions can account for the use of  that-clauses in
propositional attitude ascriptions more generally. I will do this in the ffth section.
3. CONCEPTUAL ROLE, SELLARSIAN THAT-CLAUSES, AND BELIEF
Let me start by explaining why I want to proceed by frst focusing on the case
of  belief, bracketing the other propositional attitudes. My two main reasons for doing
so are the following. First, it should already be clear that the Sellarsian account
imposes a certain constraint on how that-clauses function in propositional attitude
ascriptions. On the Sellarsian account, that-clauses pick out the meaning-constituting
properties of  declarative sentences. Insofar as those properties are related to the
some independent motivation, and which can do the work required in our context. What follows
should, consequently, be read with this reservation in mind, and it should remain clear that a quasi-
realist who follows my suggestion still has this signifcant theoretical burden to discharge.
9 Choosing a school within functionalism has two additional advantages in our context. First, it is a
view that some prominent expressivists already accept, or at least express sympathy for. See e.g.
Blackburn 1998a, Gibbard 1992 and Ridge 2006b. Hence, functionalism should not be something
which is too far from a view in the philosophy of  mind that many expressivists would want to
endorse anyways. Second, Sellars himself  was one of  the frst functionalists about the mind (see e.g.
Sellars 1956 and Sellars 1963). An investigation of  how his view about that-clauses would interact
with functionalism should, consequently, also be of  interest to those generally sympathetic to
Sellars’ views, and a combination of  both views something that is not too far from what Sellars
himself  could endorse.
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fundamental explanatory properties of  any mental state, however, it seems that they
must be primarily related to the fundamental explanatory properties of  beliefs, the
states conventionally expressed by assertoric uses of  declarative sentences. In this
respect, the Sellarsian account already requires that we explain the use of  that-clauses
in all propositional attitude ascriptions by reference to how that-clauses fgure in
belief-attributions. Second, if  one wants to explain all content-attributions to
propositional attitudes in relation to content-attributions to one particular kind of
propositional attitude, then belief  seems to be the best bet. After all, if  language has a
“downtown”—in the sense that the content of  all linguistic expression should be
explained by reference to it—then the most likely candidate for this downtown is
assertion.10 But then, the most likely candidate for the downtown of  the mind should be
belief, the state expressed by assertion.
As I already said, I want to argue that a certain school within functionalism
about the mind fts with our theoretical purposes. What is “functionalism about the
mind” though? According to functionalism about the mind, mental states are dispositional
states which are fundamentally characterized by how they function within a mental
economy.11 Mental states, on this view, are characterized fundamentally by what I will
call their “causal-functional role”.12 The causal-functional role of  a mental state is the
causal role it plays within a mental economy. So, according to functionalism, mental
states are fundamentally characterized by their relational properties, not by their
intrinsic nature.
Functionalism is often regarded as being well-suited to ft with a naturalistic,
10 As mentioned in footnote ten in the frst chapter, the metaphor of  language having a “downtown”
originates in Wittgenstein (Wittgenstein 1953), and prominently fgures in the works of  Robert
Brandom (e.g. Brandom 1983, Brandom 1994, and Brandom 2008).
11 For overviews over functionalism and the different variations that it can take, see Block 1980,
Braddon-Mitchell and Jackson 1996, a n d Levin 2013. For well-known proponents of
functionalism, see Fodor 1968, Lewis 1966, Putnam 1960 and Putnam 1967.
12 I use the label “causal-functional” in this context rather than just “functional” as is common in the
philosophy of  mind, to distinguish this role from the “functional role” that was relevant in the
second chapter. The “functional role” of  a mental state, as I used the label in the second chapter, is
the web of  platitudes characterizing that mental state in our ordinary practice. The causal-functional
role of  a mental state, on the other hand, is the set of  causal relations that characterize the state
according to a robust theory of  psychology (where this can be, but does not have to be the same as
what platitudes characterize the mental state in folk-psychology). In general, folk-psychology can be
seen as a good way to track or individuate mental states with certain causal-functional roles, without it
being a given that it provides the best means to characterize those states for explanatory purposes
or that it allows us to fully spell out the causal-functional role.
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scientifc world-view. Hence, if  we choose a school within the general functionalist
framework, we are guaranteed to satisfy at least our frst requirement. Functionalism
comes in a variety of  different versions though. Here I will commit to as little as
possible regarding what specifc version of  functionalism the expressivist should
endorse, and only make explicit commitments when our theoretical purposes require
this.13 This brings us immediately to the school within functionalism that I want to
argue can deliver the kind of  theory required in our context. Accepting this
particular school is born out of  the second requirement introduced further above,
namely, that no irreducible notion of  propositional content fgure on the theories’
most fundamental characterization of  mental states.
Even if  we can characterize mental states in terms of  their causal-functional
roles, that does not establish that they can be fully characterized without making use
of  an irreducible notion of  propositional content. This is because functionalism itself
is compatible with such a notion of  content fguring irreducibly in the functional
characterization of  mental states. However, there is a school within functionalism
according to which, on the most fundamental level, propositional attitudes can be
fully characterized without making reference to propositional content. This is the
school I will call “conceptual role semantics” in what follows.14 Conceptual role semantics
13 One question that I want to stay neutral on, for example, is whether the causal-functional role
characteristic for a mental state should be understood in normative terms or in non-normative terms.
According to some versions of  functionalism the causal-functional role of  a state specifes how
someone’s mental state ought to behave or would behave if  they are rational, while according to others, it
only specifes how such a mental state regularly or generally behaves. The relevant question here is,
of  course, whether attributions of  mental states (including attributions of  mental contents) are
normative or not. Even if  such attributions are normative in some sense though, I take it that they
are not practically normative. Hence, an expressivist will have no stake in this debate and should stay
neutral on this issue, absent arguments that such a stance is not feasible for the expressivist.
14 In the literature the term “conceptual role semantics” is used to label the broad tradition according
to which content is determined by a certain kind of  role or use (for overviews over this tradition,
see Block Forthcoming, Greenberg and Harman 2007, and Whiting 2009). The locus classicus for
conceptual role semantics in this sense is Wilfried Sellars’ work in the philosophy of  language and
mind (see especially Sellars 1954a, Sellars 1954b, Sellars 1969, and Sellars 1974). While it seems
plausible to see Sellars as the frst “real” proponent of  conceptual role semantics, note that Robert
Brandom points out that Immanuel Kant, Rudolf  Carnap and (surprisingly) Gottlob Frege can be
plausibly interpreted along these lines as well (see Brandom 2000: 49-52 and 57-61). Other
philosophers who can plausibly be read as standing in this broad tradition are e.g. Ned Block (Block
1986), Robert Brandom (Brandom 1994 a n d Brandom 2008; Brandom calls his view
“inferentialism”, but it can still be situated within the broad tradition I am calling “conceptual role
semantics” here), Matthew Chrisman (Chrisman 2010, Chrisman 2011, and Chrisman 2012),
Hartry Field (see e.g. Field 1977, Field 1978, and Field 2001b), Gilbert Harman (see e.g. Harman
1999a and Harman 1999b), Paul Horwich (Horwich 1998b and Horwich 2006), Brian Loar (Loar
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is primarily a view about the nature of  the properties in virtue of  which mental states
have their contents, what I called their “content-constituting properties” above. It
situates those properties in the causal-functional role of  those mental states. Roughly,
according to conceptual role semantics mental entities have their contents in virtue of
particular parts of  their functional roles, specifcally in virtue of  certain roles they play
e.g. in the procession of  sensory information, inference, deliberation and reasoning
more generally, and in the production of  behavioural outputs. As Gilbert Harman
characterizes the view, according to conceptual role semantics
“[content] depends on role in conceptual scheme rather than on truth
conditions. That is, [content] has to do with evidence, inference, and
reasoning, including the impact sensory experience has on what one believes, the
way in which inference and reasoning modify one’s beliefs and plans, and the way
beliefs and plans are refected in action.”15
Generally, the roles that could be relevant for a mental states’ content can be
distinguished into three kinds.16 First, “mind-entry” conditions, which specify the role
the state plays in the procession of  sensory stimuli. Second, “mind-to-mind”
conditions, which specify the role of  the state in the processes of  deliberation,
reasoning and inference. Third, “mind-exit” conditions, which specify the role of  the
state in the production of  actions. I will call that part of  the causal-functional role of
a state that is of  concern for conceptual role semantics the “conceptual role” of  that
state.
Of  course, what is characteristic for the different types of  propositional
attitudes—what distinguishes them from each other and from other mental states—is
1981), W. V. O. Quine (Quine 1960), Christopher Peacocke (Peacocke 1992), Eike von Savigny
(Von Savigny 1988), John Skorupski (Skorupski 1997), and Ralph Wedgwood (Wedgwood 2001
and Wedgwood 2008). Conceptual role semantics can also been found outside of  philosophy, for
example, in cognitive science or computer science (see e.g. Block Forthcoming and Rapaport 2002).
The views for which I will use the label “conceptual role semantics” here, are embedded within this
broad tradition, but take on commitments which not all of  those who fall within the broader
tradition might share. Authors who are plausibly read as explicitly endorsing the more narrow view
I call “conceptual role semantics” are, for example, Block, Field and Harman. Readers who are
interested in the details of  the independent motivations and arguments for such views should
consult these authors, as well as the other authors standing in this broader tradition.
15 Harman 1999b: 201. My emphasis.
16 The following tri-parte distinction goes back to Sellars (Sellars 1954b). Sellars’ focus, however, is on
language, which is why he uses the labels “language-entry transitions”, “language-to-language
transitions”, and language-exit transitions” for the three kinds of  transitions he holds relevant for
the content of  linguistic entities. My way of  labelling these transitions follows Sellars, but is
modifed to apply to the case of  mental content.
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exactly the way they operate on their content. Hence, what characterizes the different
types of  propositional attitudes on a framework of  this kind should be cashed out in
terms of  their conceptual roles. More specifcally, it should be cashed out in terms of
t h e t y p e s of  mind-entry, mind-to-mind, and mind-exit conditions which are
characteristic for mental states of  this kind. This puts us in a position to say
something about the meaning of  the term “belief ”. On this framework, the term
“belief ” will pick out mental states with a certain type of  conceptual role. Given
minimalist conceptions of  belief  and truth-aptitude—which we will still require to
allow a signifcant theoretical difference between normative and descriptive beliefs—
this should be that type of  conceptual role which is suitable for conventional
expression by assertoric use of  disciplined declarative sentences. If  one wants to
explain the meaning of  declarative sentences in terms of  the mental states they
express, this should be the kind of  conceptual role possessed by all those dispositional
states which can enter into all those kinds of  inferential relations necessary to solve
the Frege-Geach Problem. So, headaches would be out and descriptive beliefs would
be in, while it would be an open question whether the states expressivists think
constitute normative judgements would fall under this conceptual role kind.
Not only the type of  propositional attitude to which a mental state belongs is
characterized in terms of  content, however, but also what particular instance of  that
type it is. Hence, if  one accepts conceptual role semantics, then one thinks that on the
most fundamental level of  psychology those states we pick out with belief-attributions
can be fully characterized in terms of  their conceptual role. At this point, we need to
go one step further though. As I said earlier, “mental content” itself  is a notion
associated with certain kinds of  phenomena regarding mental states, which I have
called the “content-explananda”. On a defationary account we need to hold that the
content-explananda can be fully accounted for in terms not making mention of
contents, in terms of  the “fundamental explanatory properties” of  the relevant
mental states. Consequently, at this point my purposes require endorsement of  a
version of  conceptual role semantics according to which it is not only the case that
beliefs can be fully characterized in terms of  their conceptual roles, but also that all
of  the content-explananda associated with beliefs can be fully accounted for in terms
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of  conceptual role.17 Given this, it is the property of  having a particular conceptual
role which has to account for all of  the content-explananda of  a belief  on this kind of
account.
This gives me a view about the fundamental explanatory properties of  beliefs. I
can now make the frst step towards a generalization of  the Sellarsian account.
Further above I already explained that the Sellarsian account can be generalized if  it
is the case that the meaning-constituting properties and the fundamental explanatory
properties are identical or otherwise relevantly related. Now that we have a view of
these fundamental explanatory properties in place, we can tweak our understanding
of
PSYCHOLOGIZED META-SEMANTICS: Declarative sentences have their
meaning in virtue of  the judgements assertoric uses of  those sentences
conventionally express.
accordingly. Given a functionalist picture about the mind generally, it seems plausible to
think of  the ideationalist commitment along the following lines: languages are
basically (more or less) codifed ways of  providing information about the functional
profle of  one’s mental states, and the meaning of  declarative sentences is explained
in terms of  what causal-functional state one commits oneself  to be in by assertoric
use of  that sentence. Clearly though, it will be the conceptual role which is most
relevant for the sentence’s meaning, as it will, for example, be a difference in the
conceptual role of  the states expressed which accounts for the difference in meaning
between different kinds of  declarative sentences. So, on this modifed understanding
of  PSYCHOLOGIZED META-SEMANTICS it is the conceptual role of  the judgement conventionally
expressed by assertoric use of  a declarative sentence in virtue of  which that sentence
has its meaning. If  we accept this understanding of  PSYCHOLOGIZED META-SEMANTICS,
what is the consequence for the Sellarsian view?
On the Sellarsian account of  that-clauses, that-clauses function to pick out
17 This, of  course, is in a sense a more radical view than the one which holds that mental states can
be fully characterized in terms of  their causal-functional roles, but concedes that certain of  their
properties can only be described in terms of  an non-eliminable notion of  content, where the
content of  a mental state might be derivative from its causal-functional role, but its explanatory
properties not fully reducible to this functional role. Defationism about the contents of  mental
states commits us to denying such a view, however.
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meaning-constituting properties by example. More specifcally, to employ a that-clause is
to use the declarative sentence following the “that” as an example for something with
particular meaning-constituting properties as a means to pick out these meaning-
constituting properties. This way that-clauses feed on our competence with a
particular language (our implicit know-how of  the meaning-constituting properties of
sentences) to enable us to use sentences in that language as examples to talk and think
about meaning-constituting properties. For example, they allow us to assign those
properties to sentences when combined with the verb “means”. But, on the above
picture, those meaning-constituting properties will be that assertoric use of  the
sentence conventionally expresses a mental state with a particular conceptual role.
And if  this is the case, we cannot only use that-clauses to assign meaning-constituting
properties to sentences, we can also use that-clauses to pick out the conceptual roles
of  certain kinds of  mental states, namely, those states suitable for expression by
declarative sentences. Given that those states are beliefs on the minimalist conception
of  belief, this means that that-clauses provide an easy way for us to keep track of  the
conceptual roles of  beliefs via the sentences with which we are competent. And this
extends the raison d’être of  that-clauses from providing an easy means to keep track of
meaning-constituting properties, to providing an easy means to keep track of  the
conceptual roles of  at least certain kinds of  mental states, namely, beliefs.
Let me illustrate this one last time with the example from above. On the
Sellarsian account, that-clauses like “that Heinrich is a bee-keeper” serve to pick out
meaning-constituting properties by using a sentence in a language competence with
which is presupposed—in this case the English sentence “Heinrich is a bee-keeper”—
as an example to illustrate what these properties are. Because the meaning-
consituting properties, on the above account, will be that assertoric use of  the
sentence conventionally expresses a mental state with a particular conceptual role, we
can use that-clauses to pick out a particular conceptual role, using the English
sentence (in this case “Heinrich is a bee-keeper) as an illustrative example for
something which expresses a state with that role. This way, we cannot only use that-
clauses to attribute meaning-constituting properties, as in
(1) “Heinrich ist ein Imker” (in German) means that Heinrich is a bee-
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keeper.
We can also use them to attribute a conceptual role to a mental state, as in
(2) Helene believes that Heinrich is a bee-keeper.
In (2) we are attributing that conceptual role to Helene’s belief, which is possessed by
mental states expressed by sentences of  which “Heinrich is a bee-keeper” is an
illustrative example.
This also puts me in a position to explain how the Sellarsian view accounts for
the role of  that-clauses in belief-attributions. Sentences of  the form
(B) A believes that p.
attribute a state with a particular conceptual role to a person. In particular, they
attribute a mental state which is of  the conceptual role kind “belief ” and which has
the particular conceptual role picked out by “that p”, namely, the conceptual role of
the state conventional expressed by assertoric use of  the sentence “p”.
Note that on the Sellarsian account, that-clauses will, even when they occur in
belief-attributions, still possess all of  the characteristics they have in meaning-
attributions and which I highlighted in the last chapter. That is, in belief-attributions
that-clauses will still perform their role—allowing us to pick out certain properties by
example—in a non-representational fashion and there will be no informative
reductive analysis of  that-clauses in terms of  the conceptual roles they pick out.
Furthermore, in belief-attributions that-clauses will behave linguistically exactly like
referential singular terms that refer to something that supervenes on, but does not
reduce to, the conceptual role of  the belief  in question. This also means that we can
carry out belief-attributions by using the label “propositional contents” (and similar
ones) to refer to what is attributed by that-clauses. For example, rather than saying
(B) A believes that p.
we might now be able to say
(BC) A has a belief  with the content that p.
We might even be able to say,
(BP) A believes the proposition that p.
Of  course, on the Sellarsian account the information carried by claims made by
sentences such as (BC) or (BP) cannot go beyond what is claimed by sentences such as
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(B). And, while such talk is generally harmless and can be a useful tool in some cases,
we need to be at pains to not take it too seriously, lest we let ourselves be led into
metaphysical conundrum where there is none.18
One last observation about this framework: on this account, that-clauses will
behave in belief-attributions like terms that refer to something which supervenes on,
but does not reduce to the conceptual role of  certain beliefs. Parallel to the case of
the basic explanatory properties which turned out to be the most suitable candidates
for the meaning-constituting properties on the Sellarsian account, this will make the
property of  having a certain conceptual role the most plausible candidate for the
property in virtue of  which a belief  has its content. So, while it initially might have
appeared that the account on the table gives a completely different job to conceptual
roles than conceptual role semantics would, the accounts actually end up assigning
conceptual role the same status. Both views hold that conceptual roles crucially
fgures in the content-constituting properties, at least of  beliefs. The view I have
offered differs from conceptual role semantics only in virtue of  also being a view
about the nature of  content-attributions, which provides us with a particular picture
of  how the content of  a belief  and the content-constituting properties of  that belief
are related. Conceptual role semantics by itself  does not have any implications
regarding this relation. It is only a view about the content-constituting properties
themselves.
With these remarks in place, the Sellarsian account has been successfully
generalized to the use of  that-clauses in belief-attributions. Of  course, this is only a
partial success, as two things still remain to be established. First, we must establish
whether the framework on the table is compatible with the expressivist’s distinction
between normative and descriptive judgements. Second, we must establish how the
framework can account for the use of  that-clauses in propositional attitude ascriptions
more generally. The next two sections deal with these two remaining challenges in
turn.
18 Again, this stance toward propositional contents seems appropriate, given that the Sellarsian
account is supposed to be an account of  the use of  that-clauses in ordinary practice, but that the
notion of  a “proposition” is not generally part of  our ordinary practice. Ordinary folk rarely talk
about the propositions that they believe, though they might talk more often about their beliefs’
contents.
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4. EXPRESSIVISM RETHOUGHT: CONCEPTUAL ROLE EXPRESSIVISM
It is now time to see whether the above account satisfes the third requirement I
introduced above. This was the requirement that the chosen theory of  psychology
allow the expressivist to maintain her distinction between normative and descriptive
judgements, while conceding that both are beliefs. Recall that with regards to
normative judgements the expressivist subscribes to two claims, namely,
NON-REPRESENTATIONALISM ABOUT NORMATIVE JUDGEMENTS: The mental
states which constitute normative judgements do n o t consist in
representational states such that a normative judgement is true if  and
only if  the representational state it consists in is true.
and
CONATIVE NATURE OF NORMATIVE JUDGEMENTS: The mental states which
constitute normative judgements (at least partially) consist in conative
attitudes. 
Regarding descriptive judgements, on the other hand, expressivists are
representationalists. Specifcally, expressivists think that descriptive judgements
consist in representational states and not in motivational states. So they subscribe to
REPRESENTATIONALISM ABOUT DESCRIPTIVE JUDGEMENTS: The mental
states which constitute descriptive judgements do consist in
representational states such that a descriptive judgement is true if  and
only if  the representational state it consists in is true.
and
NON-CONATIVE NATURE OF DESCRIPTIVE JUDGEMENTS: The mental states
which constitute descriptive judgements do not consist in conative
attitudes. 
Can this difference be cashed out in terms of  conceptual role semantics, while still
maintaining that both normative and descriptive judgements are beliefs?
Let’s start the investigation by taking a look at how we would distinguish
between “representational states” and “conative attitudes” in terms of  causal-
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functional roles.19 I take it that representational states are states which are characterized
by their function to track features of  our external environment. In this function, they
also prominently serve to guide the agent around in that environment. While
representational states are relevant for action in this way, however, those states
themselves are in a relevant sense motivationally inert: representational states might
be causally relevant to many different kinds of  acts, but their causal-functional profle
will not be such that it will lead an agent to perform any particular action. Such states
will, consequently, be states with a causal-functional profle of  the following kind: the
procession of  and reaction to sensory inputs will play a major role in their causal-
functional profle, but insofar as the production of  action is relevant to this profle, the
causal-functional profle of  representational states will refect that they only play a
guiding role in action. Furthermore, representational states will be states which either
require of  us to expand our ontology by including those features they function to
track, or must be shown to track something already part of  our ontology, unless we
think that there is reason to think that they fail to track anything in our external
environment.
Conative attitudes, on the other hand, I take to be states which are primarily
characterized by the function to lead an agent to move around in and manipulate her
external environment. Conative attitudes do not function to track anything in the
external environment, rather they function to cause the agent to interact with that
environment. These states will directly cause the agent to do particular actions and
they will be connected to other states and events in an agent’s mental economy that
increase the likely-hood for the agent to be so moved. So, for example, conative
attitudes will be directly tied to having positive or negative experiential states in
certain situations (as pleasure and pain, for example, reinforce certain kinds of
behaviour), the agent seeing certain things in a favourable or unfavourable light, the
agent’s attention being drawn to certain things, and so on. Conative attitudes will,
19 What follows draws on the characterization of  representational states and conative attitudes from a
variety of  places. See e.g. Ridge 2006b, Sinclair 2006, Sinhababu 2009, Smith 1994a, and Sterelny
2003. I presuppose here a broadly Humean theory of  motivation, which (as already said in the frst
chapter) is often taken to be our most plausible theory of  action (the theory has gained prominence
with the work of  Donald Davidson (see Davidson 1963) and has recently been defended by
Michael Smith (Smith 1987 and Smith 1994a), and Neil Sinhababu (Sinhababu 2009).
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consequently, be states with a causal profle of  the following kind: the procession of
and reaction to sensory inputs will play only a minor role within their causal-
functional profle, but a major part of  that profle will be concerned with the
production of  action. Furthermore, conative attitudes will be states that do not
require us to expand our ontology, as conative attitudes do not function to track
anything.20
With these characterizations of  representational states and conative attitudes in
place, it should be clear that most mental states with the causal-functional profle of
conative attitudes will not be states which folk-psychology would pick out with the
term “belief ”. Rather, in folk-psychology that causal-functional profle is
paradigmatically the one possessed by non-cognitive states, most prominently, of
course, desires. Be that as it may, the crucial question is now the following: would it
be possible to claim within the above framework that in the set of  mental states that
have the conceptual role picked out by “belief ” there are some states that have the
causal-functional profle of  representational states, while others have the causal-
functional profle of  conative attitudes?
I take it that i f  there are such different kinds of  beliefs, the difference in their
causal-functional roles lies in the kinds of  conceptual roles that characterize them.
Within the conceptual role that characterizes all beliefs, we would have to distinguish
two fundamentally different kinds of  beliefs, depending on a difference in the type of
conceptual role which characterizes them. The difference between those two different
kinds of  beliefs should, thereby, be mostly a difference in the kinds of  mind-entry and
mind-exit conditions that characterize them. However, they might also differ in the
types of  reasoning and deliberation in which they prominently fgure, or how they
enter into reasoning and deliberation.21 For example, insofar as beliefs that have a
conceptual role that provides them with the causal-functional profle of
20 Of  course, both representational states and conative attitudes in some sense require us to expand
our ontology, as they both require that we include these mental states in our ontology. This,
however, is of  course not what I mean when I say that representational states do, and conative
attitudes do not, require us to expand our ontology. Rather, the issue in question is whether
representational states or conative attitudes have ontological commitments beyond this.
21 Matthew Chrisman suggests that the difference between normative and descriptive belief  should
be drawn in terms of  the difference between theoretical and practical reasoning, once all parties in
the debate concede that both normative and descriptive judgements are beliefs (Chrisman 2008).
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representational states enter into practical deliberation—reasoning about what to do
—such deliberation will terminate in intentions only if  accompanied by a conative
attitude. Beliefs with a conceptual role that provides them with the causal-functional
profle of  conative attitudes, on the other hand, might enter into practical
deliberation in a way that such deliberation will terminate in an intention without
any further conative attitude.
It should be relatively clear at this point that the assumption that there are
beliefs with such different types of  conceptual roles is neither ruled out by conceptual
role semantics, nor is it ruled out by a minimalist conception of  belief. On a
minimalist conception of  belief, a mental state is a belief  just in case it has a
conceptual role that would make it suitable for expression by a disciplined declarative
sentence. Above I suggested that this should be the kind of  conceptual role possessed
by all those dispositional states which can enter into those kinds of  inferential
relations necessary to solve the Frege-Geach Problem. This imposes some restrictions
on the kinds of  conceptual roles that could characterize a belief, since a mental state
could only qualify as a belief  if  it could be characterized by a conceptual role with a
suffciently rich set of  relevant mind-to-mind conditions. At least in principle though, a
signifcant number of  different types of  conceptual role should be compatible with
that requirement, conceptual role types which differ signifcantly among each other
when it comes to their other conditions. In our context, two types of  conceptual role
that seem, at least in principle, compatible with this requirement can, thereby, be
highlighted.
First, the requirement should be compatible with there being beliefs that are
characterized by a conceptual role of  the following kind: when it comes to mind-
entry conditions their conceptual role is characterized by a signifcantly robust set of
such conditions, which are such that we are required to expand our ontology, or show
that those conditions function to track something already part of  our ontology, unless
we want these beliefs to be misfring systematically. When it comes to mind-exit
conditions, on the other hand, these beliefs will be characterized by conditions
according to which they play—at most—a contributory role in the production of
action in combination with other mental states, most prominently desires. It seems
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very plausible though that beliefs with a conceptual role of  this type have the causal-
functional profle of  representational states. And an expressivist can hold that
descriptive beliefs are beliefs of  exactly this kind.
Second, the minimalist restriction should also be compatible with there being
beliefs with a very different type of  conceptual role. If  this conceptual role is
characterized by mind-entry conditions at all, these conditions will be such that they
do not expand our ontology. This could be the case, for example, because those
mind-entry conditions only specify a restricted set of  conditions which rule out the
belief  characterized by them. But, the conceptual role would be characterized by a
robust set of  mind-exit conditions which provides these beliefs with a motivating role
in the production of  action. It seems very plausible, however, that beliefs with a
conceptual role of  this type will have the causal-functional profle of  conative
attitudes. And an expressivist can hold that normative beliefs are exactly of  this kind.
It seems, consequently, that the framework on the table does allow the conceptual
space for an expressivist to draw the distinction between normative and descriptive
judgements that is characteristic for expressivism, while at the same time maintaining
that both are beliefs.
Of  course, to establish that there are and can be such states, as well as cashing
out their conceptual roles in detail would be part of  a theoretical enterprise that goes
far beyond the purposes of  this dissertation. Here, I just want to bring forward a
couple of  considerations which should give us some license to optimism about the
project’s success. First, I should note that for the expressivist, this diffculty should
mostly affect whether or not they can legitimately allow there to be beliefs
characterized by the conceptual role type they take to be characteristic for normative
belief. After all, representationalism about both normative and descriptive belief  is
the stance of  the dialectical opponent of  expressivism, so that opponent is in no
position to deny that some beliefs are representational states. Of  course, such an
opponent might want to deny the viability of  characterizing such beliefs within the
above functionalist framework. Given that functionalism is a relatively established
position in the philosophy of  mind, and at least some functionalist approaches offer
an account on which belief  can be fully characterized without making mention of
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content, however, I take it that this is a worry which is not all too pressing for an
expressivist.
Second, there are two ways for an expressivist to establish that there can be
beliefs with a type of  conceptual role that would give them the causal-functional
profle of  conative attitudes. The frst would be to argue that the conceptual role of
normative beliefs is actually identical to the conceptual role of  a mental state which
clearly is a conative attitude, but which we do not conceptualize as a belief  in folk-
psychology. Such a mental state could be, for example, some desire with non-
normative content. On this approach, the expressivist can argue that the Frege-
Geach Problem can be solved for normative sentences, if  normative sentences
express t h i s conative attitude. Combined with minimalism about belief, the
expressivist could then hold that this means that the mental state can be
conceptualized as a belief  as well, with the desire-like causal-functional characteristics
becoming part of  the conceptual role of  that belief. If  the expressivist takes this route,
she can hold that in folk-psychology there are two ways of  conceptualizing the
relevant causal-functional state—two different ways of  thinking about the different
parts of  the state’s causal-functional role. First, we can think about this state as a
desire with a non-normative content or second, we can think about it as a belief  with
a normative content.
The second way would be to argue that paradigm examples of  conative
attitudes can have features that would qualify them to be suitable for expression by
disciplined declarative sentences. The expressivist can then hold that there can be
states which are only conceptualizable as normative beliefs with a certain conceptual
role, but which nevertheless exemplify the causal-functional profles of  conative
attitudes. On this route, the expressivist would deny that normative beliefs can be
reduced to any of  the familiar conative attitudes—normative beliefs would be sui
generis conative attitudes, which folk-psychology can only conceptualize in one way,
namely, as normative beliefs with a certain content.
Both of  these ways require paying attention to the Frege-Geach Problem, but
they show how we can argue for the legitimacy of  assuming that there can be the
relevant mental states even without going deeper into the robust theory of
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psychology, simply by drawing on the resources which folk-psychology provides.
This concludes my discussion of  how the framework presented here would be
compatible with the expressivist view that there is a fundamental difference between
normative and descriptive judgements, while conceding that both are beliefs. One
theoretical task remains. This is the issue how the account offered of  the use of  that-
clauses in belief-attributions would deal with the use of  that-clauses in propositional
attitude ascriptions more generally.
5. DESIRE AND ALL THAT: FULLY GENERALIZING THE SELLARSIAN VIEW
I have generalized the Sellarsian account to the use of  that-clauses in belief-
attributions. This generalization was relatively straightforward: it just required a
modifcation in the understanding of  PSYCHOLOGIZED META-SEMANTICS that allowed that-
clauses to pick out the conceptual role of  beliefs. One might think, however, that the
way I have made the generalization comes at a high price: given that that-clauses now
always pick out the conceptual role of  beliefs, the use of  that-clauses in propositional
attitude ascriptions more generally can no longer be explained. Is this a devastating
objection? Not necessarily, since there is at least one way to escape this challenge. We
can escape the challenge by holding that the content of  all other propositional
attitudes can be individuated in relation to the content of  the relevant beliefs. More
specifcally, we can deal with the challenge, by holding that the conceptual role of  all
propositional attitudes can be appropriately individuated by their relation to the
conceptual role of  belief. If  this was the case, we cpuld, even though that-clauses only
pick out the conceptual role of  a belief, nevertheless use that-clauses to attribute a
conceptual role to another kind of  propositional attitude, namely, that conceptual
role which is relevantly related to the conceptual role of  a belief. Is this response
feasible?
To see whether it is, let us take a look at one propositional attitude in particular,
namely, desire. Can the suggestion provide an appropriate function from the
conceptual role of  beliefs to the conceptual role of  desires, which would be in
agreement with our intuitions about what beliefs and desires share a content? The
frst thing to note is that on the account on offer, there are actually two different kinds
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of  beliefs distinguished by their different kinds of  conceptual roles, namely, normative
and descriptive beliefs. Because of  this bifurcation in the case of  belief, we need to
consider two cases of  desire as well when we consider the suggestion that the
conceptual role of  desire can be individuated by relation to the conceptual role of
belief. First, we need to consider whether this suggestion can deal with desires with
descriptive contents, such as the desire that there are monsters hiding in the closet.
Second, we need to consider whether it can deal with desires with normative
contents, such as the desire that pleasure is good for its own sake. I will deal with each
type of  desire in turn, starting with desires with descriptive contents.
Let me begin by feshing out a little bit what the conceptual role of  such desires
would be. Among philosophers, desire is prominently known as a state that is
motivating, with its content determining the kinds of  actions an agent is disposed to
undertake. Someone who desires that there are monsters hiding in the closet, for
example, will do her best, ceteris paribus, to make it more likely that there are monsters
hiding in the closet—whatever that may be in their particular situation. For instance,
if  she believes that monsters prefer a dirty and cluttered environment, she will do her
best to create such an environment in her closet. The conceptual role of  such desires
will, consequently, be such that, in combination with beliefs about what makes the
desired outcome more likely, it causes the agent to act in certain ways. Of  course, this
does not exhaust the conceptual role of  desires:22 for example, someone who desires
that there are monsters hiding in the closet will be disposed to experience pleasure in
entertaining the thought that there are monsters hiding in the closet. Furthermore,
such a person will be disposed to have her attention directed towards the thought that
there are monsters hiding in the closet and to fantasize about such thoughts. Such
other features will need explaining as well eventually. I will do this when I consider
desires with normative contents. However, the role of  desires in the production of
action is so central to their conceptual role, or at least to the conceptual role of
desires with descriptive contents, that we have made signifcant progress, if  we can
22 While these are features of  desire which philosophers have tended to ignore in favour of  desire ’s
motivational role (which might be explained by the fact that philosophers have tended to use the
label “desire” not in its folk-psychological sense, but as a technical term for what I have called
“conative attitudes”), they have recently been highlighted by Scanlon (Scanlon 1998: 39-41). See
also Sinhababu 2009, for an account of  desire which pays attention to these features.
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account for how desires with the relevant conceptual role can be identifed within the
given framework.
Here is how I think this theoretical work can be done: Recall that beliefs with
descriptive content will be characterized by conceptual roles with a robust set of
mind-entry conditions. Those beliefs have mind-entry conditions of  this kind,
because they are representational states that function to track particular features of
the environment. With this in place, however, we can draw a distinctive relationship
which should hold between the conceptual role of  beliefs with descriptive contents
and the conceptual role of  certain desires with descriptive content: for any belief  B
with descriptive content, there will be some desire D the conceptual role of  which is
such that it tends to move the agent in a way that is conducive to bringing about
those features of  the external environment that it is the function of  beliefs with the
conceptual role of  B to track. That desire, however, will surely be the most plausible
candidate for the desire with the same content as the belief  in question: surely the
desire that p, will be that desire which functions to bring about what the conceptual
role of  the belief  that p functions to track. Consequently, the account seems to be able
to offer a function from the conceptual roles of  beliefs to the conceptual role of
desires, a function which tracks our intuitions about which beliefs and desires have
the same content.  If  this is the case, however, then it seems plausible that we can
characterize the conceptual roles of  desires with descriptive contents in relation to the
conceptual roles of  the corresponding beliefs. Hence, even though that-clauses would
pick out the conceptual roles of  beliefs on the Sellarsian account, we can still account
for their use in desire-attributions—at least when it comes to desires with descriptive
content. In such attributions they serve to identify and attribute a desire with a
certain conceptual role, by illustrating the belief  to which that desire is relevantly
related.
One question which might be raised at this point is whether this account
smuggles in any illicit notion of  propositional content by invoking the features in our
external environment which beliefs with descriptive contents function to track. Might
one not suspect that it is these features which play the role of  the propositional content
of  the relevant beliefs and desires? I want to suggest that we can resist this picture at
164
this point. Mark Schroeder has recently introduced the distinction between a
“propositional content” and a “representational content”.23 According to Schroeder,
propositional contents are what accounts for what I have called the content-explananda,
whi le representational contents “serve to carve up the world, […] correspond to
distinctions in reality, […] are associated with metaphysical commitment of  some
kind”.24 Of  course, Schroeder’s characterization of  propositional contents is overly
restrictive, because it effectively removes the possibility of  a view like the Sellarsian
from the conceptual landscape. So, we should resist t h a t part of  Schroeder’s
account.25 Nevertheless, Schroeder’s distinction helps us in this context, because it
highlights that the worry that the represented features of  reality could smuggle in
some problematic notion of  propositional content is unfounded. It would only be
problematic if  those represented features of  reality played some role in accounting
for the content-explananda. But, the represented features of  reality do not play this
role in the account on offer—this is the role which is played by the conceptual role of
the relevant desire, which is individuated in relation to the conceptual role of  the
corresponding belief. Hence, it is more plausible to see those features which are
tracked as the representational contents of  attitudes with descriptive contents, and as not
smuggling in some independent notion of  propositional content.
It seems, consequently, that we can account for the role of  that-clauses in desire-
attributions even if  we see that-clauses as picking out the conceptual role of  beliefs.
Of  course, this explanation will not work for the case of  desires with normative
contents, at least not if  we endorse expressivism. After all, if  we accept expressivism,
normative beliefs will not be characterized by a conceptual role with a signifcantly
robust set of  mind-entry conditions, because they do not function to track anything in
our external environment. If  the conceptual role of  desires with normative content
can be characterized in relation to the conceptual roles of  normative beliefs, we will
23 Schroeder 2013b.
24 Schroeder 2013b: 418.
25 This assumption is also the reason Schroeder is led to think that a defationary view cannot possibly
do the explanatory work of  accounting for the content-explananda, as he has to think that if  there
is something that accounts for these phenomena, that would have to be the propositional content of
the relevant mental state. That means, that on Schroeder’s account the Sellarsian view would
actually turn out to be not a defationary view at all, but a reductionist view. I take it that this
should give us enough pause to see that one should not accept Schroeder’s overly restrictive
framework when it comes to characterizing propositional contents.
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have to tell a different kind of  story. However, it seems to me that there is a plausible
different story to tell.
One thing that is notable is that there is actually an intuitive difference in the
conceptual roles of  these two kinds of  desires. While desires with descriptive contents
are prominently motivating, it seems very implausible that desires with normative
contents are. Suppose someone has the desire that there are monsters hiding in the
closet. Does it seem plausible that this person would be motivated to act in any
particular way? Obviously it does. As long as the person believes that monsters are
not hiding in her closet, she will be motivated to do any number of  things which
make it more likely that monsters start hiding in her closet. On the other hand, take
someone who desires that pleasure is good for its own sake. Does it seem plausible
that this person would be motivated to act in any particular way? It does not seem
very plausible that she would be. Hence, it seems that desires with normative contents
differ in a signifcant respect from desires with descriptive content: where the latter
are motivating, the former are not.
Of  course, here we must proceed with caution, as some desires with normative
contents do seem to be motivating. For example, if  someone had the desire that
eating meat is morally permissible, she might be motivated to do a number of  things,
such as supporting research into lab-grown meat. Basically, such a person would be
motivated to make it the case that eating meat loses all the properties which she
believes to make it currently impermissible. However, it is very plausible that the
ascription of  desires of  this kind can be seen as elliptical for the ascription of  a
certain mix of  beliefs with normative contents, beliefs with descriptive contents, and
desires with descriptive contents. For example, it is plausible to construe the above
person’s desire as a combination of  the belief  that causing unnecessary pain is
inherently wrong, the belief  that eating meat causes unnecessary pain and the desire
that eating meat does not cause unnecessary pain. What we have in such cases are
not really desires with normative contents, but instead convenient ways of  attributing
a complex combination of  mental states. In the case in which we have desires with
normative contents which cannot be so treated, however, it seems that such desires
would be motivationally inert.
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Note that such normative desires are not alone in having a conceptual role that
signifcantly deviates from the conceptual role of  desires with descriptive content. To
take only one example, desires with mathematical content also do not seem to motivate
agents to act in any particular way. To desire that a very complicated calculation turn
out correct, for example, does not seem to motivate one to behave in any particular
way. It is, of  course, not hard to fnd an explanation for this phenomenon: both
desires with normative contents and desires with mathematical contents have
contents which are such that if  they are true, they are necessarily true, while desires
with descriptive contents have contents which would only be contingently true.
Consequently, even if  an expressivist has to hold that desires with descriptive content
and desires with normative content are signifcantly different, there is actually
independent motivation for doing so. Hence, even if  we have to give a different
explanation for the content of  desires with descriptive content and the content of
desires with normative content, there is some independent justifcation for doing so
anyways.
So, what does characterize the conceptual role of  desires with normative content
and can those characteristics be appropriately individuated in relation to the
conceptual role of  the relevant beliefs? I take it that the most prominent features of
the conceptual role of  such desires are the following two, which I have already
mentioned further above. First, someone who desires that p, where “that p” expresses
a normative content, is disposed to take pleasure in entertaining the thought that p.26
Second, someone who desires that p, where “that p” expresses a normative content, is
disposed to have their attention drawn to the thought that p and to fantasize about
this thought. Can we make sense of  both of  these features in relation to the
conceptual roles of  normative beliefs in a way that gives us the right function from
belief  to desire?
Both features of  desires make mention of  a further mental state, namely, the
26 It is important here that the person be taking pleasure in entertaining the thought that p and not
just have a pleasurable experience when entertaining the thought that p. For example, someone who
was brainwashed to experience pleasure whenever they entertain the thought that grass is green
does not, thereby, automatically have the desire that grass is green. For desire, it is important that
the pleasure derive from the thought in a certain way and that deviant causal chains of  the above
kind be ruled out.
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propositional attitude “entertaining the thought that p”. The frst step should,
consequently, be to investigate whether an account can be given of  this propositional
attitude within the above framework, one which plausibly connects the conceptual
role of  that propositional attitude with the conceptual role of  the relevant belief.
Giving such an account is not a big problem though. One very plausible account of
what it is to entertain a thought is that it is to simulate having the corresponding belief.
“Simulation” is here to be understood as it would be used in the simulation theory in
the philosophy of  mind, namely, as running the relevant belief  “off-line” within one’s
own cognitive system.27 If  we understand “entertaining the thought that p” this way,
however, then it is easy to see how the that-clause in such attributions would make the
same contribution there as it would in a belief-attribution. After all, to entertain the
thought that p, is just to be in that functional state which is a simulation of  the belief
with the conceptual role of  beliefs picked out by “that p”. Hence, it will be very easy
to identify the conceptual role of  the relevant instance of  the state of  entertaining the
thought that p in relation to the conceptual role of  the relevant belief. This means
also, of  course, that the function from the conceptual role of  a belief  to an attitude of
entertaining the thought will track our intuitions about which instances of  belief  and
of  the attitude of  entertaining a thought will share the same content.
Given this understanding of  what it is to “entertain the thought that p”,
however, it should be clear that we can characterize the conceptual roles of  desires
with normative contents in relation to the conceptual roles of  the corresponding
beliefs as well. After all, these desires are characterized by relations to the attitude of
entertaining the thought, which itself  is characterized in relation to belief, where the
relevant attitudes will all be those which we would intuitively regard as having the
same contents. Hence, we can easily characterize the conceptual role of  desires with
normative contents in relation to the conceptual role of  the corresponding belief.
Someone who desires that p will be in a state with the following two features. First, it
will, in some relevant way, cause them to experience pleasure from simulating a belief
with the conceptual role picked out by “that p”. Second, they will be disposed to
simulate the belief  with the conceptual role picked out by “that p”, and to have their
27 For an overview over simulation theory in the philosophy of  mind, see Gordon 2009.
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attention drawn to that thought.
We now have a framework in which the Sellarsian account can deal with the
use of  that-clauses in belief-attributions and in desire-attributions. Can this account
also deal with the use of  that-clauses in other propositional attitude ascriptions
though? I would like to suggest that it provides at least a signifcant license for
optimism. As we have seen, the account c a n account for two of  the major
propositional attitudes, namely belief  and desire, and we have already seen how it
can account for another propositional attitude: entertaining a thought. Given this
result, the expressivist should now be in a position to shift the burden of  proof  to
anyone who has doubts about the above account being applicable to any particular
kind of  propositional attitude: someone who has doubts that the account will not
work for some particular kind of  propositional attitude now needs to give an
argument why the view would not be applicable to that kind of  attitude. If  such an
argument was given, the expressivist would then face a dilemma: either deny that the
relevant attitude exists, or show how the attitude can be accounted for in terms that
relate it to the conceptual role of  the respective belief. Which horn to take at that
point, however, and how problematic each horn would be, is something that can only
be determined once we are given the attitude that is supposed to generate a problem
for the above account. Therefore, at least for the moment, the expressivist should be
able to rest content that the account can deal with all of  the propositional attitudes
and shift the burden of  proof  to those who want to deny this.
6. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
In the third chapter I argued that there is an important phenomenon for which
quasi-realists have not yet given an account for how it fts with expressivism. These
are those uses of  that-clauses associated with propositional contents. This
phenomenon is important, not only because a quasi-realist must account for it to
account for relevant platitudes surrounding our ordinary notions of  truth-aptitude
and belief, such as
ASSERTION AND BELIEF: The mental state conventionally expressed by
assertoric use of  a truth-apt sentence is a belief  such that the content
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of  the belief  is the content of  the sentence.
or
BELIEF IS A PROPOSITIONAL ATTITUDE: Belief  is a state with content.
in a way that is compatible with normative thought and discourse being truth-apt and
normative judgements being beliefs. As we have seen, it also importantly fgures in
meaning-attributions in our ordinary practice, so a quasi-realist who wants to
preserve this practice, better have an account for such uses as well. As I argued in the
same chapter, there is no in principle worry that such an account could be given, which
opens the door for anyone setting out to develop exactly such an account.
The aim of  the fourth and ffth chapter was then to develop a defationary
account of  that-clauses which fts with the quasi-realist’s requirements. In the fourth
chapter I offered the Sellarsian account as such a defationary account, and
developed the account in the context of  meaning-attributions. This account
straightforwardly allows the application of  that-clauses to normative sentences even if
expressivism is true, and allows the expressivist to say that normative sentences have
propositional contents. In this, the ffth, chapter I have then argued that this account
can be generalized to the use of  that-clauses in belief-attributions and ascriptions of
propositional contents generally. The generalization allows the expressivist to say that
normative judgements are beliefs with normative propositions as their contents. In
the context of  generalizing the Sellarsian account I have suggested a novel way of
thinking about expressivism, namely, as a view according to which the difference
between normative and descriptive judgements is to be cashed out in terms of  a
difference in their conceptual role.
It should be relatively clear that the account of  that-clauses that I developed in
these two chapters allows the expressivist to account for platitudes such as ASSERTION
AND BELIEF and BELIEF IS A PROPOSITIONAL ATTITUDE, so there should be no more objection
on this front to an expressivist view which wants to allow that normative thought and
discourse are truth-apt and normative judgements beliefs. The account I gave even
explains how desires with normative contents ft within an expressivist framework, a
topic that expressivists rarely touch upon.
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CONCLUSION
This dissertation has been concerned with moving the debate surrounding
expressivism beyond the Frege-Geach Problem, by investigating two neglected
problems for meta-normative expressivism, and how the expressivist can deal with
these problems. In this short conclusion I want to give a fnal summary of  the main
arguments and achievements of  my investigation, and to point out some directions
for future research that arise out of  the dissertation. 
The frst problem this dissertation has been concerned with is the normative
attitude problem, which is an objection to expressivism based on the challenge to give
an account of  the attitude which constitutes normative thinking. According to this
objection, any attempt on the part of  the expressivist to give an account for this
attitude is impaled on one of  the horns of  a dilemma: if  the expressivist holds that
normative judgements consist (characteristically) in a distinctive, sui generis type of
conative attitude which cannot be (completely) reduced to attitudes already part of  an
account of  non-normative thinking, then the expressivist account will be
uninformative and in confict with naturalism. If  the expressivist, on the other hand,
holds that normative thinking can be completely accounted for in terms of  attitudes
that are already part of  an account of  non-normative thinking, then her account will
leave something out that is distinctive about normative judgements.
I have argued that when it comes to the normative attitude problem,
expressivists are on an equal footing with meta-normative representationalists who
face a structurally identical dilemma, and that expressivists can use the very same
resources that meta-normative representationalists have used to deal with their
version of  the dilemma. Furthermore, I have argued that these resources not only
help more traditional expressivist approaches—according to which normative
thinking can be completely accounted for in terms of  attitudes that are already part
of  an account of  non-normative thinking. These resources also, more surprisingly,
make an expressivist account feasible, according to which normative judgements
consist in sui generis attitudes. I then developed such an account in suffcient detail to
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at least give us license for optimism that such approaches are in fact feasible.
One important question for future research that arises out of  my discussion of
the normative attitude problem is whether expressivists might not be better able to deal
with the normative attitude problem with the resources made available by meta-
normative representationalists than meta-normative representationalists themselves
can deal with their own dilemma. One consideration that seems to support this thesis,
is that the expressivist thesis is far less ambitious: it is only a thesis about the nature of
normative thought, and not a thesis about the nature of  normative facts. Hence, if
the expressivist postulates sui generis normative attitudes, this will not force her to
introduce a novel ontological category, as mental states and conative attitudes already
are parts of  our ontology. This is very different from the representationalist who holds
that normative facts are sui generis. Sui generis conative attitudes, consequently, do not
give raise to any novel epistemological or metaphysical worries that are not already
raised by our general theory of  mind. On the other hand, if  the expressivist holds
that normative judgements can be fully accounted for in terms of  attitudes already
part of  our theory of  non-normative thinking, this does not force her to make any
claims about what settles normative questions. This is very different for the meta-
normative representationalist, whose thesis about how the reference of  normative
concepts is fxed determines how normative questions are settled. A detailed
investigation of  these issues, however, is a subject for future research.
The second problem that this dissertation was concerned with, was the
challenge to the quasi-realist expressivist to develop an account of  those uses of  that-
clauses associated with propositional contents that fts with the thesis that expressivism
is fully compatible with normative thought and discourse being truth-apt and
normative judgements being beliefs. My particular aim with regards to this problem
was to develop a defationist account of  the relevant uses of  that-clauses which fts with
expressivism’s theoretical commitments and with the thesis that normative thought
and discourse are truth-apt and normative judgements are beliefs.
I have argued that an expressivist-friendly account of  that-clauses can be found
in Sellars’ account of  that-clauses, which he developed in the context of  his account
of  meaning-attributions. As I have explained, this account, on a plausible reading, is a
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defationist account of  that-clauses, and it does allow talk of  the propositional
contents of  normative sentences that is unproblematic for an expressivist. I have also
shown how the Sellarsian account of  that-clauses can be generalized from their use in
meaning-attributions to their use in belief-attributions and propositional attitude
ascriptions more generally, in a way that allows the expressivist to say that normative
judgements are beliefs and gives the expressivist a way to account for other kinds of
propositional attitudes with normative contents. In this context, I introduced a novel
way of  understanding expressivism, as a view according to which the difference
between normative and descriptive judgements consists in their being beliefs with
different kinds of  conceptual roles which directly translates into the difference being
that they have different contents.
My discussion of  the second problem and the accounts of  that-clauses and of
expressivism that I suggested in that context raise several directions for future
research, of  which I here want to mention four. First, one thing that it will be
important to investigate is whether and how the Sellarsian account of  that-clauses, in
combination with the expressivist framework I developed, could be generalized even
further to other relevant uses of  that-clauses. One such use which is directly relevant
to another neglected problem of  expressivism is the use of  that-clauses in
combination with modal operators such as “ought” or “might”.1 As I suggested that
expressivism should align itself  with conceptual role semantics, one way how one
might approach this issue is to draw on the resources this tradition and views very
closely related to it offer. A promising strategy, for example, might be to draw on
Sellars’ own treatment of  modal operators, or on the work of  Matthew Chrisman on
the modal operator “ought”.2
A second important direction for future research would be whether and to what
extend my claim that all propositional attitudes can be characterized in relation to
1 This use is relevant in the context of  dealing with Andy Egan’s challenge that expressivist cannot
account for judgements of  the form “Nothing I would endorse as an improvement would lead me
to abandon my normative judgement N, but I might still be mistaken in N.” See Egan 2007. While
Simon Blackburn has recently given a response to Egan’s challenge (Blackburn 2009), Blackburn
has not given us a systematic account of  how he thinks modal operators should be treated by the
expressivist, so in an important sense the challenge remains open (as is also noted by Mark
Schroeder (Schroeder 2014b).
2 For Sellars’ work on modal operators, see especially Sellars 1958. For Chrisman’s work on “ought”,
see e.g. Chrisman 2012 and Chrisman 2013.
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belief  can be defended. This question is not only of  relevance for the view I have
developed here, it is also relevant, for example, for views like Robert Brandom’s
according to which propositional content is derivative from assertion. I think my
discussion here should make us optimistic that such a view can be defended, but if  we
fnd a view like this attractive, I think that in the future we should do more than rely
on this license for optimism, and investigate the full potential of  this view. 
A third direction for future research raised by the development of  the Sellarsian
account as an account of  propositional content, is the question whether a similar
account could be developed for other kinds of  contents (if  there are any). For
example, some attitude verbs do not only take that-clauses as their complements, but
also to-clauses, such as the attitude verb “desire”: we can not only desire that we
exercise at least twice a week, but also desire t o exercise at least twice a week.
Furthermore, some attitude verbs can also take words for objects as their
complements. For example, we can not only fear that there are monsters hiding in the
closet, but also fear the monsters hiding in our closets. It seems that in each of  these
cases we are ascribing a content to an attitude, and it is at least not obvious that such
content can or must be reducible to propositional content. Given that it is plausible
that we should give a unifed treatment for all content-attributions though, this raises
the question whether the Sellarsian account could apply to these cases as well.
A fnal direction for future research that arises out of  the discussion of  the
second question brings us back to the Frege-Geach Problem. I suggested that we
should align expressivism with the tradition of  conceptual role semantics. This
suggestion, however, raises the question whether embedding expressivism within this
tradition might not open up novel ways for expressivists to address the Frege-Geach
Problem. If  this was the case, this would provide us with one more motivation to
consider neglected problems for expressivism, as doing so might actually enhance our
ability to assess expressivism’s prospects when it comes to addressing the Frege-Geach
Problem. Furthermore, this would actually be a novel way of  approaching the Frege-
Geach Problem, and, therefore, interesting in its own right.
One last thing that needs to be highlighted at the end of  this dissertation is that
while I was aiming to move beyond the Frege-Geach Problem toward more neglected
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problems, both of  the problems I discussed in this dissertation had some signifcant
relation to that problem. Hence, while I think that the dissertation makes a good case
for the claim that expressivists have attractive answers to the challenges discussed in
this dissertation, a n d that it is worthwhile to pay more attention to neglected
challenges, as we will learn novel and surprising ways to think about expressivism, the
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